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FOREWORD
This book is the product of a U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Integrated Research Project (IRP). It
addresses a Chief of Staff, Army priority research topic
and was sponsored by the U.S. Army Pacific and the
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Directorate
of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (HQDA G-35). The book
resulted from a whole-of-War College effort. Core
curriculum and regional elective studies augmented
student research and facilitated analysis. Faculty
from across the USAWC supported analytical discussions, mentored student participants, and reviewed
the written contributions. Students and faculty met
with Asia-Pacific policy experts in the U.S. Government from the Department of State, the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, and the National Security
Council. Researchers also traveled to the Asia-Pacific
to meet with senior military leaders and security analysts in Japan and China, as well as the major U.S.
military commands in Hawaii, to explore issues and
develop recommendations on regional issues. Students, along with leading think tank subject matter
experts from the Washington, DC, area, presented
selected topics from this book at a round-table organized in conjunction with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
In 2011, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton provided a framework for the U.S. Government
to refocus the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—toward
the Asia-Pacific. She explained the importance of
Asia-Pacific regional growth to the United States
in the short-lived “pivot,” and in 2012 former President Barack Obama formalized the U.S. Government
effort with a commitment to “rebalance,” which
included negotiating a multilateral trade agreement,
ix

the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 other
nations, committing a larger portion of U.S. military
forces to the region, and improving security agreements with allies and partners. However, President
Donald Trump, shortly after taking office in January
2017, withdrew the United States from the TPP, and in
March, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs publicly declared the
rebalance was over.
This book explores the validity of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific; analyzes the ends, ways, and
means of the strategy to meet U.S. and regional partner security objectives; and considers the effectiveness
of the U.S. Government effort. This book focuses on
the impact of China’s increasing national power on
U.S. objectives and those of Asia-Pacific nations. The
instruments of national power are assessed to include
hard power, economic, military, and diplomatic, along
with providing recommendations for the United
States’ use of soft power. In addition to China, country
specific chapters include an analysis and security recommendations concerning issues related to North and
South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Analysis and
recommendations in this book may provide insights
for Trump’s NSS and subsequent security documents
and will inform security professionals across the U.S.
Government, outside of government, and foreign
governments as they modify their approaches to this
critical region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The pivot to Asia is over, suggested Susan Thornton, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, on the eve of Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson’s first visit to Asia on March 14,
2017.1 This statement, though expected, begs many
questions: Is this just a repeal of the bumper sticker
“Strategic Rebalance,” typical of administration
change? If so, what is its replacement? Moreover, if
this change is just in name but not in substance, will
President Donald Trump stay the course? If not, what
will be Trump’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific? What
should be the new focus and priorities? In short, given
the enduring U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, what
should be a sound and forward-looking U.S. strategy
toward this region?
This research project began with two questions
on the future of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: Was it the right thing to do, and have we done
it right? Given the enormous expected growth in the
region and thus the expected impacts in the world,
the answer to the first question is a resounding yes.
The answer to the second question is less clear. On
the one hand, there have been several successes, not
the least of which was the public pronouncement of
the Obama administration’s directive to pivot attention to the region and increase significant travel and
engagement in the region by former President Obama
and his senior officials. On the other hand, there have
been limited effects in world affairs and murky plans
for future U.S. endeavors in the region, complicated
by growing financial and political challenges inside
the United States. Perhaps the best answer to the
second question is that there was a great start with

xiii

an unclear follow-up. With the Trump administration
now guiding U.S. foreign policy, it is time to move forward from the rebalance to a revitalized strategy and
approach to the Asia-Pacific for the third decade of the
21st century.
The challenge now for the U.S. administration,
and for policy experts writ large, is to build an effective strategy for whole-of-U.S. Government action in
moving forward from the rebalance. In order to offer
useful recommendations on the development of an
effective U.S. strategy to address those challenges in
the region, it is useful to establish an overarching concept with which to describe the wide-ranging strategic
recommendations of the researchers in this project. To
that end, we posit:
• Strategic Goal: Ensure American leadership,
security, and prosperity.
• Strategic Task: Accommodate China’s rise
through competition without conflict.
• Strategic Vision: Economy by priority; enabled
by military power; tempered by diplomacy.
The strategic goal has long been a foundation of
American national policy. While it focuses on U.S.
interests first, this does not mean to the exclusion of all
others. American leadership will promote democratic
values and preserve the successful international order.
Partner nations want U.S. leadership in the region as a
counter to China’s rising power.
Long-range success in the Asia-Pacific region will
only come from effective international cooperation.
This cooperation must include China. In keeping with
the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, we confirm the
U.S. position to “welcome the rise of a stable, peaceful,
and prosperous China.”2 To that end, the overarching
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strategic task for the United States is how to accommodate China’s rise. America must not constrain the
responsible rise of China in the region and globally,
but at the same time should provide a check on Chinese power by protecting U.S. and partner national
interests. This check will come through the effective
use of a rules-based international order, but ultimately
it will be empowered by a position of U.S. strength
across the elements of national power.
Strategic change must have a vision to paint the
picture of success but also to motivate and guide the
efforts to achieve that success. The vision statement is
intended to highlight the three strategic instruments
the United States must use to lead in the region. The
highest priority of effort must be economic, therefore
the detailed American strategy for the region will need
to chart a course for the future centered on economic
cooperation and growth. Despite the primacy of economic considerations, the stark reality of the region
is one of significant security concerns. Therefore, the
strategy by necessity will require a strong, comprehensive plan for ensuring regional security through
a revamped regional security architecture and military agreements and the interactions of capable, well
trained, and professional armed forces to keep the
peace. Finally, robust diplomatic efforts will enable the
United States to resolve the many regional challenges
without resorting to economic or armed conflict. This
strategic concept frames the detailed recommendations of the project’s researchers.
The subsequent chapters in this book, written by
student researchers during their year at the U.S. Army
War College, provide information and recommendations on topics regarding the instruments of national
power, regional affairs, and key Asia-Pacific countries.

xv

The key findings of this project can be distilled into
four primary recommendations for the United States:
• Create a comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy to
guide whole-of-U.S. Government action plans.
• Improve U.S. national power across the instruments of national power to ensure the resources
and capability exist to achieve the strategic
goals.
• Create a “post-Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP)
trade initiative as the cornerstone of the economic element of strategy.
• Create and lead a new Asia-Pacific regional
security architecture that includes China; and
modernize current alliances and partnerships.
ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Ankit Panda, “Straight From the US State Department: The ‘Pivot’ to Asia Is Over,” The Diplomat, March
14, 2017, available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/
straight-from-the-us-state-department-the-pivot-to-asia-is-over/.
2. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC:
The White House, February 2015, p. 24.
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PART I:
INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 1
FORWARD FROM THE REBALANCE:
COMPETING IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
David Lai, John F. Troxell, and Frederick J. Gellert
The pivot to Asia is over, suggested Susan Thornton, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, on the eve of Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson’s first visit to Asia on March 14,
2017.1 This statement, though expected, begs many
questions: Is this just a repeal of the bumper sticker
“Strategic Rebalance,” typical of administration
change? If so, what is its replacement? Moreover, if
this change is just in name but not in substance, will
President Donald Trump stay the course? If not, what
will be Trump’s policy toward the Asia-Pacific? What
should be the new focus and priorities? In short, given
the enduring U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, what
should be a sound and forward-looking U.S. strategy
toward this region?
STRATEGIC REBALANCE: THE RIGHT THING
TO DO
The most significant foreign policy undertaking of
the Obama administration was the strategic rebalance
toward the Asia-Pacific. Although it came as a surprise to many at a time when the nation was exhausted
from the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and getting
hard-hit by the 2008 global financial crisis, the strategic
rebalance, officially announced in 2011, was the right
thing for the United States to do.
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The rise of China is the most significant event in the
world in the last 20 years and probably for many years
to come. According to former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton:
The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global
politics. . . . It boasts almost half the world’s population. It
includes many of the key engines of the global economy,
as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is
home to several of our key allies and important emerging
powers like China, India, and Indonesia. . . . One of the
most important tasks of American statecraft over the
next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially
increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic,
and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.2

The United States needed to focus more attention
on this historic development and increasingly critical region. After all, the rise of China is not simply a
change of national power distribution, but a phenomenon that influences the future of international relations.
Concerning this necessary policy shift, Kurt Campbell,
former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, recalls:
The central tenet of this bold policy shift is that the United
States will need to do more with and in the Asia-Pacific to
spur domestic revival and renovation as well as to keep
the peace in the world’s most dynamic region. If the larger
Middle East can be described as the ‘arc of instability,’
then the region stretching from Japan through China and
Southeast Asia to India can be seen as representing an
‘arc of ascendance,’ Asia’s march on the future. American
policy must heed this unrelenting feature of the future:
that the lion’s share of the history of the twenty-first
century will be written in the Asia-Pacific region.3

It is former President Barack Obama who put the
most significant touch on this huge undertaking:
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U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably
linked to developments in the arc extending from the
Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region
and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges
and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military
will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of
necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region [italics in
original].4

STRATEGIC REBALANCE: NOT QUITE DONE
RIGHT
Doing the right thing does not guarantee getting it
done right. In retrospect, many of the Obama administration’s approaches did not lead to the desired result.
The United States wants to see China rise peacefully
and become a responsible stakeholder; however, the
rebalance to a large extent has driven China in the
opposite direction. According to recent testimony from
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, “a rising, more confident, and assertive China, places the international
order under assault.”5
Questionable Strategic Assumptions
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted several Department of Defense
(DoD)-commissioned studies on the strategic rebalance. All of them categorically pointed out that the
strategic rebalance lacks “a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the Asia-Pacific region, particularly
when it comes to managing China’s rise.”6
Several questionable assumptions underlying U.S.
policy toward the Asia-Pacific contributed to the lack
of a coherent strategy. First, the rebalance builds upon
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an unwritten, yet long-held, U.S. foreign policy principle, put best by Kurt Campbell:
a consistent feature of American Asia strategy has been to
use diplomatic, economic, and military means to prevent
the emergence of a dominating hegemon in Asia, thereby
making the region safe for American pursuits like trade
promotion, faith advocacy, democracy support, and
territorial security.7

China’s relentless rise, however, calls this principle into
question. If the United States welcomes (or at least recognizes) the rise of China,8 then it will need to accept
this changing geostrategic reality and prepare to deal
with an Asian hegemon. The nuance becomes reconciling acceptable degrees and understanding of “dominating regional hegemon.” The focus should now
be on preventing the emergence of a hostile regional
hegemon.
Second, key architects of the rebalance, and many
in the United States, opine that China is a threat. For
example, General Mark Milley, U.S. Army Chief of
Staff, in recent Congressional testimony identified
China as a threat within the 4+1 threat construct.9
However, China should not be viewed as a threat to
the United States in the same vein as radical Islamic
terrorists or even Russia. A heightened threat perception leads to over-militarizing the relationship with
the tendency to generate spiraling security dilemmas
and fulfilling Thucydides’s Trap prophecies. Given
the extensive economic interdependencies developed
between these two powers, the United States should
continue to deal with China mostly in diplomatic, economic, and sociocultural terms.
Finally, the designers of the strategic rebalance
appeared to have argued against the centrality of China.

6

In Kurt Campbell’s words, “China is the big story, no
doubt. But for us to be successful, we’re going to have to
work with others more effectively. We’ve got to embed
our China policy in a larger Asia strategy.”10 With this
view came the repeated talking point: “It is not about
China.” Many in the Asia-Pacific understand that the
rebalance is mainly, if not only, about China. After all,
which other nation in the Asia-Pacific deserves such
attention and effort from the superpower? The Obama
administration’s refusal to address the “elephant in
the room” publicly as the main challenge resulted in
a strategy that was not focused on the central issue of
the rise of China.
Be that as it may, the rebalance, as Kurt Campbell
puts it:
would require bolstering alliances with states like
Australia and Japan, working with new partners like India
and Vietnam, strengthening our military and economic
tools of statecraft, engaging multilateral institutions, and
maintaining our democratic values, all while intensively
engaging Beijing and seeking to shape the contours of
China’s rise.11

Despite the inherent soundness of each of these
approaches, the problem is that when the United
States does not focus its policy on China; no matter
how much the United States has tried to shore up support from the other Asian nations; it is not enough to
get China to behave in accordance with the existing
rules-based international order. As a result, while it is
good to strengthen relations with the allies and recruit
more partners in the Asia-Pacific, the Obama administration’s effort was not effective.
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REVISITING THE POWER TRANSITION
THEORY
Many in the United States are now aware of the
Thucydides Trap and the danger of power transition
between great powers. The Thucydides Trap is based
on the ancient Greek historian’s (Thucydides) account
of the Peloponnesian War, in which he argues the inevitability of that war because of Sparta’s fear of a rising
Athens. The potential for conflict between the United
States and China reflects a similar dynamic within the
international system. Kenneth Organski, who first put
forward the power transition theory, notes that accommodation is an alternative to the deadly Thucydides
Trap. Indeed, in a power transition, the contending
great powers, namely the extant stakeholders and the
upstart, have basically two options: fight or accommodate. Organski suggests that if the rising power is
unstoppable, accommodation should be the prudent
policy.12
Figure 1-1 puts the power transition theory between
the United States and China in perspective. Power
transition between China and the United States has
already passed the first stage where China has gone
through the initial taking-off period. The transition is
now in the initial part of the second stage where China
continues to narrow its national power inferiority gap
to that of the United States.13

8

Great-Power-War-Free-Zone

War-Prone-Zone

Great-Power-War-Free-Zone

Figure 1-1. U.S.-China Power Transition.14
At this time, fear is no longer the defining factor.
How the United States and China come to terms with
the emerging realities in the two nations’ relations is
much more significant.
We can observe some typical behaviors at this stage
of the power transition. The status quo leader is becoming more concerned as the rising power approaches
parity with it in the two nations’ national power capabilities. There is the temptation and danger of the
status quo power launching a preventative attack to
short-circuit the rising power. The rising power, on the
other hand, emboldened by its growing power, can
challenge the status quo power. Becoming more assertive is the typical recourse of the upstart.
In many respects, the relationship between the two
in power transition is similar to a parent and teenager.
The teenager has become a more independent actor
and expects greater responsibility and control; yet the
parent may not realize in time the changes and continues to demand acceptance of previous constraints and
9

limitations. Holding firm to the rules and demanding
obedience are typical on the parent side. The United
States has been demanding that China behave in the
rules-based order and become a responsible stakeholder. China, on the other hand, challenges U.S. rules
and presses for changes.15 The U.S. strategic rebalance
is a typical act at this stage of the power transition. China’s responses also fit many of the descriptions.16
There is widespread debate in the United States
between the hawks and doves over what the United
States should do about China. The hawks argue that
the United States should stand firm and punish China
for every wrongdoing, while the doves suggest accommodation should come into play in the U.S. policy
toward China. Accommodation is by no means easy
for the United States, especially at a time when it still
enjoys a substantial upper hand in hard power. Yet it
is not too early to prepare for it. Accommodation does
not imply appeasement. In the case of China, such an
approach would recognize a greater leadership role in
international institutions and accept various Chinese
initiatives, such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment
Bank, but also insist that China adheres to reasonable
boundaries as represented by the existing rules-based
international order.
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
On January 20, 2017, Donald J. Trump was sworn in
as the 45th President of the United States. Determined
to fix America’s perceived domestic and international
troubles, the new President put forward his policies:
For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the
expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of
other countries, while allowing for the very sad depletion
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of our military. We’ve defended other nations’ borders
while refusing to defend our own.
We assembled here today issuing a new decree to be
heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every
hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will
govern our land. From this moment on, it’s going to be
America first.17

Domestic issues aside, the President’s call signaled
a return to the realism of Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson and the populist nationalism of President Andrew Jackson, from the idealism of
President Woodrow Wilson that has been guiding U.S.
foreign policy for much of the last 100 years. Under
Trump, national interest—principally focused on the
security and economic well-being of the American
people—but not ideology will be the guiding principle
for U.S. foreign policy.
Many find the President’s call objectionable—
because those Americans believe the liberal international order led by the United States shaping
international institutions has significantly benefited
U.S. economic development, national security, and
international influence. Realists who focus on nationalism, such as Trump, argue that the United States
must pursue a foreign policy with a viewpoint that
anarchy is an enduring feature of the international
system, with no permanent friends or enemies, but
permanent interests; interactions tend to be conflictual because states compete for power and security.18
Some argue this realist foreign policy vision is what
the United States needs now. This is especially significant with respect to America’s relations with China
and the Asia-Pacific.
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AN ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGY BY DESIGN
This research project began with two questions
on the future of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: Was it the right thing to do, and have we done
it right? Given the enormous expected growth in the
region and thus the expected impacts in the world,
the answer to the first question is a resounding yes.
The answer to the second question is less clear. On
the one hand, there have been several successes, not
the least of which was the public pronouncement of
the Obama administration’s directive to pivot attention to the region and increase significant travel and
engagement in the region by former President Obama
and his senior officials. On the other hand, there have
been limited effects in world affairs and murky plans
for future U.S. endeavors in the region, complicated by
growing financial and political challenges inside the
United States. Perhaps the best answer to the second
question is that there was a great start with an unclear
follow-up. With the Trump administration now guiding U.S. foreign policy, it is time to move forward from
the rebalance to a revitalized strategy and approach to
the Asia-Pacific for the 3rd decade of the 21st century.
Despite Trump’s espoused “America First” priority, current reality for the Trump administration is dictating more, not less engagement for the United States
in the Asia-Pacific region. Of note, the first trips by
senior U.S. defense officials and diplomats in the new
administration were to China and Northeast Asia. The
first head of state visit received by Trump was from
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Whether deliberately, or by circumstance, the Trump administration
signaled the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific
region to the world. The challenge now for the U.S.
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administration, and for policy experts writ large, is to
build an effective strategy for whole-of-U.S. Government action in moving forward from the rebalance.
The Asia-Pacific region is fundamentally a set of
diverse, complex challenges. In order to offer useful
recommendations on the development of an effective
U.S. strategy to address those challenges in the region,
it is useful to establish an overarching concept with
which to describe the wide-ranging strategic recommendations of the researchers in this project. To that
end, we posit:
• Strategic Goal: Ensure American leadership,
security, and prosperity.
• Strategic Task: Accommodate China’s rise
through competition without conflict.
• Strategic Vision: Economy by priority, diplomacy by necessity, enabled by military.
The strategic goal is straightforward and has long
been a foundation of American national policy. While
it focuses on U.S. interests first, this does not mean to
the exclusion of all others. American leadership will
promote democratic values and preserve the successful international order. Partner nations want U.S.
leadership in the region as a counter to China’s rising
power. The United States is a Pacific nation with enormous power to do good works in the region. Longrange success in the Asia-Pacific region will only come
from effective international cooperation.
This cooperation must include China. In keeping
with the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy, we confirm the U.S. position to “[welcome] the rise of a stable,
peaceful, and prosperous China.”19 To that end, the
overarching strategic task for the United States is how
to accommodate China’s rise. America must allow
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China to rise in the region and globally, but at the same
time provide a check on Chinese power by protecting
U.S. and partner national interests. This check will
come through the effective use of a rules-based international order, but ultimately it will be empowered
by a position of U.S. strength across the elements of
national power. Whether China rises through peaceful
competition or through military and economic conflict
may be determined solely by the fair and effective use
of international rules.
Strategic change must have a vision to paint the picture of success and to motivate and guide the efforts to
achieve that success. The vision statement here highlights the three strategic instruments the United States
must use to lead in the region. The highest priority of
effort must be economic, and therefore the detailed
American strategy for the region will need to chart a
course for the future centered on economic cooperation and growth. Despite the primacy of economic
considerations for the region, the stark reality of the
region is one of significant security concerns. Therefore, the strategy by necessity will require a strong,
comprehensive plan for ensuring regional security
through a revamped regional security architecture and
military agreements and the interactions of capable,
well trained, and professional armed forces to keep the
peace. Finally, robust diplomatic efforts will enable the
United States to resolve the many regional challenges
without resorting to economic or armed conflict. This
strategic concept then frames the detailed recommendations of the project’s researchers.
The subsequent chapters in this book, written by
student researchers during their year at the U.S. Army
War College, provide information and recommendations on topics regarding the instruments of national
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power, regional affairs, and key Asia-Pacific countries.
A summary of those chapters is presented here and
can be distilled into four primary recommendations
for the United States:
• Create a comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy to
guide whole-of-U.S. Government action plans.
• Improve U.S. national power across the instruments of national power to ensure the resources
and capability exist to achieve the strategic
goals.
• Create a “post-Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP)
trade initiative as the cornerstone of the economic element of strategy.
• Create and lead a new Asia-Pacific regional
security architecture that includes China; and
modernize current alliances and partnerships.
Regional Overview
In Chapter 2, William Donnelly analyzes how the
United States can get it right with China. First among
U.S. strategic tasks is managing China’s rise by understanding China’s goals and intentions. A key will be
to address China’s concerns about containment. Thus,
U.S.-China communication and cooperation must be
robust and effective, including the difficult issue of
military-to-military engagements.
A key for the future of relations in the region will
be multilateral organizations. In Chapter 3, Eric Young
discusses the need for a U.S.-led multilateral security architecture (MLSA). America must lead in the
region while building multinational institutions. No
other nation in the region can do so now or in the foreseeable future. While some nations may look to the
United States as the ultimate protector in the region,
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the best long-term solution will be an effective multilateral security architecture of Asia-Pacific nations that
includes China. This must not become a counter-China
organization. Today, the largest and best-known multilateral organization in the Asia-Pacific is the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN).
ASEAN expanded its initial writ of focusing on
political and economic issues with the establishment
of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993 as the
“first region-wide Asia-Pacific multilateral forum for
official consultations on peace and security issues.”20
It has since added the annual ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), and regularly convenes the
East Asian Summit (EAS). All of these entities are
designed to address regional security challenges, but
growing tensions in the region require moving beyond
dialogue-based institutional arrangements to a MLSA
that can actually resolve regional security issues. The
MLSA must be able to respond quickly to military
provocations and include enforcement mechanisms.
The existing hub-and-spoke architecture for U.S.
mutual defense treaties has served well as a deterrent
for armed conflict. The challenge in the future will be to
maintain security in a complex region, with emerging
powers and gray zone actors, short of traditional war.
A multilateral organization will offer the best method
to address real challenges, manage competition, and
avoid conflict.
Besides managing China’s rise, the United States
will need to manage the positive growth of other rising
regional powers, notably India and Japan, as well as
work with other Asia-Pacific nations in navigating difficult challenges such as the ongoing disputes in the
South China Sea (SCS). Todd Carroll analyzes India in
Chapter 4. India will likely have the largest population
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in the world by 2028 and an economy larger than
the United States by 2050. This will require the U.S.
strategy to include detailed goals and increased
engagement with India in military, commercial, and
diplomatic areas. Neil Owens analyzes Japan in Chapter 5. Japan is the world’s third largest national economy and has embarked on a “strategic renaissance,”
seeking to assume a greater international leadership
role, improve its bilateral and multilateral relationships, and increase its defense deterrent capabilities.
These Japanese activities are strategically beneficial
for the United States and should be encouraged. The
Trump administration can assist Japan by encouraging
its policy, facilitating a more cooperative Japan-South
Korea relationship, deepening economic ties, reexamining the U.S.-Japan Base Realignment Plan, and
encouraging continued public discussion on Japan’s
future international role.
Regarding the SCS, in Chapter 6, Robert Arnold,
Jr., examines U.S.-China interactions in this volatile
sub-region. Reviewing the U.S. options to curtail U.S.
actions in the SCS, to cooperate with China in the SCS,
or to compel China to change its activities within the
SCS, his recommendation to cooperate with China is
the most productive method to secure U.S. interests in
the long term. Cooperation would focus on multilayered collaboration with China by building upon current U.S.-China military-to-military engagement and
would necessitate the employment of all of the instruments of U.S. national power.
The Philippines is a key player in the SCS and in
Chapter 7, Romeo Brawner, Jr., of the Philippine Army
analyzes the current ambivalence of the Philippine
leadership toward the United States and offers recommendations for U.S. interactions with Asia-Pacific
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nations from a unique third-country perspective.
Because of its central geographic location, cooperation
with the Philippines must remain a top priority for
U.S. strategy. A key will be to acknowledge Philippine
autonomy while meeting mutual needs in security,
diplomacy, and economic realms.
An area of increasing importance in military and
civilian domains is cyber. In Chapter 8, Steven Pierce
finds cyber activities, good and bad, have the potential
to enable or disrupt strategic goals, as what happens in
the cyber domain increasingly does not stay solely in the
cyber domain. Cyber cuts across diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments in ways that
we are only now beginning to understand. As nations
interact and compete, cyber is becoming the ubiquitous
medium through which all information flows. Without
protected, resilient, and sufficient cyber-based capabilities, all strategic-level interactions become more difficult to conduct and less trustworthy. Because of the
cyber domain’s increasing power and influence at the
national and international level, the U.S. strategy must
produce effective U.S.-China cooperation regarding
cyber activities. As a start, the United States and China
should improve ongoing cooperation by developing
actionable measures in the areas of commercial uses,
intellectual property protection, and counter cybercrime activities. This cooperation can then expand to
other nations in the region and globally.
The Economic Instrument of Power
In Chapter 9, Jeffrey Zaiser argues that the top
agenda item for U.S. economic strategy must be to
seek a second best option to replace the TPP. As the
former cornerstone to the U.S. economic strategy for
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the region, the TPP served as the instrument for U.S.
economic leadership. Since the announcement of U.S.
withdrawal from the agreement, the United States
lacks a specified economic strategy for its participation
in this critical economic region. The existing piecemeal
system of trade agreements among the Asia-Pacific
nations will not be sufficient to sustain and manage the
significant economic growth in the coming decades.
However, one key goal is to negotiate a free-trade
agreement with Japan, thus recouping some of the
effort put into the TPP negotiations. The United States
should also consider formally joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A key lesson from
the recent AIIB experience is that the United States
cannot prevent nations from joining non-U.S. initiatives, and should not be seen as obstructing Chinese
initiatives that meet legitimate needs and operate
transparently within accepted international standards.
The Military Instrument of Power
Chapter 10 addresses the comprehensive military
aspects of a future U.S. strategy. Ryan Finn and David
Moore consider the transregional, multi-domain, and
multifunctional (TMM) threats of today and make
several recommendations. The United States should
create a cohesive joint strategy for military forces in
the region to impose multiple strategic dilemmas for
China’s growing military power. This will include
maintaining the technological advantage, involving
partner nations, and developing responses to gray
zone activities.
Chinese military capabilities are a longer-term challenge for U.S. strategy. While China will take the path
of least resistance as it seeks increasing hegemony,
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China increasingly signals its willingness to showcase
its growing military might. The United States must be
open and direct with China to create a shared vision
for the region. This vision must ensure that China, and
the other 35 nations of the region, can only succeed by
remaining inside the rules-based international order.
The list of regional challenges and confrontations is
long and growing, especially those involving resources
such as in the SCS. Without strong encouragement and
enforcement to settle disputes peacefully, the United
States risks military involvement in conflicts not of its
choosing. Thus, the United States, along with willing
partners, will need to respond effectively and aggressively to negative behaviors by China, other states, and
nonstate actors on American terms. There is a growing need to develop and conduct counter gray zone
activities in whatever form or location they occur. This
will require the United States to create a formal, written, and detailed whole-of-government strategy with
supporting plans that can meet the growing variety of
subtle and difficult challenges in the region.
The United States must seek frank dialogue with
Chinese military and civilian leaders to foster transparency on both sides and avoid conflict by minimizing misunderstanding and miscalculation. A key
component of frank dialogue will be effective engagements between Chinese and American military forces.
Expanding Sino-American military exchanges, as part
of the larger military engagement plans for the region,
should be a part of the future U.S. strategy. Though
constrained under the fiscal year (FY) 2000 National
Defense Authorization Act, there remains much the
two countries can do in furthering military exchanges.
These partnerships foster transparency, legitimacy,
expertise, partner capacity, and engage stakeholders.
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This will result in negotiations that are more constructive during peace and improved mutual responses
during crises.
Regarding U.S. military posture in the region, U.S.
military forces and capabilities, currently centered in
the Northeast Asia sub-region, should be redistributed
across the whole region. This will transform the Cold
War U.S. posture to current requirements in which
security threats are more dispersed, military capabilities cover greater ranges, and challenges involve more
nations than at any time in the past.
North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development is the key imminent security problem
for the United States in the region. In Chapters 11 and
12, Frazariel Castro and James Connor, respectively,
review the history and current situation on the Korean
Peninsula and offer their recommendations for U.S.
steps to combat a belligerent North Korea. Ensuring
viable U.S. and partner military options are available to
counter North Korean threats will continue to be essential. Castro argues that the international community
has not succeeded, and will not succeed, in influencing
Kim Jong Un to comply with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) to abandon completely,
verifiably, and irreversibly North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs. As a counter-proposal, he posits that regional peace will best be
achieved by the United States establishing diplomatic
relations with North Korea without the pre-condition
of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons program. The United States should then take nascent steps
to limit Kim Jong Un’s nuclear aims while maintaining
U.S. military superiority as a deterrent against North
Korean provocative actions.
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Connor argues that the United States must persuade China to take a tougher stance with its policies toward North Korea to influence the country to
comply with the UNSCRs regarding nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the United
States and South Korea should accelerate the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from a
U.S. lead to South Korean lead, and the international
community must do more to stop the illicit flow of foreign currency into North Korea. Both sets of options
generate significant counter arguments for further
study. The first option of the United States establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea will raise
concerns about the U.S. commitment to international
institutions such as the UN Security Council and its
resolutions, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, North Korea has a solid track record of violating
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Through several
multilateral diplomatic initiatives since the early 1990s,
the United States has provided security commitments
and economic incentives to North Korea with the U.S.
assurance to normalize diplomatic relations if North
Korea abandons nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
development activities. North Korea agreed to these
initiatives and then violated the agreements on every
occasion. The second option of pressuring China to
do more to influence North Korea to comply with the
UNSCRs also has been unsuccessful, and might generate second- and third-order effects that would harm
the China-North Korea relationship in ways that could
increase instability on the peninsula.
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Soft Power Considerations
An often under-appreciated power for U.S. influence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is through people-to-people exchanges for scientific research, policy analysis,
social and economic development, and education. Joel
Buenaflor looks at people-focused activities in Chapter 13 and finds that people-focused activities provide
tangible assurance of the benefits from a partnership
with the United States. The U.S. strategy for the region
should include methods and resources for a variety of
people-focused activities throughout the various U.S.
Government agencies. Commerce, agriculture, education, health, legal, energy, transportation, finance,
and even military expertise are all areas in which the
United States can exert enormous influence and build
long-term good will. Proposed deep-cuts to funding
for the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) programs should
be reversed. A robust program of education and development exchanges can provide significant results over
the long term for relatively low cost.
In Chapter 14, Sandra Minkel reviews the major
U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region as part of the rebalance and offers some lessons learned. The presence of
senior U.S. officials, including the President, at highlevel summits, dialogues, and forums has been very
helpful in advancing U.S. plans in the region. A key
diplomatic shortcoming was the long-delayed conclusion of the TPP agreement and the choice not to participate in the AIIB. The need to relay a consistent U.S.
policy for the region through the numerous security,
economic, and diplomatic forums will be critical to
moving forward from the rebalance strategy. Finally,
given the complex and long-range efforts that will be
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necessary in the region to achieve U.S. goals through a
whole-of-government approach, there will be a need
to maintain sufficient budgetary resources for Department of State and USAID activities.
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CHAPTER 2
CHINA’S RISE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN
FOR THE UNITED STATES?
William P. Donnelly

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
China clearly wants to restore its rightful place as a
world power. Its official statements confirm the desire
to become a strong, economically prosperous society
by 2049, and that it wishes to achieve this development
peacefully. China will take the path of least resistance
to achieve this and to protect its non-negotiable core
interests, which include maintaining the Communist
Party of China’s (CPC) power. China will work within
the rules-based international order when doing so furthers its aims. However, China will not accept being
contained and will challenge the United States and the
existing rules of the international order if it feels they
are threatening its core interests. Increasingly, China
questions the U.S.-led rules-based international order.
What are the rules? Are they fair? Should the rules be
modified and reformed? China’s views and actions
over South China Sea (SCS) issues and contests with
the United States in those troubled waters have clearly
borne this new Chinese character out. China clearly
perceives the U.S. rebalance as a containment strategy.
U.S.-China communication and cooperation must
continue, including military-to-military engagement
when allowable, but the United States should be open
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and direct with its concerns about China’s intentions.
The United States must recognize that although China
will pursue the path of least resistance, it will use
whatever means necessary to achieve its goals, and the
United States should be prepared to challenge China’s
statements and actions if they threaten U.S. or allied
interests. The United States should do this constructively and from a position of strength―while there
is still an opportunity to influence the relationship
positively.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, numerous studies
have attempted to decipher the strategic intentions of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Yet questions
about this issue continue to emerge. The United States
and its allies consistently express concerns about China’s uncertain future.
What does China want? What does the rise of China
mean for the United States and the world? Does the
PRC desire to surpass the United States and replace the
international order with one more favorable to China?
Will China pursue its goals peacefully as promised or
will it use force if necessary? What will it do if its goals
are challenged? Has the United States correctly read
China’s strategic intentions―and can America still
influence China and shape future U.S.-China relations?
In simple terms, China wants to return to what it
perceives to be its rightful, historic place as a world
power through growth, development, and modernization. China will take the path of least resistance
to achieve this objective and to protect its core interests. In a 2011 National White Paper, titled “China’s
Peaceful Development,” China identified its core
interests as:
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state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity
and national reunification, China’s political system
established by the Constitution and overall social
stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable
economic and social development.1

The White Paper also expressed China’s respect for
other nations’ rights and interests, and China’s unwillingness to gain at the expense of another nation. However, China’s actions reveal that it will not accept being
contained and will challenge the United States and the
rules-based international order if it feels its path to
development is threatened.
Although U.S. intent is not to contain China
directly, the Chinese perception is that most of the U.S.
rebalance to the Asia-Pacific appears to be designed
to encircle China. U.S. policy toward China over the
past several decades has generally relied on a “principled position of strength.”2 However, because of China’s development, the nature of U.S.-China relations
has changed. The United States needs to adjust its
approach toward China as well. It is important that the
United States does this constructively and develops
a shared vision with China about the future of U.S.China relations―while the opportunity to influence
the relationship positively still exists.
OPPOSING VIEWS ON CHINA’S INTENTION
There are numerous schools of thought on China’s intentions, too many to examine in a study of this
scope. However, two prominent opposing views are of
particular significance. The first is the “Hundred-Year
Marathon” approach advocated by Michael Pillsbury,
a China observer with decades of experience in both
government and professional research organizations.3
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Pillsbury asserts that China’s growth, ambitions, and
intentions are based on a premeditated plan to surpass the United States and become the world’s leading superpower by 2049. He argues that this has been
China’s intent all along, begun in earnest with Communist leader Mao Zedong and rooted in centuries of
Chinese history. Deception is key to this strategy, and
China uses it today as it did in centuries past. Now
that the Soviet Union no longer poses a threat to China’s ascendancy as a world power, China is focused
on the United States and will use deception and whatever else is necessary to surpass it as the world’s only
superpower.
Pillsbury notes that the very use of the term “strong
nation dream” by President Xi in one of his first
speeches on the Chinese Dream is itself remarkable.
He argues that no Chinese leader has ever used this
type of language before and that it was a deliberate
choice, specifically linked to Chinese publications that
espouse China’s intent to replace the United States as
the world’s leading superpower.4 Pillsbury believes
that China will reshape the world order in its image,
to support its growth and expansion. He also suggests
that the United States does not realize that this is happening and is behind in responding to this threat.
China’s lack of transparency and recent aggressive
actions certainly lend support to Pillsbury’s argument.
However, an opposing view of China’s strategic intentions is articulated by Dr. David Lai, a professor and
China expert at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC)
in Carlisle, PA. Dr. Lai was born and raised in China
and possesses a deep understanding of Chinese culture and history. Lai agrees that China has ambitions to
become a world power, but disagrees with Pillsbury’s
primary thesis and argues that China’s perceived

32

aggressive expansion, including military activity,
is simply a natural outgrowth of its incredibly rapid
economic and increasing national power and capabilities. China is modernizing and growing at a rate that
even Chinese leaders are struggling to grasp, and it
must expand as a nation to meet the demands that this
growth has put on its economy, resources, and population. This expansion naturally causes concern for
China’s immediate neighbors in the region, the international community, and the United States. However,
Lai believes that China’s actions cannot be ignored,
and how the United States and the world respond to
China directly affects future Chinese strategic actions.5
Dr. Lai notes that within the context of both of these
viewpoints, there is a relevant axiom to consider―that a
nation’s strategic intentions depend on its capabilities.6
In the same way that Carl von Clausewitz described an
enemy’s power of resistance as a product of the means
at his disposal and the strength of his will, a nation’s
strategic intentions depend on its capabilities (means)
and will to employ them (will)―and therefore naturally increase as capabilities increase.7 This axiom can
be applied to China’s growth over the past 35 years.
When China began to modernize in the 1970s under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the nation was underdeveloped and economically weak. Deng’s modernization focused on four major areas: agriculture, industry,
technology, and the military, with a goal of overall economic and social development.8 Initially, the military
had to accept being a lower priority in this development plan since the Chinese economy did not yet have
the economic and technological engine to support it. It
naturally follows that less ambitious Chinese strategic
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intentions accompanied this lack of economic and military capability. China’s recent explosive growth has
changed this dynamic.
If Pillsbury is correct that China desires to replace
America as the world’s most powerful superpower
and will continue to use deception to carry out its strategy, then his thesis presents a worst-case scenario. Dr.
Lai’s premise is more optimistic. This book argues that
both Pillsbury and Lai are partially correct. First and
foremost, China’s goals are to be a world power led by
the CPC, maintain Chinese socialism, and ensure the
betterment of the Chinese people. This is factual and
openly stated by official Chinese documents and leaders. Next, China will achieve this by taking the path
of least resistance (with the least amount of strategic
risk), but will meet any resistance it encounters with
whatever means necessary to overcome it. China will
not accept being contained or encircled and will ensure
that the CPC maintains its status and legitimate control of the PRC. China’s statements and actions support this concept.
Does China harbor conscious intentions to replace
the United States forcibly as a superpower and rewrite
the international order in a manner favorable to China?
China does not need an entirely new world order
favoring its way of doing business. The level of effort
involved with replacing the rules-based international
order and the cost of the conflicts it might induce could
actually arrest China’s growth and impede its ability to
achieve its goals. China has benefitted greatly from its
inclusion in the existing world order established and
led by the United States. China will continue to work
within this order to achieve its goals when it is possible
to do so.
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However, China has demonstrated that when the
international order hinders or precludes the achievement of its goals, it will ignore, amend, or uproot portions of it to protect its core interests. China simply will
not be contained, and it considers its core interests to
be non-negotiable. The United States must recognize
this and be aware of the high potential for conflict and
misunderstanding that exists where U.S. and Chinese
interests overlap. Additionally, the United States must
continue to emphasize that it welcomes China’s peaceful and responsible rise, but not its rise at the expense
of others and the existing international order.9
Has the United States read China’s intentions
correctly within the context of the rebalance to the
Asia-Pacific? In some ways, it has. For example, U.S.
leaders and policymakers have been adamant about
communicating that the rebalance is not about containing China’s rise.10 The problem, however, is that China
does not perceive this to be true and clearly believes
the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific is an attempt at containment. Recent Chinese military-to-military engagements between the United States and China confirm
this.11 The United States has interests other than China
in the Asia-Pacific, but China is both a partner and a
competitor in the region, and both nations see each
other as such.
China is clearly the dominant regional power
and is becoming more influential. The United States
acknowledges this and should declare that its policies
in the Asia-Pacific do largely concern China and its
interests―some of which overlap with American interests. This can be done in a manner that allows for both
cooperation and more frank discussions about points
of friction, which will exist between an established and
an emerging world power.12 The new administration
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under President Donald Trump seems to be taking this
approach, and should continue to do so.
At the same time, the United States is right to
increase its military posture in the Asia-Pacific region,
specifically in the maritime domain.13 The United
States and its allies must approach China’s military
growth and modernization, and its militarization of
disputed territorial claims, with caution. China’s military outposts in the SCS, its improved anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) and maritime capabilities, and
its willingness to utilize the China Coast Guard and
People’s Liberation Army Navy in a coercive manner
are concerning. These developments present potential challenges to interests of the United States and its
allies in the region, including freedom of navigation,
sovereignty, and a stable international order. China
has repeatedly stated that it desires to pursue its core
interests peacefully. However, if China feels that its
interests are directly threatened and its use of measures short of conflict prove unsuccessful at protecting
those interests, it has the ability and the potential will
to use military force. The United States must maintain
a hedge against this capability in order to protect U.S.
interests, address threats to allies, and assist new partners in the region.
It is due to this growing capability that the United
States must engage more with China now, while the
balance of power is still in America’s favor and China
is willing to communicate. Can the United States still
influence its relationship with China and persuade
China to change? Recent engagements, though not
without disagreements and some misunderstanding,
suggest that the answer is yes. What remains to be
seen is how the relationship between the two nations
will develop and mature under Trump’s administration. Although Trump has issued some tough rhetoric
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regarding China’s behavior, his recent assurance that
the United States will honor the “One China” policy
demonstrates a potential for continued dialogue and
engagement.14 The relationship is dynamic and will
continue to evolve, and will be tested if either nation
openly challenges one of the others’ core interests.
A recent positive development is the increased
trade, military-to-military interaction, and memoranda of agreement between the United States and
China. The two nations have demonstrated that there
is still an opportunity for communication, cooperation,
and resolution of disagreements. Military-to-military
engagement is key to fostering this type of relationship.
Regular interactions, even small ones, have proven to
be fruitful and will be important going forward.15 The
United States should pursue more of these, as well as
larger scale engagements such as the Rim of the Pacific
exercise and fora involving senior defense officials.
U.S.-CHINA “ELBOW-RUBBING”
The relationship between the United States and
China seems to have evolved into a series of back-andforth actions and reactions. China takes actions to protect its interests, the United States objects and/or reacts,
and China feels additional pressure to do even more to
protect itself. Chinese officials have difficulty understanding why the United States and others cannot or
will not respect China’s claims or the actions taken to
grow and to protect itself.16 At times, it resembles the
classic power transition struggle between an emerging and entrenched world power as described by Lai.17
This dynamic was demonstrated by China’s responses
to recent U.S. rhetoric condemning China’s militarization of territories in the SCS, the potential assignment
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of a U.S. Marine security detachment in Taiwan, and
increased U.S. naval operations in the SCS―these U.S.
actions elicited quick reaction from China.18
This is dangerous, but the onus is on China to
slow down or stop this cycle. There is concern about
provoking China, yet it is China that is expanding,
coercing other nations, and disregarding international
norms. Nobody wants a miscalculation or unnecessary
escalation, and all nations should strive to avoid both.
However, if China desires that the international community respect its interests―and wishes to honor its
own words regarding peaceful development, respect
for other nations rights, and rejecting expansion or
hegemony―then it must demonstrate these intentions
with credible actions.
Recently, China announced that its annual defense
budget for 2017 will increase by only 7 percent―the
lowest in 10 years―though Chinese officials still consider its defense spending “enough to protect its ‘rights
and interests’ and prevent ‘outside forces’ from interfering in its territorial disputes.”19 While this reduced
level of defense spending may not be a deliberate effort
to slow down the action-reaction cycle, it does not
accelerate it, and is at least a step in the right direction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
China is a rising power that wants to take its rightful place as a world power with a thriving economy,
a strong military, and a prominent voice on the world
stage by 2049. China will take the path of least resistance to achieve this position and protect its core
interests while refusing to be contained or encircled.
China will continue to be a contributing member of the
rules-based international order, but will amend, add
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to, or ignore it as necessary to achieve its goals. This
has a direct impact on the United States and the international community, neither of which can ignore the
rapid growth or actions of the world’s most populous
nation.
The United States must be open about its intentions in the Asia-Pacific region regarding China and
directly address areas where the two nations’ interests
intersect, and especially where those interests conflict.
At the same time, the United States is right to increase
its military presence in the region as China grows and
modernizes its armed forces and expands its militarization of the region. This is necessary to ensure that the
United States postures itself to support both allies and
partners and maintain its interests in the Asia-Pacific.
Additionally, both nations must continue, and ideally increase, military-to-military engagements with
each other. These engagements offer opportunities for
cooperation and lessen the probability of miscalculation from both sides.
Finally, it remains to be seen if China’s strict adherence to one-party rule will be an inhibitor to its future
growth and role as a world power, or if internal pressure from the Chinese population will ultimately prove
too much to allow the CPC to rule as it chooses.
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CHAPTER 3
DEVELOPING A U.S.-LED MULTILATERAL
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Eric W. Young
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Asia-Pacific region is viewed as the most consequential for America’s security and prosperity. While
five bilateral defense treaties demonstrate U.S. resolve
for regional stability, the expanding Asia-Pacific security architecture, and increasing critical issues, demand
greater U.S. engagement and leadership.
While the U.S. defense treaties provide large-scale
conflict deterrence, shared responsibility for regional
security threats below large-scale conflict is necessary
and requires more than the dialogue-only solutions
that existing regional forums provide. To remain the
region’s security leader, the United States must adapt
to the evolving environment while capitalizing on
existing organizations and infrastructures.
Strategically, such adaptation must recognize, but
not succumb to, China’s influence and perspectives as
a rising regional power. As such, leading the development of a multilateral security architecture (MLSA)
that includes but expands beyond the current “huband-spoke” defense treaty alliance system will increase
regional capability and resolve to meet both long-term
and emerging security challenges.
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For strategic perspective, China has also indicated
interest in developing a “win-win” regional security
architecture of its own, providing itself opportunity to
supplant the United States as the leader for regional
security, especially if the United States decides to not
act beyond its existing defense alliance obligations.
This chapter provides four specific recommendations for establishing a framework that enables shared
responsibility for dealing with security threats below
the level of large-scale conflict:
• The United States should lead the development
of a MLSA that empowers existing regional
forums and organizations, strengthens existing defense treaties and alliances, and encourages the development of new linkages between
nations to advance regional stability and conflict prevention.
• Consider China as a potential partner in a
MLSA in order to advance trust among regional
participants while countering perceptions that
a MLSA purposely contains China’s rise; may
also lessen observations of a U.S.-China power
rivalry.
• Provide enforcement mechanisms not currently
available in existing regional security structures.
• Utilize all instruments of national power for
MLSA establishment and success―it is not a
military-alone solution or requirement.
INTRODUCTION
While the nations in the Asia-Pacific strive for economic development, they are nevertheless troubled by
unsettled territorial disputes and a wide range of other
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security issues. What should be the security mechanism to deal with these problems?
Since the end of World War II, the United States
has taken upon itself as a provider and custodian for
security in this region. The United States does this
through a hub-and-spoke alliance system. For a variety of reasons, this system is increasingly inadequate
for the growing security problems in the Asia-Pacific.
Meanwhile, China is also pushing for a region-wide
multilateral security architecture to replace the U.S.led system.
Should the United States continue to rely on the
existing alliance system to maintain order and resist
China’s moves? Should the United States cave in to
China’s pressure and let China create a new security
system in the Asia-Pacific? Between these two opposing positions, is there a middle-ground approach for
the United States to create a new security architecture
to address regional challenges? The answer is straightforward: the United States has no choice but to take up
the challenge to do so.
EXISTING U.S.-LED SECURITY ALLIANCE
SYSTEM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Centered around five bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, the Republic of the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and the Republic of Korea, the U.S.
security alliance system has contributed to regional
security and stability since the early 1950s. These
mutual defense treaties are commonly referred to as
a hub-and-spoke system: the United States is at the
center, and each bilateral treaty partner is a separate
“spoke.”1 Each evolved from U.S. efforts to counter the
spread of communism in Asia following World War
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II, when the United States was unable to develop a
“Pacific Ocean Pact” analogous to the North Atlantic
Treaty in Europe.2
In his book, Powerplay: The Origins of the American
Alliance System in Asia, Professor Victor Cha, former
Director for Asian Affairs in President George W.
Bush’s National Security Council, notes that these
exclusive and tightly-controlled bilateral hub-andspoke alliances created a “‘powerplay’ in U.S. grand
strategy,” allowing it “to exert considerable political,
military, and economic control over key countries in
East Asia.”3 However, those alliances essentially guaranteed regional security, and arguably prosperity, by
contributing to large-scale conflict deterrence during
the Cold War era. Today they remain central to preventing large-scale regional conflict while also demonstrating continuing U.S. security commitment with
each treaty partner.
OTHER ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY
CONFIGURATIONS
Twenty-seven years after the Cold War ended,
Asia-Pacific regional challenges remain and are potentially becoming more volatile. The evolving security
environment fosters insecurities that drive many countries to seek enhanced defense cooperation.4 Existing
defense alliances, partnership engagements, and security cooperation activities reassure allies and partners
while simultaneously aligning U.S. regional strategy,
resources, and capabilities. Further, regional security
organizations and mechanisms also influence the existing security architecture.
The largest regional organization, the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), promotes the
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active collaboration and mutual support of 10 member
states on issues including prosperity, economic development, regional peace and stability, agriculture, education, and industry.5 For their specific relations with
one another, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) signed in 1976, requires
signatories to settle differences or disputes peacefully,
and renounce the threat, or use, of force.6 Signatories
must also mutually respect the independence of other
states, their territorial integrity, and their national
identity, while recognizing each state’s right to exist
free from external interference.7
In 1987, ASEAN amended the TAC, inviting
non-Southeast Asia countries “to accede to the Treaty
in order to build confidence, promote peace and
security, and facilitate economic cooperation in the
region.”8 Participating non-Southeast Asian countries and organizations (including China, India, South
Korea, Russia, Australia, France, North Korea, and the
European Union) reflect global interest in the region’s
security and prosperity. The United States signed the
TAC in July 2009.9 However, the TAC does not include
enforcement provisions, which perhaps were not considered necessary in 1976 due to the significant U.S.
military presence as well as the region’s decentralized
nature.
In 1993, ASEAN established the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) as the “first region-wide Asia-Pacific
multilateral forum for official consultations on peace
and security issues.”10 The ARF’s objectives, identified
in the First ARF Chairman’s Statement in 1994, are:
1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on
political and security issues of common interest and
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concern; and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts
towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy
in the Asia-Pacific region.11

Today, ARF membership includes the United States
and 26 other regional and non-regional countries.12
However, the ARF remains solely a security dialogue
venue. For the United States, it is a “regional foreign
minister-level forum for promoting security” through
which the United States helps shape a regional rulesbased order.13
In 2006, ASEAN convened the inaugural ASEAN
Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM). Held annually,
the ADMM:
is the highest defence consultative and cooperative
mechanism in ASEAN . . . [aimed at promoting] mutual
trust and confidence through greater understanding of
defence and security challenges as well as enhancement
of transparency and openness.14

As another, albeit high-level, dialogue forum, the
ADMM’s objectives include:
[promoting] regional peace and stability through dialogue
and cooperation in defence and security; [giving] guidance
to existing senior defence and military officials; dialogue
and cooperation in the field of defence and security within
ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners;
[promoting] mutual trust and confidence through greater
understanding of defence and security challenges as
well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and
[contributing] to the establishment of an ASEAN Security
Community (ASC).15

As an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, the United States
participates in the annual ADMM-Plus, which, since
2010, is a “platform for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners to strengthen security and defence
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cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the
region.”16 The ADMM-Plus objectives include building
partner capacity among member countries to address
shared security challenges, promote mutual trust and
confidence, and enhance regional peace and stability
through cooperation in defense and security.17 Practical cooperation discussion areas, facilitated through
Experts’ Working Groups, include maritime security,
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, military medicine,
and cyber.18 As a practical matter, the ADMM-Plus
provides the United States a conduit to engage with
China, itself an ASEAN Dialogue Member, regarding
security issues and concerns. Overall, ASEAN and its
attendant sub-organizations are part of an inter-connected “web” of Asia-Pacific organizations (economic,
diplomatic, and military) that bind regional and
non-regional countries.
Notably, ASEAN’s aims and purposes include promoting “regional peace and stability through abiding
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to
the principles of the United Nations Charter.”19 As
an active ASEAN Dialogue Partner (which includes
an ambassadorship to ASEAN), the United States has
a central role in “the evolving rules-based regional
architecture that promotes regional peace, stability
and prosperity.”20 The U.S.-ASEAN security dialogues
focus on the U.S. role in “maintaining peace, security,
and stability in the region through its participation in
different ASEAN-led regional mechanisms such as the
[ARF], the . . . ADMM-Plus, and the East Asia Summit
(EAS).”21
For the United States, the EAS provides significant
opportunity for strategic influence. At the conclusion
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of the first EAS meeting in 2005, the participating states
agreed that the EAS “would continue to be a leaders’-led Summit for strategic discussions on key issues
affecting the region and the evolving regional architecture.”22 Held annually, EAS strategic dialogues gained
more prominence in recent years due to former U.S.
President Barack Obama personally attending. While
it originated with “a vision of community building,”
U.S. participation in the EAS, along with increasing
strategic tensions, raised it to a “confidence building
and conflict prevention mechanism” for addressing
all regional security challenges, including threats arising from North Korea.23 While it remains a dialogue
opportunity, participating in the EAS advances U.S.
leadership for regional security, influence, and conflict
prevention.
An additional security and conflict prevention
mechanism involves country-to-country dialogues on
specific topics, such as the Six-Party Talks on ending
North Korea’s nuclear proliferation.24 Although stagnant since 2009, the Six-Party Talks demonstrate multinational efforts to address and prevent regional
conflict. Bilateral mechanisms also exist―most recently
demonstrated in the 2017 Japan-Russia “two plus
two” discussions between their respective foreign and
defense ministers that were specially focused toward
resolving long-standing disputes and urging North
Korean restraint.25
Conflict prevention is defined as a:
peace operation employing complementary diplomatic,
civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor
and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action
to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of
hostilities.26
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U.S. conflict prevention activities include reassuring
allies and partners, conducting military and non-military engagements, supporting humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief efforts, supporting ASEAN initiatives, undertaking confidence building measures, and
reiterating international norms and law. Such activities involve various diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power that
best enable regional stability and security.
Discussing conflict prevention’s increasing role in
the Asia-Pacific region, Dr. Frank Hoffman posits that:
Declines in the preponderance of U.S. power in the Asia–
Pacific theater have reduced conventional deterrence, and
China’s military expansion could accelerate instability.
The United States is challenged to demonstrate that it
retains the ability to conduct military operations in the
Asia–Pacific region and fulfill its treaty obligations to
its allies. This requires a military capacity—one that is
growing increasingly suspect—to achieve two critical
U.S. objectives: maintaining freedom of the commons
(air, sea, space, and cyberspace) and limiting the potential
for large-scale regional conflict through deterrence.27

Conflict prevention activities advance a key U.S.
interest: supporting the rise of a peaceful China that
adheres to international norms and law. For example,
confidence building measures essentially lower the
likelihood that conflict may occur between potential rivals by building interoperability and trust. U.S.
military engagements with China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) allow limited military-to-military confidence building discussions and exercises
that contribute to decreasing mistrust while enabling
regional stability and strategic interoperability.28 Such
an exercise is the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Rim of the Pacific
(RIMPAC), held every 2 years, that includes China’s
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Peoples’ Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) participation.29 Confidence building efforts facilitate conflict
prevention by enabling allies and partners to align
their security efforts to deter, or counter, future threats.
For all of their benefits, ASEAN (including its
ADMM+ and ARF), the EAS, the Six-Party Talks,
other regional security engagements, and bilateral and
multilateral military-to-military security exchanges
are limited in their ability to resolve regional security issues among participating nations. As the complex and uncertain security environment continually
evolves, Asia-Pacific regional security requires more
than dialogue, highly structured confidence building
security engagements, or over-dependence on U.S.
military presence. Further, the new U.S. administration, as discussed during Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s first trip to the region in March 2017, is distancing
itself from previous dialogue efforts, most notably the
Six-Party Talks.30 In addition, whether the new U.S.
President will personally participate in the ARF as his
predecessor did also remains to be seen.
Based on existing security structures and the evolving U.S. foreign policy approach to the region, a gap
exists for the United States between meeting bilateral mutual defense treaty provisions and enforcing
decisions resulting from various multilateral regional
forum discussions. Therein lies the weakness of the
current system. As the 21st century unfolds, Asia-Pacific nations, including the United States, must be confident that threats to regional stability will be met with
a clear, unified, region-wide resolve and response. It is
within this gap between dialogue entities and mutual
defense alliances that a U.S.-led MLSA takes shape.
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CHINA’S PERSPECTIVES ON ASIA-PACIFIC
SECURITY
While the:
prevailing [U.S.]-led power structure has contributed
to subdued levels of interstate conflict and war . . . that
system and its attendant security are being challenged
by major powers, abetted by a reduced [United States’]
presence in key regions.31

In the Asia-Pacific, China’s significant economic growth
and rapid military modernization directly alter the balance of power, highlighting China’s leadership against
long-standing U.S. influence.32 In this regard, the existing U.S. alliance system presents a significant concern
for China: how to overcome this ostensibly Cold War
relic while leading in the Asia-Pacific region. From the
Chinese perspective, the U.S. “alliance system in the
region surrounding China is a reality that will last for
some time . . . [and an] important issue in China’s rise
is how Beijing will coexist effectively with U.S. alliances.”33 Recognizing that the:
American centered alliance system in the Asia-Pacific
region. . . . has critically influenced that region’s security
order [since World War II and] the recent implementation
of the United States’ ‘rebalancing strategy’ toward Asia
and the strengthening American dominance over regional
affairs has been interpreted by Beijing as a U.S. effort to
enhance its alliance system in this part of the world and to
strengthen its security partnerships with some countries
in the region.34

While the United States consistently states that it welcomes a rising China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in international affairs,35
assessing the Chinese view of the current U.S. security
architecture and Pacific focus is essential.
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Professor Zhou Fangyin, of the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies in China, articulates two
schools of thought regarding China’s views toward the
U.S. alliance system. On one hand, the U.S. commitment to maintaining this system supports a “Chinese
posture of ‘peaceful development,’ . . . which embodies
a ‘low profile’ and generally nonconfrontational posture towards the United States and its alliance system
in Asia.”36 Professor Zhou notes that:
America’s underwriting of this network meets some
important security and political requirements of various
U.S. allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
Mitigating allied anxiety by the United States extending
deterrence guarantees has traditionally contributed to
regional stability by, for example, ‘capping the bottle’ of
Japanese militarism or maintaining a conflict threshold
on the Korean Peninsula. This has been especially true
in the absence of an effective or efficient macrosecurity
architecture to solve the security problems faced by East
Asian countries. In this context, those in China who have
acknowledged this situation have concluded that the U.S.
alliance system in Asia has played a fundamental role
in regional security, even though its indefinite survival
might not be welcomed as the preferred outcome by most
Chinese policymakers.37

Challenging the “peaceful development” school
of thought is the view that the U.S. alliance system is
a “security impediment” rather than facilitator.38 In
December 2016, the United States Pacific Command
(USPACOM) commander reiterated the U.S. position
that “[in] Asia, there’s not that compelling, single,
focused enemy.”39 Those in China believing that the
U.S. alliance system is a security impediment do not
hold the same view. Rather, they view the formerly
named Rebalance, and resulting emphasis on the
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existing alliance system, as a direct response to China’s
rapid rise. It is:
the obvious catalyst behind Washington’s decision to
reinforce its strategic influence and presence in the AsiaPacific region . . . [and the] U.S. pivot strategy, according
to this faction, is nothing less than a U.S. effort to contain
[China].40

While the United States openly supports China
becoming an increasingly capable and active partner
in addressing regional and global challenges, the Chinese view the U.S. legacy alliance system as increasingly resembling an “offensive realist strategy directed
against China that impedes the realization of a great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”41 An interesting
opinion-perspective is that China has never conceived
of a foreign nation “as more than a tributary to it,”
and China’s current rise arguably appears to retain
this hubris.42 Reinforcing this perspective is Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s proclamation that “it is for the
people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia”―with
an ascending China as the leader.43 As Professor Zhou
notes, coexisting with the U.S. alliance system while
China’s “own strength and influence are rising” is a
significant challenge.44
In June 2016, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister
Kong Xuanyou noted, “when compared with economic cooperation, the security architecture construction in East Asia lags behind.”45 As such, he further
identified that constructing “a security architecture
that complies with the regional reality and meets the
needs of all sides is a major strategic task for regional
states.”46 Such comments reinforce Xi’s proposal for a
Chinese-led counter to the U.S. alliance system. At the
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2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi stated:
One cannot live in the 21st century with the outdated
thinking from the age of Cold War and zero-sum game.
We believe that it is necessary to advocate common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in
Asia. We need to innovate our security concept, establish
a new regional security cooperation architecture, and
jointly build a road for security of Asia that is shared by
and win-win to all.47

Xi’s vision is already taking shape, at least in public
Chinese government rhetoric. At the 2016 Xiangshan
Forum in Beijing, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu
Zhenmin identified five existing security mechanisms
in the Asia-Pacific:
• The United States-led alliance system and relevant bilateral and multilateral arrangements;
• The ASEAN-centered security dialogue and
cooperation frameworks such as the ARF and
ADMM+;
• Special mechanisms on hotspot issues such
as the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsular
Nuclear Issue and the Quartet on Afghanistan;
• Regional security cooperation mechanisms
including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
(CICA); and,
• Track 1.5 or Track 2 security dialogues such as
the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Xiangshan Forum,
and the Asia-Pacific Roundtable.48
Rather than identifying how any, or all, of these existing structures might best enhance 21st century security, Vice Minister Liu instead noted that they “reflect
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underlying disconnects in our region: problems left by
the cold war, lack of coordination among sub-regions,
and differences on security concepts.”49 Therefore, in
order to best deal with existing, and emerging, regional
security challenges, China’s view is that a new, Chinese-led security architecture is necessary.
China’s proposed architecture is based on its concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and
sustainable security, advocating “consultation and dialogue, openness, inclusiveness, and win-win cooperation.”50 Essentially, China desires replacing the U.S.-led
alliance system with a China-led and promoted “partnership” community, perhaps mirroring the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization.51 Within this community,
Xi advocates employing the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) as the baseline for interaction among Asia-Pacific nations.52 Further, Xi notes that “China stays committed to seeking
[the] peaceful settlement of disputes with other countries over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights
and interests.”53
Although advocating a “win-win” security environment, China’s actions in the disputed East Sea and
South China Sea areas demonstrate otherwise. While
China’s rise and corresponding increase in national
strength arguably shifted the world’s economic center
of gravity to the Asia-Pacific, “[it] is not surprising,
then, that as China’s economic might has grown, so
has its ability and inclination to use national power
and influence to advance its geopolitical ends.”54 For
example, as a party to the United Nations Convention
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on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China specifically
reserved and declared that it:
will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of the
boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the States
with coasts opposite or adjacent to China respectively on
the basis of international law and in accordance with the
principle of equitability.55

While China’s domestic laws claim certain named (and
“other”) islands as belonging to China, other coastal
nations (including the Philippines, Japan, and Vietnam) also claim several of the same islands, creating
multiple disputes that should be resolved equitably on
the basis of international law, which the Philippines
attempted to do through its 2016 UNCLOS arbitration
case.56 However, China’s aggressive island building
in the South China Sea in the midst of these unsettled
maritime claims arguably indicates, and certainly so
perceived by the other regional states, that the principle of “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity” is not a reciprocal requirement where China’s interests are concerned.57
U.S. LEADERSHIP FOR 21ST CENTURY ASIAPACIFIC SECURITY
Charting the initial course for his administration,
President Donald Trump recently stated that U.S. “foreign policy calls for a direct, robust and meaningful
engagement with the world,” which involves “American leadership based on vital security interests that we
share with our allies all across the globe.”58 Further,
America is willing to find new friends, and to forge new
partnerships, where shared interests align. We want
harmony and stability, not war and conflict. We want
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peace, wherever peace can be found. America is friends
today with former enemies. Some of our closest allies,
decades ago, fought on the opposite side of these terrible,
terrible wars. This history should give us all faith in the
possibilities for a better world.59

This U.S. foreign policy vision preserves the open,
stable, and rules-based international order that has
underpinned Asia-Pacific peace, prosperity, and stability since World War II. Formalized ties throughout
and external to the region create a web of engagements
(diplomatic, economic, and military) that demonstrate
regional interests are more common, and combined,
than believed possible when the United States first
entered into its bilateral defense treaties.
As Asia-Pacific nations look to the United States for
security reassurance and rules-based stability, it is in
the U.S. national interest to share that responsibility
beyond the existing bilateral security alliance structure. Incorporating existing bilateral security alliances
(without terminating them) into an interconnected,
regional security architecture will reinforce Asia-Pacific security resilience, strengthen regional diplomatic
and economic endeavors, and enable shared conflict
prevention. Professor Cha identifies such a scenario
as a “‘complex patchwork’ of bilaterals [sic], trilaterals [sic], and other plurilateral configurations,” which
inevitably includes already-existing security mechanisms. Such an interconnected and dependent geometry between states results in “a useful tool for muting
regional security dilemmas” through shared responsibility and mutual security interests.60 For the United
States, developing and leading such a “complex patchwork” MLSA that builds on existing relationships
while strengthening bilateral security alliances, is a
feasible, acceptable, and suitable means for sustaining
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regional security. Reinforcing this approach is the
observation that “US-centered bilateralism and Asia’s
emerging regional institutions (both ASEAN-centered
and China-based . . .) [do not] operate at odds with one
another.”61 To retain this important dynamic, a U.S.led MLSA should recognize, and build on, the region’s
complex nature, economic inter-dependence, and
already-existing security mechanisms.62
While a U.S.-led MLSA could take many forms,
the chosen form cannot trump substance; as a precondition, it must work in concert with existing U.S.
defense treaties. The MLSA must define regional security requirements, establish responsibilities and relationships among participating states, and implement
national contribution procedures (such as funding,
personnel, equipment, and logistics). Basic, guiding
principles such as resolving disputes peacefully, uniting to counter emerging threats to regional security,
allowing countries to make their own security decisions free from intimidation, preserving the rules of
international law pertaining to air and sea navigation,
and acting in recognition of each country’s own constitutional processes, must be addressed and resolved.
Further, a MLSA must include implementation mechanisms (e.g., consultation among member nations, special discussion processes, support to existing regional
security mechanisms) and enforcement procedures
(when and how to act―including using force―beyond
dialogue exchanges) in order to be effective and viable
for conflict prevention.
While existing regional security dialogue venues
provide many of the baseline principles outlined
above, establishing when and how participating
nations actively align against emerging threats must
be developed. Fortunately, other non-Asia-Pacific
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organizations are instructive in this matter. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) is one such organization. While not a perfect
template, the OSCE demonstrates an architecture that
has evolved from the challenges of the Cold War to
addressing “the present era of regional conflict, arms
proliferation, terrorism and other emerging threats
by combining a uniquely comprehensive definition of
security with flexibility and innovation of response.”63
Membership is key to gaining regional support, and
a U.S.-led MLSA must welcome and incorporate new
partners and opportunities. While the existing defense
treaties provide the greatest deterrence against largescale regional conflict, all regional nations should be
invited and encouraged to participate in the MLSA to
their fullest individual potential. The MLSA will enable
those nations to go beyond dialogue to resolve actively
lesser threats and challenges on the conflict spectrum
(e.g., through partnered maritime domain awareness),
essentially altering existing regional security dynamics. Further, as a MLSA builds on existing relationships
(creating linkages within linkages), a new security
forum similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) North Atlantic Council, while not precluded, may not be needed if the EAS or ARF grows
into this role.
Finally, U.S. leadership must accomplish three
goals. First, reassure allies and partners that entanglement or entrapment for U.S. regional gain (including countering China) is not the MLSA’s purpose.
Second, advocate that mutually supporting and
regionally responsible security protects against current and future threats. Third, retain the existing bilateral defense treaties while not precluding new U.S.
security relationships.64 Working toward these goals
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will help the United States avoid alienation while also
shaping regional expectations for responding to security threats.
Implications and Options for the New
U.S. Administration.
For the United States, an important decision
includes whether to advance the prior administration’s
principled security network efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. The danger for the decision maker is that
policy becomes so geared to satisfying the vigorously
communicated needs of those close at hand that insufficient account is taken of the needs of those more distant and less salient. The hierarchy of concerns on the
foreign policy agenda will reflect hierarchies within
national political systems and salient alliances and
international organizations.65
For the new U.S. administration developing its
Asia-Pacific policies, the following MLSA strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and risks should be considered. Leading a MLSA provides the means to
achieve lasting influence and shared security responsibility that ultimately supports diplomatic, economic,
and informational efforts within, and external to, the
Asia-Pacific region. Further, a MLSA enables pan-regional military-to-military engagement and modernization while reassuring allies, partners, and neighbors
through conflict prevention activities. A MLSA also
provides a strategic opportunity for the U.S. military (principally the USPACOM) to plan and conduct
engagements within a web of interconnected security
partners who each have diverse regional economic and
diplomatic interests.66
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The region’s previously discussed security dynamics risk escalation and conflict, most notably on the
Korean Peninsula and in the South China and East Seas.
However, diversifying security relationships, modernizing existing alliances, enhancing interactions among
new partners, strengthening regional institutions to
reinforce rules and norms, and developing collective responses to shared challenges all define ways in
which the United States can achieve its regional objectives.67 Further, MLSA “burden sharing” potentially
lowers overall U.S. costs in both money and personnel as a web of interconnected nations is empowered
(with U.S. support rather than dependence) to prevent
conflict and respond collectively when required. Most
significantly, a MLSA provides a different, evolving
approach to regional security that adapts to the changing security environment and pits, interdependently
with allies and partners, “our enduring strengths
against the vulnerabilities of our adversaries.”68
Further, MLSA legitimacy under international
law adds credibility. Article 52 of the United Nations’
Charter provides that:
regional arrangements for dealing with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security as are appropriate for regional action [are not
precluded] . . . provided that such arrangements are
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations.69

For example, NATO is such a regional security
arrangement.70 Establishing a MLSA, whether formal
or informal, that complies with international law and
reinforces “rules-based order” for the Asia-Pacific
region provides legitimacy; doing otherwise risks both
international acceptance and respected U.S. leadership.
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The biggest potential weakness is a lack of regional
resolve to participate actively in a MLSA that advocates and advances conflict prevention activity. While
a MLSA would buttress existing arrangements through
an interconnected enforcement web of shared-interest
nations, participating nations would be expected to
contribute more than dialogue for conflict prevention.
Further, China likely will view a U.S.-led MLSA as
a direct threat to its regional leadership: “China has all
along taken the advancement of regional prosperity
and stability as its own responsibility.”71 According to
its January 2017 “White Paper” on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, China is:
[c]ommitted to pushing forward the building of regional
security mechanisms . . . [while shouldering] greater
responsibilities for regional and global security, and
[providing] more public security services to the AsiaPacific region and the world at large.72

The U.S.-China competition for regional security leadership, arguably the most difficult issue to address,
risks regional states having to choose between their
closely-located economic trading partner (China)
and more distantly-located security provider (United
States), potentially weakening a U.S.-led MLSA.73
Mitigating these weaknesses requires an approach
that the United States should openly consider: invite
China’s participation as a welcome and necessary partner in order to utilize both U.S. and Chinese regional
security leadership. Doing so establishes the single-largest confidence building mechanism for both
countries, as transparency will be necessary for both
nations to work together for common security goals.
Finally, including both nations (perhaps someday
as co-equal participants) in a single MLSA requires
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strategic patience; simply bringing both nations into
the same U.S.-led security architecture will not happen
quickly. Underlying, long-standing security issues and
differences remain unresolved and must be addressed
before a U.S.-China MLSA could be considered or even
implemented.
A U.S.-led MLSA presents two notable opportunities. First, achieving long-term regional security presents an opportunity for the United States and China to
work together for a common security purpose, even if
they are not MLSA partners. Strategically, and with a
nod toward China’s economic growth and rapid military modernization, the United States generally considers China an emerging, or already existing, “near-peer
competitor.”74 Henry Kissinger recently noted that the
United States should try to make Chinese President
Xi’s objective to “turn adversaries into partners . . . the
dominant theme of U.S.-China relations.” Changing
the analysis from “near-peer competitor” to “nearpeer partner” clearly alters regional security dynamics.
Doing so should not make the United States beholden
to China, or require the United States to compromise
its values and interests. Rather, removing a potential
near-peer competitor by finding common ground for
security engagement will change the region’s conflict
prevention security dynamic. However, such a change
requires significant action by both nations, which for
the United States includes re-looking the NDAA 2000
limits on military-to-military engagement.
Second, developing a U.S.-led MLSA that overlaps existing regional economic and security forums
demonstrates U.S. understanding of, and commitment
to, the evolving region. It also provides enforcement
mechanisms, or “teeth,” that existing security dialogues
do not. Further, and unlike the existing bilateral U.S.
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treaty alliances, a MLSA presents opportunities to welcome all states interested in working together to maintain regional security. Granted, creating a MLSA, and
encouraging states to exercise the strategic patience to
let it develop, will take time. However, ever-evolving
Asia-Pacific dynamics present the United States a significant opportunity for regional security leadership.
The most significant risk is inaction. Although
China has not yet established a regional security architecture that does not mean the United States should not
do so. Strategically, the United States must determine
whether silence regarding or inaction toward China
advocating for its own regional security architecture
potentially signals that 21st century Asia-Pacific security leadership belongs to China. Abdicating such
leadership potentially threatens U.S. stature and influence within the region, arguably validating a power
transition perception that China’s rise is at the expense
of a declining United States. A further potential risk
is whether extending “linkages among the spokes”
beyond the current hub-and-spoke alliance system,
(e.g., a Philippines-Japan-South Korea “link” where
the United States is individually connected to each participant) increases the possibility that the United States
may be pulled into a regional conflict “without any
additional security benefits [of its own].”75 Addressing
these risks within the MLSA is essential for mitigating
their impact on U.S. security leadership and regional
resolve.
CONCLUSION
The United States should lead the development of
an Asia-Pacific multilateral security architecture that
empowers existing regional forums and organizations,
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strengthens existing defense treaties and alliances, and
encourages the development of new linkages between
nations to advance regional stability and conflict prevention. Carefully considering China as a potential
partner is essential, as doing so will advance trust
among regional participants and counter perceptions
that such an architecture purposely contains China’s
rise. At the same time, gaining China’s participation
may lessen observations of, and challenges inherent to,
a great power rivalry between a rising China and an
established United States. Ultimately, effective Asia-Pacific regional conflict prevention―a significant reason
for developing a multilateral security architecture
that evolves beyond mutual defense treaties―requires
a joint U.S.-China partnership from the beginning.
Doing so necessitates changed behaviors and expectations by both nations, as well as strategic patience
to adjust to a near-peer partner environment. Simultaneously, an effective MLSA will provide enforcement mechanisms not currently available in existing
regional security structures. Finally, developing a
MLSA requires all instruments of national power―it is
not a military-alone solution or requirement. Patience
and trust will be necessary, especially since a U.S.-led
MLSA is not intended, at least currently, to counter or
oppose a specific threat, but instead to meet the complex security challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region
in the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LARGEST TIGER:
INDIA IN THE U.S. POLICY TOWARD
INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
Todd D. Carroll
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
India is the world’s most populous democracy and
shares many western values and political institutions
with the United States. While it has been a rocky relationship for many years since India gained independence in 1947, the trend has been improving for the past
decade and a half. This chapter explores ways in which
the United States can best support the development of
India while coaxing it to play a bigger role in the IndoAsia-Pacific (IAP). India is especially well suited to
check China’s assertiveness, as no one can claim India
is an outsider meddling in Asian affairs. With a population poised to become the world’s largest in 2028,
and an economy that could surpass that of the United
States by 2050, India will be the most important player
in the decades to come in maintaining cooperation, stability, and security in the IAP. To guide India’s rise as a
great power that respects and defends the rules-based
international order, the United States should engage
India along four lines of effort: military, diplomatic,
commercial, and people-to-people.
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INTRODUCTION
India is the world’s most populous democracy
and a rising power. Although it shares many western
values and political institutions with the United States,
the U.S.-India relationship had been rocky for many
years since the latter gained independence in 1947. The
past 15 years, however, have witnessed an impressive
improvement in the two nations’ relations. With a U.S.friendly Prime Minister in Narendra Modi, the time is
ripe for the United States to do everything possible
to assist India in harnessing the power of its growing population and guide its path toward becoming a
responsible great power that respects and defends the
rules-based international order.
Perhaps the best indication of the rising importance of India is its economic turnaround since the liberalization of its economy in 1991. Since these reforms
went into effect, the gross domestic product (GDP) of
India has more than quadrupled, growing at an average rate of 7 percent a year.1 Economists expect this
trend to continue, predicting that India’s GDP will
rise from $7.28 trillion in 2014 in terms of purchasing
power parity (PPP, or real GDP adjusted for price level
differences across countries) to $42.21 trillion in 2050,
and likely displacing the United States as the world’s
second largest economy.2
With a political and judicial system developed
during the British colonial period, India shares many
western values with the United States. One might
assume this would make the two powers natural allies,
but for much of India’s post-independence history,
this has not been the case. During the Cold War, India
was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, which
was a group of third-world countries that refrained
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from siding with either the United States or the Soviet
Union. However, as this movement gradually weakened, India drifted closer to the Soviet Union while
the United States built stronger strategic relations with
Pakistan and China.3 Much of India’s foreign policy
calculus is focused on what is happening in Pakistan,
with which India has gone to war four times. There are
still extremely high tensions over the disputed Kashmir region. As recently as September 2016, 18 Indian
soldiers were killed by armed militants in the garrison
town of Uri. High-ranking Indian officials, including
the Home Minister, have accused the Pakistani government of being complicit in the attacks.4 India had
a brief war with China as well in 1962 over their disputed boundary in the Himalayas, which remains
problematic to this day. Sino-Indian relations were further strained due to China’s assistance to Pakistan in
the development of its nuclear weapons program and
continued aid to Pakistan’s civil nuclear program.5
Indo-American relations declined further as a result
of India’s underground nuclear test program. In 1998,
the Clinton administration responded with economic
sanctions,6 even encouraging Beijing to play a bigger
role in ensuring peace and security in the South Asian
region.7
Former President George W. Bush took a different
approach toward India. His administration was more
suspicious of a rapidly rising China than the Clinton
administration. Feeling that China was trying to alter
Asia’s balance of power in its own favor,8 Bush engineered a lower-key pivot to Asia. Part of this effort was
to engage India. His former National Security Advisor
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote, “India
is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be
in America’s, too.”9 President Bush lifted sanctions
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against India because they were “not in the national
security interests of the United States.”10 The strategic
relationship was furthered with the announcement of
the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative in
2005 (approved by the International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA] in 2008).11
Following former President Barack Obama’s inauguration, Indo-U.S. relations began to drift as the new
administration pursued a closer relationship with
China. Obama made early important concessions to
China in the realm of human rights in the hope of
developing a closer partnership, perhaps even a “G2”
aimed at stabilizing global issues.12 Indian sensitivities
were further rattled as the former President did not
include Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his first
wave of introductory phone calls to other foreign leaders, including Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari.13
In November 2009, in a major policy speech in Asia,
Obama vowed to “strengthen old alliances and build
new partnerships” in the IAP but failed to include India
on the list of countries to which he was referring.14
By mid-2010, once again India became a part of
the U.S. strategic calculus. William J. Burns, the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, affirmed this
when he stated, “India’s strength and progress on the
world stage is deeply in the strategic interest of the
United States.” Michele Flournoy, the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, added “India’s success is very
much in America’s national interest” and that “increasingly our specific security interests are converging.”15
In November of that year, Obama delivered a very
well received address to the Indian Parliament, in
which he endorsed India’s bid for a permanent United
Nations (UN) Security Council seat. Prior to the speech,
most Indians felt Obama placed their interests behind
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those of regional rivals Pakistan and China. Afterwards, very few held the same opinion.16
In 2011, the Obama administration rolled out the
“Pivot to Asia” or Strategic Rebalance, a long-term U.S.
effort to spur domestic revival and renovation as well to
keep peace in the world’s most dynamic region.17 India
figured to play a prominent role in the rebalance. With
these actions, Indo-U.S. relations were back on a positive track. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) considers
India and the United States to be natural allies, whose
relations “constitute the key element in the architecture of tomorrow’s democratized world order.”18 With
the BJP rising to power in 2014 under the leadership of
Modi, the Obama administration wanted to redouble
the efforts toward consolidating gains and taking the
relationship to the next level.
To guide India’s rise as a great power that respects
and defends the rules-based international order, the
United States should engage India along four lines
of effort: military, diplomatic, commercial, and people-to-people. Each of these lines of effort is discussed
in more detail.
MILITARY LINE OF EFFORT
Former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Ashton
Carter played a critical role in advancing this line of
effort. Carter devoted more personal attention to his
Indian counterpart, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, than any previous SECDEF. During regular
meetings in both India and the United States, the two
developed a very strong personal relationship.19 In an
encouraging sign of how the new SECDEF will treat
the relationship, James Mattis, in his testimony before
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the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that
“The U.S. policy should continue to pursue a long-term
strategic relationship with India” and he “will focus on
what steps can be taken to bolster the overall defense
relationship.”20
Some of Ash Carter’s most important work has
included the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the status of India as a “Major Defense
Partner.” In 2012, as Deputy SECDEF, Carter undertook an initiative to provide increased senior-level
engagement to get beyond the legal and bureaucratic
obstacles to defense technology and trade with India.21
This initiative became the DTTI, which incorporated
the ability to co-produce weapons in India, along with
the transfer of technology. Carter’s efforts also paved
the way for naming India a Major Defense Partner in
June of 2016, further easing technology sharing “at a
level commensurate with that of its closest allies and
partners.”22
While the DTTI is an incredible step in the right
direction of improving the military relationship and
meshes nicely with Modi’s “Make in India” campaign,
more can be done. While relaxing the standards for
technology exchange is beneficial, the current levels
of sharing impede greater sales and undermine the
potential of the relationship. Russia, which provides
70 percent of India’s defense imports, provides strategically sensitive technology in hardware ranging from
missiles, to ships, to nuclear submarines, to fifth-generation fighter aircraft.23 As of now, co-production
efforts between the United States and India are limited
to only low-end weapons such as the Raven unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) and reconnaissance modules for
the C-130J aircraft.24 The Trump administration should
work with Congress to remove barriers in order to allow
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for greater transfer and sharing of technology without
intrusive end-use monitoring agreements, something
India will absolutely not accept.25 Until this happens,
Russia will remain India’s main defense supplier. This
is important as co-production and technology sharing
accelerate Indian development, and as a partner with
the United States, interoperability is key to the effectiveness of multinational military operations.
As India builds its capabilities through advanced
systems acquired from either the United States or
Russia, bilateral defense cooperation could be furthered by allowing Indian service members access to
U.S. training. Teaching India’s warfighters the knowledge the U.S. military has gained over time in some
of their recently gained technologies, such as UAV or
airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) employment,
and synchronizing tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTP) would make an enormous difference to India’s
ability to use these new capabilities effectively.26 By
providing more advanced warfighting systems and
training India’s operators in U.S. service schools, the
United States will exponentially increase India’s ability to be a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean
and Western Pacific. An economically vibrant and militarily strong India will be more inclined to look after
its interests regionally, the foremost of which is peace
and stability. Beyond technology sharing, improving interoperability, and synchronizing procedures,
there is one other significant area in which the United
States could do more to enhance the bilateral security
relationship.
Joint military exercises have become a common
occurrence between the United States and India. The
United States has been a long-time participant with
India in the Malabar Naval Exercise and India has
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contributed warships to the U.S. Navy-led Rim of
the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise since 2014. In fact, the
United States cooperates with India in more military
exercises than it does with any other country, and
across all five military branches.27 This provides outstanding training for both sides as it is not often that
U.S. military units are able to interact with Russian
hardware. These exercises not only strengthen Indian
forces, they also help identify shortcomings in U.S.
employment procedures. At Cope India in 2004, some
U.S. Air Force tactics were exposed as ineffectual and
forced revisions in the way the Air Force fights.28 The
incorporation of other friendly regional countries such
as Japan and Australia only magnifies the benefits.
However, exercises are for the most part still relatively
simple and often times overly scripted. To maximize
effectiveness, these exercises must become more complex and involve the best combatant capabilities on
both sides.29 As defense analyst Ashley Tellis notes,
“taking the gains from familiarization and common
TTPs,” as discussed above, “and applying them in
combined operations represents the acme of defense
cooperation.”30
DIPLOMATIC LINE OF EFFORT
Diplomacy is another area where inroads could be
made to aid India’s development and strengthen the
bilateral relationship. India’s older statesmen, insistent
upon state intervention in the economy, a “nonaligned”
stance to world affairs, and a distrust of close relations
with the United States, are giving way to a younger
generation that is friendlier toward the West due to the
two nations’ many cultural ties and a wish for India
to play a greater role in world affairs.31 A window has
opened for greater opportunity to expand connections.
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There are multiple areas in which the United States can
support India’s rise, facilitating the dream of India’s
younger generation that the country play a larger role,
while providing the additional voice of a great power
with common, shared values on international affairs.
As was previously mentioned, since 2010, former
President Obama supported India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This was a very
successful, trust-building move, and the United States
should continue to push for it.
Since the early 1990s, India has sought membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum as part of its “Look East” policy, in which it
tries to integrate further with Pacific Rim and East
Asian economies, but has been repeatedly denied.32
The United States invited India as an observer for the
2011 APEC meetings hosted by the United States in
Hawaii and has supported India’s accession to membership.33 The United States needs to continue to press
for Indian membership here and in other groups such
as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
which would allow for greater exchanges of defense
technology, and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG),
which would enable India to expand its civilian atomic
energy sector.
In addition, the United States could offer assistance
to the Indian government with expertise and programs
for combating corruption, alleviating poverty, homeland security, improving agricultural practices and
women’s empowerment. Corruption is rampant in
India; by some estimates, India’s underground economy could be half of the country’s GDP.34 In fact, on
the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business scale, India
ranks 130 out of 190 nations.35
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Technical assistance could also be offered to support
Indian programs to fight corruption, such as Modi’s
attempts at a cashless society to combat exploitative
middlemen from collecting fees on monies intended
for the poor. To attract the investment and manufacturing required to employ India’s vast population,
corruption has to be reduced. Poverty is pervasive in
India, and has only increased with globalization, providing another reason why the country so badly needs
investment.36 Creating jobs through investment is how
India harnesses the power of its population dividend
and would greatly reduce poverty, lessen instability,
and help eliminate the barriers and special interests
that paralyze the central government. Breaking down
the caste system and improving education and health
care could diminish the crushing effects of poverty.
Homeland security and terrorism are among the top
concerns of the Indian citizenry, and these are certainly
areas where the United States has much expertise to
offer.
Agriculture in India is notoriously underdeveloped
and forms a massive protectionist-voting bloc that stifles reform. Over half of India’s total employment is
involved in agriculture (in 2010, India was 51 percent
compared to just 2 percent in the United States);37 by
enhancing agricultural productivity and competitiveness, India could overcome political resistance to free
trade and build the type of economy it needs to grow.
Enlarging opportunities for women and bringing them
into the labor force could raise India’s GDP growth by
as much as two percentage points a year.38 For India
to grow into the world-class economy it wishes to be,
these factors need to be addressed.
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COMMERCIAL LINE OF EFFORT
To advance and broaden the bilateral economic
relationship between the two countries, an emphasis
should be placed on cooperation at the level of individual companies and states while waiting for progress
on cooperation between the national governments.39
Some Indian state governments provide more business-friendly environments than the national government. Notably, Gujarat, where Modi was the chief
minister, realized annual GDP gains of 10 percent
during his tenure from 2001-2012.40 Other business-oriented states, such as Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu,
have been success stories, while less open states have
languished. Indian states can neutralize national trade
barriers with incentives, and many have the size to
qualify by themselves as high-priority customers for
American companies.41 The U.S. Government could
help facilitate greater investment in India by lessening the burden of taxation on U.S. companies that
repatriate profits. This would encourage companies to
do business in India while keeping more earnings to
reinvest at home, benefitting both countries. The large
market and incredible potential has many companies hoping to gain a foothold in a burgeoning India;
proper incentives could give U.S. companies an advantage over fierce international competitors.
If India can develop and take advantage of its population dividend, it will be the world’s largest free
market, and a critical one for sustaining the American
economic engine. Creating barriers to the greater foreign
investment required for India to become an economic
powerhouse are its rampant corruption, complex and
lengthy investment and business approval processes,
antiquated land acquisition and labor laws, poor contract enforcement, and protectionist policies for its
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manufacturing and agriculture sectors.42 The protectionist policies and other trade barriers harken back
to the time of India’s independence, when Indians felt
the need to support their fledgling industries.43 What
would be most beneficial to both the United States and
India would be a free-trade agreement (FTA) and a
high-quality bilateral investment treaty (BIT). An FTA
would significantly enhance the present unimpressive trade numbers between two economies of such
size, valued at only $66 billion in 2015.44 A high-quality BIT, one that included intellectual property rights
as investors look for transparency and rule of law,45
would bring massive investment and new companies to India. These investments and the jobs they will
bring are required for India’s economy to develop and
sustain fiscal health for the long term. Talks on these
initiatives will ebb and flow due to poorly-conceived
existing policy and reticence within parliament, but
Modi urgently wants these measures. The United
States should continue to press on these reforms but
give the Prime Minister the space, time, and technical assistance he requires as he works to convince the
opposition of the benefits of such agreements.
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE LINE OF EFFORT
People-to-people ties, much like military-to-military cooperation, can be of great benefit to advancing cooperation between the United States and India.
Over time, as Indians and Americans interact and
gain greater appreciation for each other’s cultures, the
relations between the two nations should improve,
fostering understanding and communication.46 While
we have a strong and vibrant Indian immigrant population of 2.4 million47 in the United States, the second
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largest immigrant population behind Mexico, the U.S.
Government can facilitate greater human contacts
between our two nations to enhance the partnership
and aid India’s development.
While programs are in place to improve educational and worker exchanges, improvements could be
made. The U.S.-India Education Foundation (USIEF) is
an outstanding program that has provided 19,000 students from the United States and India the opportunity
to study in the other country since program inception
in 1950.48 Every effort should be made to continue
and expand programs such as this to increase people-to-people ties. When it comes to worker exchanges,
much more can be done, which will be explored further
below. It is imperative that people be allowed to travel
between the countries to provide the innovations and
cultural and economic ties both need to compete and
thrive in an increasingly connected and competitive
world.
In recent years, stories highlighting the horrors
of outsourcing have come out in the press and have
taken hold of the American consciousness. In turn,
constituents have pressed their representatives to take
action that in some cases have hurt the advancement
of human ties between the United States and India.
The progression of these crucial relations is most damaged once policy and law impose barriers to H-1B and
L-1 visas, which Indians use far more than any other
nationality to live and work in the United States. Both
visas are nonimmigrant visas that allow companies to
temporarily employ foreign workers.
H1-Bs require a bachelor’s degree or equivalent and
are issued for those going to work in a specialty field.
L-1s require no specific skill, but the worker must work
for a multinational company and have been employed
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by that company for 1 year in their home nation.49 H-1B
and L-1 visas normally work on a reciprocity schedule,
meaning if a foreign government charges a U.S. citizen a fee for a visa, the U.S. Government will charge
the same fee.50 Rhetoric about outsourcing has turned
into more frequent visa application rejections and
increased fees, which exceedingly affect information
technology (IT) firms due to their significant international presence.51 The IT field is a top Indian industry
generating over $150 billion annually, more than half
of which results from business being done with North
America.52 American fees and rejection rates for Indian
visas have both risen sharply, in contrast to treatment
of workers of other nationalities.53
Some of the anger is warranted, because some
U.S. companies, such as Disney, have been accused
of replacing American workers with immigrants to
save money and are responsible for the rise of “body
shops.”54 Body shops are contracting companies that
sponsor workers on H-1B visas and illegally subcontract the workers out to other companies using doctored resumes.55 The body shop can then report it
never displaced American workers since the sub-contracting employer does not need to report it hired any
H-1B workers.56
This policy should extend to those with degrees in
science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) or
other defined fields where the United States is lacking
trained people. About a quarter of all start-up companies in engineering and technology are founded by
foreign-born entrepreneurs, and of those, 33.2 percent
were from India. In fact, Indians founded more engineering and technology firms than immigrants born
in the next nine immigrant-founder countries combined.57 Keeping opportunities open for immigrants
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is key to maintaining a vibrant and growing economy
while advancing relations by building cultural affinity
between the United States and India. While some good
legislation, such as the Stopping Trained in America Ph.D.s From Leaving the Economy Act of 2015
(STAPLE Act), have been proposed, they have not been
enacted. The U.S. Government needs to pass such legislation while encouraging India to liberalize its labor
laws to bring in the global talent it desperately needs
to expand Indian corporations and provide additional
jobs to employ its burgeoning youth population.
It may seem counterintuitive for India to send its
most talented innovators to the United States, but in
the long run, such a move greatly assists Indian development. The talent networks remaining in India will
gain access to valuable knowledge and technological networks abroad.58 Additionally, many expatriates will eventually return home, empowered by new
ideas, experience, and connections to play a direct role
in India’s development.59
Those individuals with people-to-people ties or
simply a strong interest in furthering the partnership
between the United States and India can do their part
by pressing government officials on the need to revise
policies, which restrict this critical exchange. As Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and
Central Asian Affairs, noted in 2008:
We’ve had periods of excitement between the United States
and India before. The bubbles burst, the enthusiasm is
turned to disappointment. What’s to make this different?
And, for those of us in government, how do we make it
different this time? My answer to the first question is:
YOU. You’re the ones who make it different: the students,
the trans-oceanic families, the academics, the doctors, the
business people. You are the foundation and the dynamic
between the United States and India. And, what can
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governments do to help you? Listen to you, please tell us
how to open doors and remove obstacles. We’ll help you
find even more exciting opportunities.60

CONCLUSION
A strong and thriving India is in the best long-term
interest of the United States. As traditional allies and
partners in the West see their relative power decline,
the United States will need new partners with strong
voices that are willing to defend the existing international rules-based order and to reinforce acceptable
norms. No single country has an advantage or potential that is even close to that of India. By focusing on
these four lines of effort—military, diplomatic, economic, and people-to-people—the United States can
best assist Indian development and guide India’s path
toward becoming a responsible world power. India’s
rise can be exemplary to other developing nations,
demonstrating that democracy and open societies will
work better than authoritarian alternatives. Additionally, India’s extensive connections with China will
help encourage them to work within the rules-based
system rather than outside of it. For now, the United
States should encourage India to do more as a partner in maintaining regional security, for in the longterm, India may be the strongest guarantor of peace
and prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. It will be an
extensive and challenging process—relationships take
a long time to build, and the United States cannot be
dissuaded by short-term disagreements that will inevitably arise. In the end, a strong bilateral relationship
will pay dividends far greater than any sacrifice either
country will have to make to achieve it.
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CHAPTER 5
JAPAN’S STRATEGIC RENAISSANCE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Neil J. Owens
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Japan has responded to what it sees as an increasingly unfavorable strategic situation by implementing a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” policy. As the
Trump administration develops its new Asia-Pacific
policy, how should the United States approach the
U.S.-Japan alliance?
The Japanese perspective is that it needs to assume
a greater international leadership role, strengthen its
alliance with the United States, and improve the Joint
Self Defense Force’s deterrent effect. Japan’s increased
international role will present some risk to the United
States, but the biggest risk would be to allow the
U.S.-Japan alliance to atrophy.
The United States should continue to encourage Japan to assume an increased international role
and pave the way for Japan’s new policy by facilitating a closer Japan-South Korea relationship. The
United States and Japan should also renegotiate the
2006 Realignment Roadmap that would result in the
reduction of U.S. combat power in Japan. A successful renegotiation would result in a plan that reduces
the impact of U.S. bases on the Okinawa community,
thus maintaining the long-term political viability of a
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forward-deployed U.S. military posture while maintaining the current level of deterrence. Finally, the
United States should encourage Japan to continue
its existing public discussion on the regional security environment and on the appropriate role for the
United States-Japan alliance to play within it. The ability of the Japanese public to identify the link between
the U.S. military presence and Japan’s national security will likely serve to strengthen public support for
the alliance.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, Donald Trump shocked American political culture by securing an upset electoral
victory over Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton.1
Former Secretary of State Clinton held views representative of those within the U.S. foreign policy establishment and was expected to continue former President
Barack Obama’s strategic “Rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region. Of the many questions that have emerged
from Trump’s unexpected victory, some of the most
important involve what his presidency will mean for
U.S. Asia-Pacific policy. What policy approach will the
new administration take? What part will Japan play
within it?
Japan is a major power in the Asia-Pacific. An
advanced industrial nation that has been on the forefront of cutting-edge technological development and
design for decades, it possesses the world’s third
largest economy and exports advanced manufactured items worldwide.2 Japan is a successful liberal
democracy and shares U.S. views on the importance of
democracy, human rights, and the existing rules-based
international system. Although it has traditionally
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followed a modest approach to foreign and defense
policy, there is ample evidence that Japan is willing to
do more in these areas.
The United States should understand the international environment from Japan’s perspective, identify
the major elements of Japan’s policy response, and
highlight the benefits that the U.S.-Japan alliance can
provide to the United States.
THE VIEW FROM ICHIGAVA
Japanese strategists see an international environment that is becoming increasingly unstable and decidedly less safe.3 A palpable shift of global power away
from the West and toward the Asia-Pacific brings with
it uncertainty and an unwelcome weakening in international leadership and resolve.4 “Gray zone” situations, in which states employ carefully calibrated
levels of force to advance their interests incrementally,
while being careful to remain below the threshold that
would trigger a military response—are on the rise
in the Asia-Pacific.5 Japan, a self-described maritime
nation economically reliant on seaborne trade, is confronting a world in which the principle of freedom of
navigation is being challenged by a growing number
of states.6 The international rules and norms that have
enabled Japan to navigate its way from post-war ruin
to economic ascendancy are increasingly under threat.
This is a significant concern for a state that identifies itself as a “peace-loving nation” and which has
rigorously adhered to international rules and norms
for over 70 years. Conscious of its early 20th-century
history and restrained by a constitution that limits its
ability to employ military force abroad, Japan is careful to operate as a responsible international actor. It

109

maintains a defense-oriented, nonthreatening military posture and its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,”
which forbid possession, use, and third-party storage
of nuclear weapons, demonstrates its deep-seated
opposition to nuclear weapons.7
Japan views North Korea as the greatest threat to
its national security. North Korea’s ballistic missile
and nuclear weapons development programs appear
to be accelerating, and it is currently capable of ranging nearly all Japanese territory.8 North Korean behavior is provocative and destabilizing, and its aggressive
rhetoric is frequently aimed at Japan. North Korea’s
bizarre Japanese abduction program, in which it kidnapped Japanese citizens and brought them to North
Korea in an apparent attempt to improve the quality of
its intelligence services, remains a high-profile political
issue in Japan.9
While North Korea constitutes an immediate threat,
China poses a more long-term strategic challenge to
Japan’s interests. China’s economic ascendency has
been swift: since the early 1970s, it has undergone
“the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy
in history.” It now boasts the world’s second largest
economy, is the world’s largest manufacturer, and
exports more than any other country.10 Over the past
decade, it has placed an increasing emphasis on building a modern, capable military: its defense budget is
the world’s second largest and is six times larger than
that of Japan. Japan estimates that China’s military
spending has increased by over 300 percent in the
years between 2006 and 2016.11 Most observers believe
that China’s defense spending is significantly higher
than its official documents indicate; the lack of reliable
information on China’s military budget makes it difficult to determine how it prioritizes its spending or to
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identify the capabilities that it is trying to develop.12
Japan maintains that this lack of transparency is troubling because it obscures China’s long-term strategic
intentions.13 Even more troubling is that, as China’s
economic and military power have grown, so too has
the aggressiveness with which it pursues its expansive
maritime territorial claims. China’s behavior in the
East China Sea has resulted in significantly increased
Japan-China tension.
Japan and China are involved in three closely related
East China Sea disputes. The first dispute involves
the maritime boundary between Japan’s and China’s
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); although there was
a 2008 agreement to negotiate a boundary settlement
and to develop hydrocarbon resources jointly in the
disputed region, negotiations broke down in 2010 and
have yet to restart.14
The second dispute involves sovereignty of the
resource-rich Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.15 The Senkaku
Islands—eight uninhabited features claimed by Japan,
China, and Taiwan— have been in the possession of
Japan for over a century. Although the United States
does not take a position on the territorial dispute, it
recognizes that Japan “administers” the islands and
that they are covered by U.S.-Japan security guarantees.16 In 2010 and again in 2012, the Senkaku dispute
became a flash point between China and Japan. These
crises caused significant diplomatic, political, and economic friction, and drove China to increase its civilian Coast Guard patrols dramatically in the disputed
waters.17 Japan views China’s Senkaku activity as a
“gray zone” attempt to challenge Japan’s territorial
integrity using non-military means.18 Japanese and
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Chinese Coast Guard vessels now regularly engage
each other in tense encounters, and, while both sides
behave professionally, the likelihood of a crisis-inducing miscalculation remains uncomfortably high.19
The third dispute began in November 2013 when
China established an Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) over part of the East China Sea.20 Japanese military aircraft operating within the declared ADIZ are
often intercepted by Chinese military aircraft; meanwhile, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) is
regularly forced to scramble to intercept Chinese intrusions into its own ADIZ (see Figure 5-1).21 Not only
does China’s military regularly operate within Japan’s
ADIZ, but many of its flights also violate Japan’s territorial airspace over the Senkakus.22

*Although an ADIZ flight is designed to challenge a country’s air
defense capability, an ADIZ violation does not necessarily entail
a territorial airspace violation.

Figure 5-1. JASDF Scrambles to Intercept Foreign
Military Intrusions into Japan’s ADIZ.23
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China’s actions during these disputes fuel the concern with which Japan views China’s rise. China has
consistently displayed a willingness to employ every
instrument at its disposal to pressure its neighbor and
advance its interests; many of the methods used seem
escalatory and disproportionate. The de facto embargo
of rare earth minerals, the sanction—if not outright
encouragement—of violent anti-Japanese protests,
the use of heavily-armed maritime craft to challenge
disputed maritime boundaries and territorial claims,
and the willingness to treat international waters and
airspace as its own territory raise troubling questions
about China’s judgment and its dedication to adhering
to the existing rules-based international system.24
Japan also has a contentious relationship with
Russia.25 The main area of disagreement is the fate of
Japan’s four Northern Territories, which Russia seized
at the end of World War II and of which both countries claim ownership.26 Despite some recent optimism
that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and President
Vladimir Putin of Russia would be able to negotiate
a settlement, it appears now that the negotiations fell
victim to the larger dispute between Russia and the
West over Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine.27
Although Russia and Japan cooperate on economic
issues, and in particular on hydrocarbon exploration,
the Japanese-Russian relationship is tempered by the
continuation of Russian military activities in Japanese airspace as well as by Russian unabated efforts
to modernize its military capabilities on the disputed
islands.28
Even Japan’s relationship with the Republic of
Korea (ROK), a neighbor which shares many of the
same security concerns and with which it shares a
major ally, is troubled. Despite close economic ties
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and the recent signing of some modest security agreements, political and diplomatic relations between the
two countries are marred by a continuing dispute
over the highly-charged legacy of the Korean “comfort women” issue and by a territorial dispute over
Takeshima/Dokdo Island.29 Polling indicates that a
sizeable majority of Koreans oppose the 2016 “final”
agreement on the comfort woman controversy that
the Abe government negotiated with ROK President
Park Geun-hye’s government.30 Moon Jae-in, recently
elected to replace the impeached President Park, has
stated that he thinks the agreement should be revised,
and a recent comfort women flare-up has caused Japan
to withdraw its ambassador to Korea.31 These disputes effectively reduce the likelihood of meaningful
bilateral security cooperation, complicate the strategic
landscape, and serve as an unwelcome reminder to
Japan that the legacy of its behavior in World War II
can still be difficult to overcome.
Finally, Japan faces major economic and demographic challenges. After 45 years of rapid expansion,
Japan’s economic growth slowed considerably in the
early 1990s and has remained sluggish ever since.32 A
long period of deflation acted as a further drag on the
economy, and Japan’s government debt is the highest
in the world.33 Japan cannot rely on population growth
to alleviate these economic problems, as its population
is aging rapidly and is expected to enter a period of
steep decline.34 The prospects of successfully turning
these long-term systemic trends around appear dim.
The one bright spot on the horizon for Japanese
strategic planners is Japan’s alliance with the United
States, the undisputed “cornerstone of Japan’s security” since the end of World War II.35 At the heart of
the U.S.-Japan alliance is the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security, in which the United
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States committed itself to Japan’s security.36 By basing
its military forces in Japan and extending its nuclear
deterrence, the United States enabled Japan to focus
on economic development, while de-prioritizing the
development of its self-defense forces.37 At the same
time, the U.S.-led security architecture maintained
regional stability, enabling a remarkable period of
region-wide economic growth. As regional challenges have increased, the United States-Japan alliance
has kept pace, and the United States is now heavily
involved in Japan’s maritime surveillance and ballistic
missile defense.38
Yet, even the U.S.-Japan relationship is experiencing uncertainty. During his election campaign, Trump
implied that Japan should acquire its own nuclear
weapons and complained that Japan’s funding for U.S.
military basing is inadequate.39 More significantly, he
withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a
free-trade agreement that the Obama administration
viewed as central to its Rebalance to the Pacific policy
and which many observed as an essential element of
Washington’s attempt to maintain its competitive strategic advantage over China.40 The TPP would have
improved economic ties between members and would
have further cemented the U.S. leadership role in the
Asia-Pacific. Abe’s allies in the Japanese Parliament
(the Diet) had supported the TPP despite the substantial political risks involved.41 Although Defense Secretary James Mattis’s visit to Tokyo and Abe’s trip to
Washington in early 2017 provided much needed reassurance, the events of the presidential campaign and
of the early days of the Trump administration demonstrated Japan’s vulnerability to the whims of American
politics. 42 It is likely that profound unease remains in
Tokyo.
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JAPAN’S RESPONSE: PROACTIVE
CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe, Japan
has instituted an ambitious and multi-faceted approach
to confront the challenges. Entitled the “Proactive
Contribution to Peace” policy, Japan’s new strategic
approach will enable it to exert its international influence more effectively.43 Abe’s first step was to establish a National Security Council, which immediately
released a National Security Strategy (NSS) establishing
the foundation of the new policy.
The 2013 National Security Strategy articulates
Japan’s three national security objectives: to increase
deterrence, to improve regional security by strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and improving Japan’s
regional ties, and to strengthen the rules-based international order while adopting a leading international
role.44 While it insists that its policy orientation is
peaceful in nature, it emphasizes “the international
community expects Japan to play a more proactive role
for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capabilities.”45 The NSS goes
on to describe how, in order to fulfill its international
role and safeguard its national interests, Japan must
embark upon a series of broad strategic approaches.
The first approach is to both “strengthen and
expand” Japan’s defense and diplomatic capabilities.
This requires Japan to pursue an increased international leadership role aggressively so that it possesses
“the power to take the lead in setting the international
agenda.”46 This also involves increasing the deterrent effect of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) by
improving warfighting capabilities, particularly in
ways suited to protecting Japan’s territorial integrity
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and maritime security. The JSDF must be integrated
into a whole-of-government security architecture that
includes law enforcement agencies and local governments, thus enabling Japan to respond seamlessly to
a full spectrum of security challenges, from gray zone
activities to natural disasters.47 The National Defense
Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (NDPG)
provides amplifying guidance. It calls for the development of an integrated and more agile “Dynamic
Joint Defense Force” capable of deterring potential
aggressors; responding to and defeating any attack;
and otherwise contributing to regional and global stability.48 The NDPG prioritizes the development of air
and maritime capabilities to enable Japan to monitor
and defend its dispersed island territories and defend
against the North Korean nuclear threat; areas targeted
for improvement include persistent maritime and
aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
strategic and operational lift, amphibious forces, and
ballistic missile defense. While most of the modernization effort is focused on the Air and Maritime Self-Defense Forces, the Ground Self-Defense Force is directed
to reduce its reliance on heavy conventional forces in
favor of lighter, more agile ones.49 The NDPG also calls
for greater interoperability with the United States and
for enhanced joint training.50
In order to implement this approach, the Abe government has increased defense spending and loosened
the rules prohibiting the export of defense technologies. Japan’s defense budget has increased for each of
the last 5 years, and its fiscal year (FY) 2017 defense
budget is the world’s seventh largest.51 In 2014, the
government modified a long-standing prohibition on
arms exports, authorizing exports to allies and partners
under limited circumstances.52 This policy is meant to
create a more competitive defense industry, increase
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cooperation with the United States, and reduce perunit costs for the self-defense forces.53 Japan now offers
major systems for export, increasing the prospect for
closer defense ties with regional partners. Its Soryu
submarines and Shin Maywa seaplanes are attractive
to regional militaries, while the SM-3 Block IIA shiplaunched anti-ballistic missile—developed jointly with
the United States and an integral part of their combined
ballistic missile defense plans—is a candidate for third
party sales.54 Although Japan recently failed in a bid to
obtain a contract to build submarines for Australia, its
status as a finalist is evidence of the increasing competitiveness of Japan’s defense industry.55
The second NSS approach is to strengthen the
U.S.-Japan alliance to ensure that the United States
remains committed to upholding Japan’s security
requirements. This involves expanding and deepening defense cooperation, ensuring the continued presence of U.S. bases in Japan, and tightening economic
ties.56 The periodic U.S.-Japan secretary-level Security
Consultative Committee conference has subsequently
gained an increased prominence and formalized alliance defense arrangements. The resulting Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation of 2015 clarifies each
state’s responsibilities in the event of armed attack,
identifies areas in which to improve military interoperability, and establishes a standing “Alliance Coordination Mechanism” (ACM) to improve operational
coordination.57 The ACM is particularly important
because it enables the United States and Japan to
respond to contingencies without having to establish
an ad hoc coordinating framework as they did when
responding to the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake
and tsunami.58
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The highly controversial Security Legislation of
2014 was specifically designed to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance; it removed legal restraints, which would
potentially have prevented the Japanese from providing military assistance to the United States while it was
actively involved in the defense of Japan. This legislation authorized the use of “collective self-defense” in
circumscribed circumstances, modestly increased the
circumstances in which Japan could provide logistic
assistance during United Nations (UN)-led operations,
and broadened rules of engagement for certain peacekeeping operations.59
The final NSS approaches are designed primarily to
strengthen security and diplomatic cooperation with
other regional allies, with regional multi-lateral institutions, and with organizations and countries outside
of the Asia-Pacific. The Abe government has aggressively undertaken this approach, and in particular, it
has emphasized Japan’s “special relationship” with
Australia and its budding relationship with India.60 At
the same time, Japan has increased its profile within
regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, the East
Asian Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial
Meeting-Plus.61 Cognizant of the challenge posed by
China’s aggressive defense of its territorial claims in the
South China Sea, Japan has provided several ASEAN
nations—including the Philippines, Vietnam, and
Indonesia—with funding and equipment to improve
their maritime patrol capabilities.62 These diplomatic
initiatives will gradually help build Japan’s profile and
regional leadership role.
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IT’S NOT ALL GOOD NEWS FOR THE UNITED
STATES
As the Trump administration develops its Asia-Pacific policy, it should recognize the extraordinary strategic importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United
States accrues enormous benefits from the U.S.-led
Asia-Pacific security and economic system, and its alliance with Japan constitutes the “cornerstone” of the
system.63 For more than 60 years, the robust U.S. military presence in Japan has ensured regional peace and
stability. Japan possesses significant economic clout;
the alliance between two of the world’s three largest
economies is greater than the sum of its parts. Japan
is the United States’ closest Asian ally and has proven
to be a reliable partner. U.S. and Japanese interests
align in all major policy areas; Japan shares U.S. liberal values and is dedicated to increasing its role in
upholding the U.S.-led international system and the
rule of law. Japan cooperates closely with the United
States on virtually every issue of significance in the
Asia-Pacific, and the importance of this cooperation
will only increase as Japan’s diplomatic clout grows.
The impact of this relationship is global in scope, as
the United States and Japan cooperate on economic,
diplomatic and security issues such as countering terrorism, providing assistance to developing economies,
advancing global health initiatives and fighting infectious diseases, implementing G7 sanctions on Russia,
and working toward UN reform.64 Japan has accommodated the forward basing of U.S. troops for decades,
and pays approximately 70 percent of the associated
financial costs.65 Simply put, the U.S.-Japan alliance is
a fundamental component of U.S. efforts to safeguard

120

its national interests in the Asia-Pacific and around the
world.
The U.S.-Japan alliance is as important as ever due
to the deterioration of the security situation in Northeast Asia and in the Asia-Pacific. As challenges mount,
it is critical for the United States to ensure it maintains
a close relationship with like-minded allies. The United
States has consistently stated that it “welcomes the rise
of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China,” and while
it appears likely that China’s relative power will continue to grow, it is unclear if it will develop into a country that respects and adheres to existing international
rules and norms.66 A U.S.-Japan alliance is essential to
ensure continued deterrence of North Korea, to serve
as an effective bulwark against any Chinese attempt to
dominate the region, and to help guarantee the continued existence of a security and economic framework
that provides peace and prosperity for the Asia-Pacific.
Japan’s strategic renaissance poses some risks to
U.S. national interests: one risk is that Japan, emboldened by U.S. security guarantees, may escalate the East
China Sea conflicts; a second is that others in the Northeast Asia—particularly South Korea and China—may
resist Japan’s attempts to pursue a more active role
in regional affairs.67 Although these risks should not
be discounted entirely, they can be mitigated and are
outweighed by the benefits that Japan’s new policy
provides.
The greatest risk is that Japan, knowing that the
United States is committed to backstopping Japan’s
national security, would escalate the Senkakus dispute in an attempt to demonstrate conclusively its
sovereignty and permanently resolve the dispute in its
favor. This could result in an armed conflict between
the United States and China over a few uninhabited
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islands. This risk is unlikely to develop, however,
because it would not be in keeping with Japan’s overwhelmingly non-aggressive approach to foreign policy.
It is unlikely that Japan would choose an aggressive
course because it would significantly damage its security interests were it to be unsuccessful. Moreover, as
the stronger power in the alliance, the United States
has enough leverage over Japan to ensure that it does
nothing that the United States would consider overly
provocative.
The second risk is that other states in Northeast
Asia would actively resist Japan’s efforts to implement
its new policy approach. Neither the Korean nor the
Chinese people have forgotten the atrocities that Imperial Japan inflicted during the 20th century, and those
memories color their views of modern Japan. The ill
will that these memories generate is exacerbated by
the well-publicized behavior of Japanese nationalists
and some members of the Abe government.68 There is a
risk that either South Korea or China—or both—could
use these issues as justification to challenge the legitimacy of Abe’s policy approach and of Japan’s efforts
to increase its international role. This could reduce the
scope of Japan-ROK cooperation, complicate efforts to
resolve East China Sea disputes or respond to North
Korean provocations, and reduce the willingness of
either the ROK or China to cooperate with the United
States on other issues.
To mitigate this risk, Japan will need to work to
convince its neighbors of its benign intent. As Japan’s
relationship with the ROK demonstrates, this will be
neither quick nor easy. Japan can point to its 70-year
tradition of adhering to international rules and norms,
and in the case of the ROK, can point to shared interests. The United States can assist in this effort. While
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it is unlikely that China will recognize that Japan’s
policy is purely defensive, it is not clear that Japan’s
new approach will dramatically change the status quo
of the difficult Japan-China relationship.
The biggest risks to U.S. national interests are not
associated with Japan’s new policy; rather, they are
related either to the United States weakening the alliance itself deliberately or through inaction. Twenty
years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that, unmoored
from its only alliance, “A disoriented Japan would be
like a beached whale, thrashing helplessly but dangerously”; such a scenario “would spell the end of
the American role in the Asia-Pacific.”69 Ultimately,
Japan has other options available to it, as unpalatable
as those options may be to both Japan and the United
States. Were Japan to doubt the inviolability of U.S.
security guarantees, or were it to determine that there
was no place for a U.S.-Japan alliance in an “America
First” policy, then there is a real possibility that Japan
would have to develop a security strategy that does
not involve the United States. Japan would have three
options: it could develop an East Asian security system
which did not involve the United States but which
was able to balance against China; it could develop an
independent method of maintaining its own security
and deterring potential adversaries; or it could learn to
accommodate China’s regional interests. The first two
options seem unlikely: as a major economic and military power, China would be difficult for East Asian
states to balance against; moreover, China has proven
its ability to disrupt any regional consensus that runs
counter to its interests.70 It is unlikely that Japan could
develop sufficient conventional military power to
effectively deter North Korea and, if necessary, China.
Although Japan possesses the capability to develop a
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nuclear deterrent, it is unlikely that it would overcome
its overwhelming, deep-seated political and cultural
resistance to doing so. Which leaves accommodation
of China.
Despite the historical antagonism between Japan
and China, there is a logic to such an approach: why
balance against Asia’s ascending major power when
Japan can gain a measure of security by bandwagoning
with it instead? After all, China has significant leverage
over North Korea should it decide to use it, so China
could significantly reduce the severity of the threat that
North Korea poses to Japan. Moreover, China would
also be more likely to negotiate over the Senkakus if to
do so would enable it to drive a wedge between Japan
and the United States or to draw Japan into its orbit.
Should the Japanese come to view the United States as
unreliable, Japan may reluctantly decide that its safest
course is to reconcile itself to the inevitability of Chinese regional hegemony and to accommodate China’s
supplanting of the United States.
Barring the emergence of a domestic political or
economic crisis that derails China’s continued growth
or internal stability, such a policy would increase the
likelihood of China’s ascendance to regional hegemony from a mere possibility to a virtual certainty. The
United States would find that its influence in Northeast Asia and in the greater East Asian region would
be greatly diminished. Japan and other Asia-Pacific
nations would have to subordinate their interests to
those of China in order to maintain harmonious relations. Slowly but surely, China would reshape established rules and norms of regional behavior to fit its
interests. Although China has benefitted tremendously
from the existing international system, it is not wedded
to it, and if it were in a position to set the rules it would
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likely do so in a way that undermined U.S. values and
weakened U.S. economic and security interests.71
Fortunately, the likelihood of this occurring is
low; Japan shows little interest in foregoing its liberal values or in subordinating its interests to China’s.
Japan has amply demonstrated that it is wedded to a
rules-based international approach grounded in liberal values. It also shares a long, conflict prone history with China, and the associated historical baggage
decreases the likelihood of cooperation.72 Although the
possibility is low, it is not non-existent. The Proactive
Contribution to Peace policy makes clear that “Japan
cannot secure its own peace and security by itself,” so
if the United States should demonstrate indifference
to Japan’s security interests, then it may be forced to
seek help elsewhere.73 There is recent precedence for
such an approach. During his short-lived 2009-2010
administration, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama had
intended to prioritize Japan’s relationship with China
over its relationship with the United States.74 Although
Hatoyama’s approach did not represent a full formal
repudiation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is hard to see
how the United States would have fit into the integrated East Asian system that Hatoyama envisioned.75
The Hatoyama administration should be seen as a cautionary tale that demonstrates the U.S.-Japan alliance
is not something that the United States should take for
granted.
RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. POLICY
So what policy approaches should the new Trump
administration take toward Japan? First and foremost,
the Trump administration should continue to encourage Japan as it develops and implements its new
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policy. Japan’s strategic renaissance can bring tremendous benefits to the United States. As one former U.S.
official said of the Abe administration’s policies, “As
far as we’re concerned it’s all good news.”76 The more
Japan assumes a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific, the
more it is able to advance shared Japanese-U.S. interests. As Japan develops closer relationships with other
U.S. allies such as Australia, its actions will serve to
reinforce the U.S.-led security and economic order.
Japan will also be in a better position to use its heightened diplomatic profile to assist the United States in
improving its relationship with important regional
states such as Vietnam.77 Although the occasionally
cautious and incremental nature of Japan’s policy
changes may lead to some frustration in Washington, a
stronger Japan will strengthen U.S. ability to safeguard
its own national interests in the long run.
The United States should also help pave the way for
Japan’s new policy by facilitating a closer Japan-ROK
relationship. Both Japan and South Korea play a critical
role in ensuring stability in Northeast Asia, but their
difficult relationship complicates regional security.
The United States should facilitate the improvement
of the Japan-South Korea relationship by employing
what Mark Manyin from the Congressional Research
Service refers to as the “Commissioner” method of
managing the dispute. In this model, the United States
would focus on advancing the South Korea-Japan-U.S.
trilateral relationship, thereby providing a mechanism for Japanese and South Korean officials to work
together to advance common interests without allowing ongoing disputes to derail cooperation.78 Even if
this trilateral relationship is focused exclusively on
security issues, it can serve as a foundation for a more
comprehensive political and diplomatic relationship.
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Japan has recent experience in this regard: Japan’s
relationship with Australia began as a pragmatic military relationship but has since blossomed into a successful strategic partnership.79 Ultimately, successful
U.S. efforts to improve the Japan-South Korea relationship would significantly advance the national security
interests of all three states.
At the same time, the United States should continue to communicate its disapproval when members
of the Abe cabinet appease or otherwise support Japanese nationalists and ultra-nationalists. The statements and actions of Abe and his cabinet members,
which include trips to the controversial Yasukuni
shrine, attempt to obscure Japanese responsibility for
the Pacific war. Statements that seek to minimize the
depravity of―or simply deny the existence of―wartime atrocities inflicted by Imperial Japan are not only
historically inappropriate, they are also damaging to
Japan’s efforts to improve regional relationships and
to increase its diplomatic leadership role.80
The United States should reciprocate Japanese
efforts to strengthen the alliance. One way to do this
is to deepen U.S.-Japan economic ties. Although the
Trump administration has chosen to pull out of the TPP,
the administration has indicated that it is interested in
pursuing a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with
Japan in its place.81 Such an agreement would deliver
net benefits to both countries by reducing barriers to
trade and anti-competitive subsidies. Although Japan
is the fourth largest U.S. trading partner, it maintains
steep import tariffs and quotas to protect its agricultural industry; the United States provides the largest
share of Japan’s agricultural imports, so it has much to
gain if an FTA reduces Japan’s protectionist policies.82
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The United States should also work with Japan to
renegotiate the 2006 Realignment Roadmap. Although
the Roadmap was an appropriate response to the political and security situation of 2006, it is no longer suited
to fulfill the policy goals of either the United States or
Japan in the new, more challenging security environment. The Realignment Roadmap, which reduces the
U.S. military footprint in Okinawa by rebasing some
U.S. units elsewhere in the Pacific, was designed to
“maintain deterrence and to mitigate the impact of
U.S. forces on the local communities.”83 Yet, while it
successfully reduces the impact of U.S. forces on some
Okinawan communities, it fails to maintain, and indeed
weakens, deterrence. In light of increased Asia-Pacific
security challenges, it is counterproductive for the
United States to reduce its combat power in Japan and
disperse it westward and eastward across the Pacific.
As one senior U.S. military officer commented while
looking at a map that depicted the planned realignment, “All the arrows are moving in the wrong direction.”84 It reduces military capability and signals a
weakening of U.S. resolve, thus reducing deterrence
during an uncertain and increasingly unstable time.85
Advocates for the current plan argue that, while
the plan is far from ideal, reducing the impact of the
U.S. military presence on Okinawa is critical in order
to maintain the “long-term political viability” of the
U.S.-Japan alliance.86 Yet, it is possible to do this without reducing deterrence. The United States and Japan
should continue with the elements of the existing Roadmap that reduce the military footprint on Okinawa but
rebase the displaced units elsewhere in Japan. This
would fulfill the original intent of the Roadmap: it
would reduce the impact of U.S. basing on Okinawa,
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maintain deterrence, signal U.S. resolve, and reassure
Japan of U.S. commitment.87
Finally, the United States should encourage Japan to
continue its existing public discussion on the regional
security environment and on the appropriate roles for
Japan and for the U.S.-Japan alliance to play within it.88
Recent polling demonstrates that the Japanese consider
the United States a reliable partner, and that a majority
of Japanese support the U.S.-Japan alliance.89 This support is crucial for the continued political viability of a
robust U.S. military presence in Japan; the ability of the
Japanese public to identify the link between U.S. basing
and Japan’s security will strengthen public support for
the alliance. Japan is facing an increasingly challenging
security environment, and Japanese citizens are well
served by an informed public discussion on the challenges that exist and on the options available to Japan.
In the long run this will not only increase the popular
consensus that underlies Japanese decision making,
it will also help to improve the U.S.-Japan alliance by
increasing the public’s understanding of the important
role that the United States plays, and that U.S. military
bases and forces play, in Japan’s defense.
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CONCLUSION: GETTING READY FOR THE
ASIAN CENTURY
Although it is notoriously difficult to determine
the shape of the future international environment, current economic and demographic trends indicate that
the Asia-Pacific region will continue to grow in importance. The United States will want to ensure that it is
positioned properly to take advantage of the opportunities that these trends bring, while ensuring that it
can continue to safeguard its national interests. The
U.S.-Japan alliance is sure to play a vital role in those
efforts. Yet, as Japan evaluates its regional environment, it has recognized that the policy approaches that
have served it so well over the past half-century are
no longer suited to the challenges that it faces. Japan
recognizes that the security situation in Northeast Asia
is gradually deteriorating, so its response has been to
reinvigorate its foreign and defense policies to enable
it to increase its contribution to regional and global
stability. Ultimately, this new policy approach serves
the interests of both Japan and the United States. As
the Trump administration designs and implements its
own Asia-Pacific policy, it should seek to ensure that
it remains firmly anchored upon the hugely beneficial
U.S.-Japan alliance.
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CHAPTER 6
CURTAIL, COOPERATE, OR COMPEL IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA?
Robert R. Arnold, Jr.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The United States and China are currently in direct
conflict over each other’s actions in the South China
Sea. Chinese acts include aggressive behavior to further territorial aspirations and excessive maritime
claims, harassment of U.S. military-led Freedom of
Navigation Operations (FONOPS), significant reclamation on disputed land features, and construction of
new infrastructure that serves both military and nonmilitary purposes.
The United States is concerned that China’s activities challenge the existing international order and are
a violation of international law. Maintaining military
freedom of navigation is also a vital U.S. interest. The
U.S. interpretation of freedom of navigation is the most
contentious issue for China.
Although China declared it respects commercial
freedom of navigation and has taken no steps to limit it,
the United States is concerned that China “may change
its mind” and restrict commercial freedom of navigation in the future despite the negative impacts it might
have on both China’s and U.S. economic interests. The
United States takes no position on territorial and maritime claims, but wants to see a peaceful resolution,
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thereby sustaining regional stability. U.S. actions consist of maintaining a strong military presence in the
area, engagement with allies and partners, and freedom of navigation operations near disputed areas to
support United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). China’s main assertion is that U.S. military freedom of navigation operations are intrusions
into its sovereignty and a breach of China’s territorial
integrity. China views state sovereignty and territorial
integrity as core interests. China stated it is committed
to upholding international law, maintaining freedom
of navigation in and flight over the South China Sea,
and to preserving peace and stability by cooperating
with partners throughout the region.
While a proposal to cooperate with China seems
counterintuitive and is likely to be unpopular with
many audiences in the United States, it is the most
productive method to resolve this issue for the following reasons. First, it is the truly pragmatic choice.
Second, this plan has the best chance for long-term
success because it involves China as a willing participant. Third, no matter how hard it tries, the United
States cannot stop the rise of China, short of going to
war. Fourth, if the United States wants a peaceful and
responsible China, it must guide the process. Fifth,
cooperation with China would bring greater international respect and legitimacy for U.S. global leadership
efforts. Finally, the Trump administration’s willingness to accept nontraditional solutions and modifications to the existing international system will enable
the success of this policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States and China are currently in direct
conflict over each other’s actions in the South China
Sea. Chinese acts include aggressive behavior toward
its neighbors to further territorial aspirations and
excessive maritime claims, harassment of FONOPS,
significant reclamation on disputed land features, and
construction of new infrastructure that serves both
military and nonmilitary purposes.1 The primary U.S.
concern is that China’s activities challenge the existing
international order and are a violation of international
law. Since the United States is the leader of the global
system, it views Chinese opposition to the rules and
norms associated with this structure as an attempt to
increase China’s regional and international influence
at U.S. expense. Maintaining freedom of navigation
is also a vital U.S. interest for two reasons. First, the
United States desires assured access for its military
forces throughout the maritime global commons, to
include the South China Sea. This aspect of freedom of
navigation is the most contentious for China. Second,
although the Chinese have stated they respect commercial freedom of navigation and have taken no steps
to limit it, the United States has a very real concern that
China “may change its mind” and restrict commercial
freedom of navigation in the future, despite the negative impacts it might have on both China’s and U.S.
economic interests. Finally, the United States takes no
position on territorial and maritime claims, but wants
to see a peaceful resolution thereby sustaining regional
stability.2 U.S. actions consist of maintaining a strong
military presence, engagement with allies and partners, and FONOPS near disputed areas to support
UNCLOS.
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China’s main assertion is that U.S. military
FONOPS are intrusions into Chinese sovereignty and
a breach of China’s territorial integrity. China holds
state sovereignty and territorial integrity so dear that it
views them as core interests.3 In addition, China stated
it is committed to upholding international law, maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight in the
South China Sea, and to preserving peace and stability
throughout the region.4 Upon examination of China’s
affirmed principles, it would seem the United States
and China share common interests in the South China
Sea. If so, why are the two counties involved in such a
contested dispute? To answer this question, this chapter will address the following four points: 1) the background behind this problem and the contemporary
issues surrounding this issue; 2) U.S. national interests
and China’s core interests; 3) the official government
positions of both nations on the South China Sea; and
4) the current actions of the United States and China
in the area. Lastly, three options will be provided for
review, culminating with a final recommendation
for the current administration to consider as the U.S.
response to China’s actions in the South China Sea.
BACKGROUND
For centuries, China maintained sporadic contact
with South China Sea islands and other land features.
The most frequent use of the area was by Chinese
fisherman.5 As China’s power waned, European colonial nations increased their influence throughout the
region. However, they also generally maintained freedom of navigation for all parties transiting the South
China Sea. The region was administered by Imperial
Japan during World War II, and although Japan was
forced to relinquish all “stolen” land features in the
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Western Pacific, including the South China Sea, as a
part of the post-war settlement, it did not surrender the
“spoils” to any clearly designated recipient country.
In 1946, the Republic of China sent two destroyers
to the South China Sea to “recover” the islands and
land features.6 In the following year, the Republic of
China government proclaimed a vast majority of the
South China Sea with the infamous 11-dash line. The
Chinese claim was through an official map depicting
the area in the South China Sea.7 The Republic of China
did not have the time and effort to take effective control
of its claimed properties in the South China Sea, since
China had become engulfed in a civil war between the
government and Communist forces.
The Nationalist government lost the war and sought
shelter in Taiwan in 1949. The Communists founded
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland.
With respect to the South China Sea, the PRC continued to claim it by using the 11-dash line, yet for a variety of reasons did not exercise much actual control. In
1953, China removed two lines in the Gulf of Tonkin as
a friendly gesture to North Vietnam,8 creating China’s
Nine-Dash Line.9
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
The most contentious territorial claims include
three main areas: Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands,
and Scarborough Shoal. The Paracels are claimed by
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, but have been occupied
and administered by China since 1974 after a successful armed struggle with South Vietnam. Brunei, China,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all
have claims within the Spratlys. All claimants, except
for Brunei, hold land features there. There has been
friction among nations in this area for nearly 30 years,
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as best illustrated by the military conflict between
China and Vietnam in 1988. The Scarborough Shoal is
disputed by China, the Philippines, and Taiwan and
was the site of a stand-off between China and the Philippines in 2012. Although the Sino-Philippine relationship has become more positive since October 2016,
when Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte stated his
desire to move his country closer to China, their discord has yet to be fully resolved.10 A good illustration
of this rift occurred in February 2017 when the Philippines alleged that China might be building on a reef
near the Scarborough Shoal to solidify its claim there.11
Finally, less controversial claims include the Pratas
Islands that is contested by China and Taiwan, but
occupied by Taiwan and the Macclesfield Bank, which
is claimed by China, the Philippines, and Taiwan.12
The conflicting maritime disputes are caused by two
major issues: overlapping Economic Exclusion Zones
(EEZ) that, in accordance with UNCLOS, can extend 200
nautical miles (NM) from internationally recognized
landmasses; and China’s Nine-Dash Line which has
no clear definition and has been officially and successfully debunked. The Nine-Dash Line was challenged
by the Philippines in 2013 when it filed an arbitration
case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration against
China over 15 counts of maritime disagreements, the
most significant of which was the Nine-Dash Line.13 A
year later, China tested one of its maritime assertions
within the Nine-Dash Line by emplacing an oil-drilling platform near the Paracel Islands within Vietnam’s
EEZ. This was the first time the Chinese drilled in an
EEZ that was contested with another nation. It sparked
stern reaction by both the Vietnamese government and
its people. Violent protests broke out, causing damage
to Chinese businesses in Vietnam and resulting in the
death of two of China’s citizens. During the conflict,
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Chinese and Vietnamese vessels were seen colliding at
sea. China eventually removed the oil rig, 1 month earlier than originally planned.14 The Permanent Court of
Arbitration released its results on July 12, 2016, and all
of its rulings were against China. Most significant was
its decision that “there was no legal basis for China to
claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas
falling within the ‘nine-dash line’.”15 China rejected the
whole arbitration act, did not participate in the hearings, and disavowed the ruling. There is a certain bit of
irony in China’s reaction, given its status as a signatory
to UNCLOS since 1996.16 See Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1. Maritime Claims in South China Sea.17
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In late 2013, China started land reclamation in the
Spratlys. In less than 2 years, China reclaimed over
2,900 acres of land at seven of its eight outposts and
built multiple artificial structures on six of its controlled land features in the Spratly Islands. The speed
and scale shocked the United States, the disputants,
and the rest of the world.18 China also stated its territories in the Spratlys would be used for military
and nonmilitary tasks like search and rescue, disaster
relief, scientific research, fishing production, conservation, and maritime safety.19 Previously, in 1993, China
built a military capable airfield and upgraded Woody
Island in the Paracels with “an artificial harbor with a
concrete dock 500-m long and capable of accommodating destroyer and frigate class vessels.”20 In February
2016, China deployed surface-to-air missiles to Woody
Island.21
INTERESTS
According to the National Security Strategy (NSS),
vital U.S. national interests are to maintain global leadership to promote security, prosperity, values, and
international order.22 The specific plan to address interests in the Asia-Pacific, officially called the “Strategic
Rebalance,” had been nested with broader priorities
contained in the NSS. In October 2011, then-Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton introduced the idea of shifting U.S. focus to the region that became known as the
pivot to the Pacific.
We need to be smart and systematic about where we
invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best
position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and
advance our values. One of the most important tasks of
American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be
to lock in substantially increased investment-diplomatic,
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economic, strategic, and otherwise-in the Asia-Pacific
region.23

The next month, former President Barack Obama clarified his intent during a speech to the Australian Parliament.
We seek security, which is the foundation of peace and
prosperity. We stand for an international order in which
the rights and responsibilities of all nations and all people
are upheld. Where international law and norms are
enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation
are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to
regional security, and where disagreements are resolved
peacefully.24

During his inaugural remarks in January 2017,
President Donald Trump prioritized domestic concerns such as employment, internal investment,
national unity, and the transfer of power back to the
population. However, he also addressed international
affairs focused primarily on the NSS priorities of security, prosperity, and values. The President’s comments
supported the need for security through strength and
revealed his desire for greater economic prosperity. Although important, U.S. values should not be
forced.25 The United States would instead “shine as an
example” for other nations to emulate.26 In a true realist
approach, which stresses an international order that is
guided by states focused on attaining interests through
the accumulation of power, Trump proclaimed all
countries have the right to seek their own interests.27
This statement reveals that the Trump administration
may be more accepting of other nations working to
achieve their own interests, likely so long as they do
not compete with U.S. national interests. In the future,
such a perspective may lead to a more multipolar
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system instead of the current U.S.-driven unipolar
international order.28 Even though Trump’s inaugural
address did not specifically mention his position on
continued engagement in the Asia-Pacific, his pledge
to “reinforce old alliances and form new ones”29 seems
to imply that maintaining current bilateral hub-andspoke30 alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines is a priority. Additionally, it is likely that Trump would be open
to engaging new partners in this region and elsewhere
in the world.
Based on China’s claims in the area, it is clear that
their core values are truly held sacred and guide their
every action.
China is firm in upholding its core interests which
include the following: state sovereignty, national
security, territorial integrity and national reunification,
China’s political system established by the Constitution
and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for
ensuring sustainable economic and social development.31

Chinese territorial and maritime assertions in the
East and South China Seas highlight the importance
of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the
desire for national reunification. However, the emphasis on Taiwan is the clearest example of the value of
national reunification. China supports its core interest
of national security by the reform and buildup of its
military, the stated desire for a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula, and by its territorial and maritime claims,
land reclamation, military infrastructure construction,
and by actions within the East and South China Seas.
Although not often mentioned internationally, the bolstering of Chinese military capabilities also strengthens its internal stability.32 China’s increase in economic
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prosperity directly supports its core interest to achieve
sustainable economic and social development. China
created and distributed its specific vision for the future
of the Asia-Pacific in a recent white paper.
China has all along taken the advancement of regional
prosperity and stability as its own responsibility. China
is ready to pursue security through dialogue and
cooperation in the spirit of working together for mutually
beneficial results, and safeguard peace and stability
jointly with other countries in the region.33

The Chinese focus on being responsible and
enhancing peace and stability through dialogue and
cooperation with regional partners should be especially enticing to the Trump administration since these
goals are in line with overall U.S. interests and could
be used to foster a better and closer relationship with
China.
OFFICIAL POSITIONS
In reference to the South China Sea, the four main
themes expressed in the NSS include maintaining freedom of navigation, deterring aggression, resolving
disputes peacefully, and respecting international law
and order.34 First, perceived threats to freedom of navigation within the South China Sea are a major security
concern for the United States because open trade routes
remain absolutely critical to the economic well-being
of the United States, China, and the greater world community. Prosperity is also touted as a key priority in
both the NSS and in statements by Trump. In addition
to accounting for “more than 10 percent of global fisheries production”35 and billions of gallons of oil and gas
reserves,36 “almost 30 percent of the world’s maritime
trade transits the South China Sea annually, including
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approximately $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound
for the United States.”37 While economic protection
remains a genuine concern for the United States, there
is another, often unexpressed, aspect that is crucial for
the United States: unimpeded military access to the
Asia-Pacific region. Since the United States is the preeminent military power with global operational reach,
it must preserve its ability to project military force anywhere in the world, with unopposed access being preferred. China’s military presence in the South China
Sea remains a real threat to U.S. power projection
capabilities. Second, the United States is committed to
deterring aggression in the area. Major global conflict
has been averted for over 70 years because of continued U.S. presence, its relationship with allies and partners, and the inherent security that brings. Third, the
United States would ultimately like to see all disputes
worked out in a peaceful manner that will help sustain
regional stability.38 Finally, international law and order
must be reinforced. This has been facilitated by several
methods. First, sustaining freedom of navigation is
inextricably linked to bolstering international law since
it supports UNCLOS. Although the United States has
not ratified UNCLOS, it follows its tenets, considering
them world norms. Second, deterring aggressive acts
sustains the international order by preserving peace
and stability. Finally, and significantly, strengthening
the rules-based international system supports the leadership and influence the United States enjoys globally.
In December 2016, then President-elect Trump
stated China was building a “massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea.”39 Beyond
that, he has not professed an official position on the
South China Sea. However, both Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis made
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clear and direct statements on the U.S. official position
there. Unfortunately, their comments were not mutually supporting. This led to ambiguity on the actual
U.S. position regarding the South China Sea. At his
confirmation hearing in January 2017, Tillerson stated,
“We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that,
first, the island-building stops and, second, your access
to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”40 His
words seemed to indicate the Trump administration
was planning to take a strong military approach to
Chinese actions in the region. However, in early February 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis contradicted
Tillerson when he declared, “What we have to do is
exhaust all efforts, diplomatic efforts, to try to resolve
this properly, maintaining open lines of communication.”41 He went on to add, “and certainly our military
stance should be one that reinforces our diplomats.”42
Such discord indicates there is no clear U.S. policy on
the South China Sea. Given this fact, the Trump administration may be open to considering a wide variety of
recommended options.
China has consistently stated its position on the
South China Sea emphasizing four main points: being
a regional leader, maintaining peace and stability, following international law, and its dedication to cooperating with partners.
China is an important force for maintaining peace and
stability in the South China Sea. It abides by the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and is
committed to upholding and promoting international rule
of law. It respects and acts in accordance with international
law. While firmly safeguarding its territorial sovereignty
and maritime rights and interests, China adheres to the
position of settling disputes through negotiation and
consultation and managing differences through rules
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and mechanisms. China endeavors to achieve win-win
outcomes through mutually beneficial cooperation.43

First, it is significant for the United States to recognize and welcome the message in the first sentence
of China’s posture statement. Simply stated, China is
telling the world it longs to be an important player in
regional affairs. This desire is a critical first step for
influencing China to become a responsible partner of
the United States. Two of China’s other points were
also noteworthy: peace and cooperation. Given this
promise, it can be inferred that those two particular
themes are important to China. The second point, preserving peace and stability, is imperative to broadening China’s economic progress—that is its main source
of strength.
Additionally, any military action, especially against
the United States, would hamper China’s development
and is not something the Chinese would welcome, at
least for now. Despite its increasing military capability,
China is still no military match for the United States.44
Another aspect of maintaining peace and stability is
China’s stated dedication to the peaceful settlement
of disputes. This assertion also supports international
law and order.
The third point is that China is committed to international law. Although most people in the United
States would likely question this fact, there is a certain
truth to this argument. In spite of China’s poor behavior in the region demonstrated by its bullying actions
in response to territorial ambitions and extreme maritime claims, increased reclamation, and continued
military capable construction, the Chinese have not
blocked commercial vessel freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea. China’s rationale for respecting
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this aspect of freedom of navigation is simple: ensuring the free flow of commercial goods through this
vital trade route is critical to sustain China’s economic
prosperity, so it is within its interest. As previously
mentioned, the real concern for China regarding freedom of navigation is the U.S. military FONOPS, which
China views as provocative. For that reason, China continues to harass, shadow, and impede U.S. warships
conducting this mission. Although not precisely in the
manner the United States would desire, China has also
followed the guidelines of UNCLOS in two ways. It
abides by Article 310, which says signatory states can
provide a declaration or statement upon acceding to
UNCLOS. A small percentage of nations have done so,
with China being one of them. During the ratification
process, China stated the desire “to obtain advance
approval from or give prior notification”45 to foreign
military vessels transiting its EEZ which China considers territorial waters. What China fails to recognize
is that “declarations or statements do not purport to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions
of” UNCLOS.46 In other words, all UNCLOS signatories can make official statements, but doing so will not
alter the rights or precepts guaranteed by the convention.47 China also subscribes to Article 298 of UNCLOS
that allows signatory nations to opt out of certain provisions concerning the resolution of disputes, without
prejudice. This is what China did when it rejected the
ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that held
that China’s “Nine-Dash Line” was inconsistent with
UNCLOS.48
The last Chinese pledge pertains to cooperation
with partners. When coupled with peaceful claim settlement, the Chinese method to achieve both is best
addressed by what it calls a “dual track approach.”
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China proposed this idea to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which emphasized territorial and maritime dispute resolution through
bilateral negotiations while concurrently working
together to maintain regional security and stability
multilaterally.49
China’s dual-track approach means specific disputes are
to be peacefully solved through bilateral negotiations and
consultations by countries directly involved on the basis
of observing historic facts and international law; in the
meantime, peace and stability in the region should be
jointly protected by China and ASEAN countries.50

It is abundantly clear that this method leaves out
the United States, who is not a claimant to South China
Sea territorial or maritime disputes. Actions such as
this are meant to increase China’s regional influence
at the expense of the United States. Given this fact, the
United States must remain engaged in the South China
Sea or its regional influence will be steadily diminished.
ACTIONS
U.S. actions in the South China Sea consist of three
components: a substantial physical military presence,
military exercises and exchanges with allies and partners, and unilateral FONOPS. Forward deployed U.S.
military forces are meant to bolster regional stability and security. Military exchanges with allies and
emerging partners serve two purposes: to improve
the security capacity of traditional allies; and to
engage new partners, including China and important regional organizations like ASEAN, in a cooperative manner mitigating future conflict. The Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC) is one such exercise that meets those
parameters.
168

The exercise’s objectives are to enhance the interoperability
of the combined RIMPAC forces as well as to integrate
new participants in the employment of multinational
command and control at the tactical and operational
levels. In 2014, China participated for the first time.51

U.S. FONOPS have been conducted near contested
territories and excessive maritime claims made by
China, but have been ineffectual in altering China’s
behavior since the execution of FONOPS have not been
aligned with the intended purpose. The United States
proclaims that, within the South China Sea, it “will
continue to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with
international law.”52 However, in many cases, when it
actually performed FONOPS, it constrained itself by
operating as if it was in China’s territorial waters by
purposely sailing beyond 12 NM of disputed land features. Doing so actually legitimized China’s assertions
since its “territorial waters” were being respected.
Additionally, U.S. vessels would often execute innocent passage within 12 NM of the contested land.
Again, such actions supported the very same claims
that the FONOPS were originally meant to challenge,
because innocent passage is only required to be performed within territorial waters.53
China has continued to engage in a number of procedures that supported its territorial and maritime
contentions to include hostile actions against other
claimants, countering U.S. FONOPS, enhancing land
reclamation efforts, and building infrastructure to support military and nonmilitary functions.54 China prefers to employ a mixture of civilian and military assets
to enforce its assertions in the South China Sea. These
include civilian fishermen, Chinese Coast Guard, militia, other maritime law enforcement units, and the

169

People’s Liberation Army Navy who support their
actions.55
Maritime militias may escalate their operations and even
clash with other nations’ ships. They did just that in
2011, when they harassed PetroVietnam vessels near the
Vietnamese coast; in 2012, when they became embroiled
in a standoff with the Philippines over Scarborough
Shoal; and in 2014, when they protected China’s Haiyang
Shiyou 981 oil rig from Vietnamese reprisals. Chinese
militias also impeded U.S. vessels that were conducting
freedom of navigation patrols in waters claimed by China
in 2015.56

Using civilians and other nonmilitary assets to conduct asymmetrical tactics keeps the conflict below the
threshold to be considered an act of war. Neither the
United States nor any South China Sea claimant will
likely go to war with China over its militia ramming
a fishing boat, its quiet land reclaiming actions on
a small reef in the middle of the ocean, or its building of dual-purpose airports on such features. China
knows this reality very well and is following the teachings of ancient Chinese theorist Sun Tzu who stated,
“to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of
skill.”57 These “gray zone” tactics are China’s attempts
to “win without fighting.”58 China’s opposition to U.S.
FONOPS and overflight operations has also been executed using conventional methods. In October 2016, the
USS Decatur conducted FONOPS outside the 12 NM
range of the Paracels. China reacted by dispatching
three ships to follow the U.S. vessel.59 More recently,
China responded to a U.S. aircraft near Scarborough
Shoal where:
on Feb. 8 (local), an interaction characterized by U.S.
Pacific Command as ‘unsafe’ occurred in international
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airspace above the South China Sea between a Chinese
KJ-200 aircraft and a U.S. Navy P-3C aircraft.60

It is not readily apparent if this was an accident or an
intentional encounter, but it is clear that China will
continue resisting U.S. efforts to ensure freedom of
navigation using military assets.
OPTIONS
Three alternatives for changing U.S. policy in the
South China Sea were constructed within the general
framework of curtail, cooperate, and compel. The curtail option would involve the United States halting
FONOPS in the South China Sea, but continuing to
maintain military presence in the region. Additionally, engagement with China using diplomatic and
economic methods would increase. There are three
opportunities present with this choice. First, stopping
FONOPS would provide the United States with the
flexibility to use its economic instrument of national
power to focus on other priorities within the Asia-Pacific, other hotspots around the world, or on domestic issues. During his inauguration, Trump declared
the United States had prioritized the needs of other
nations before its own for too long, creating negative
economic impacts. This might be a chance to invest in
the homeland and elsewhere.
For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the
expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of
other countries, while allowing for the very sad depletion
of our military. We’ve defended other nations’ borders
while refusing to defend our own. And spent trillions of
dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen
into disrepair.61
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Easing the national debt, which in mid-February 2017 amounted to over $19 trillion, would also
be an economic benefit of the curtail alternative since
there would be some cost savings with discontinuing
FONOPS, although this would admittedly be a drop in
the bucket.62 Second, just as stated with the economic
resources, some military assets could be diverted and
refocused on other areas of tension like the Korean
peninsula, the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), and the deterrence of Russia in
Europe. Finally, removing the friction of FONOPS and
concentrating more closely with China on diplomatic
and economic collaboration may lead to a better relationship between the two nations. This could, at some
point in the future, result in even stronger economic
interaction and China’s support for other U.S. security interests like future UN Security Council initiatives, defeating ISIS, dissuading Russian aggression,
rebuking North Korean belligerence, influencing Iranian actions in the Middle East, and prohibiting global
nuclear proliferation.
There are three risks inherent in this option. First,
choosing to discontinue FONOPS may signal a weakening of U.S. global leadership and resolve. This could
send a negative message to U.S. allies and partners
and to near-peer competitors and adversaries, initiating new challenges to U.S. interests if not properly
explained. Second, this action could be politically risky
for the Trump administration for appearing weak on
China. As in the first risk, the rationale of this policy
would need to be clarified for Congress and for the
U.S. public. Finally, diplomatic and economic cooperation may not be compelling enough to influence China
to discontinue its aggressive actions in the South China
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Sea. Building a solid relationship with China may partially mitigate this risk.
The cooperate alternative would focus on collaboration with China on multiple levels and would consist
of executing procedures by employing all instruments
of U.S. national power. Start by communicating with
several audiences, using varied messages. The Chinese government would need to understand why the
United States was seeking greater cooperation. The
plan would be to use China’s own message emphasizing the mutual benefits of cooperation or its “win-win
process.”63 Next, reiterate the respect and affinity the
American and Chinese people have for one another.
The Chinese-American diaspora should be used to
support this theme. The dissemination of U.S. pop
culture or “soft power” may also be very appealing to
Chinese youth. Congress and the U.S. populace would
need to comprehend why cooperating with China was
necessary. This collaboration must be viewed as a positive undertaking that would result in greater security, stability, and economic prosperity for the United
States. The objective to exert greater influence on China
in the long term also must be explained, primarily to
Congress. The international community must recognize the benefit of this approach and believe that this
will facilitate peace, stability, and prosperity. As equal
partners, the United States and China would be able to
maintain and further develop their military and economic strength. Each nation would be able to cooperate
with the other from a position of strength. Diplomatically, given China’s current interest in military-to-military engagement and exercises with the United States
which focus on common interests and challenges such
as antiterrorism, counterterrorism, antipiracy, humanitarian assistance disaster relief (HADR), search and
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rescue, and maritime navigational safety, would be the
best place to begin efforts. In this case, the U.S. military
would be used to further diplomacy.
The current U.S. military maritime strategy emphasized both opportunities and risks in working with
China’s rising military, but welcomed the chance to do
so.
China supports counter piracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden, conducts humanitarian assistance and disaster
response missions enabled by its hospital ship, and
participates in large-scale, multinational naval exercises.
. . . However, China’s naval expansion also presents
challenges when it employs force or intimidation against
other sovereign nations to assert territorial claims.64

Similarly, the Chinese military echoed a desire to work
with U.S. military forces.
China’s armed forces will continue to foster a new model
of military relationship with the US armed forces that
conforms to the new model of major-country relations
between the two countries, strengthen defense dialogues,
exchanges and cooperation, and improve the CBM
(confidence-building measures) mechanism for the
notification of major military activities.65

As the relationship between the United States and
China developed, the level of cooperation would be
expanded to include improved diplomatic, economic,
and military collaboration such as support for critical
U.S. short-term security interests like resolving friction in the East and South China Seas in accordance
with UNCLOS. The United States would first need
to ratify UNCLOS. Later, both countries could work
together on long-term security issues like defeating
ISIS, neutralizing terrorists, stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and deterring the aggressive
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behaviors of North Korea, Russia, and Iran. China’s
Vice Foreign Minister, Liu Zhenmin, supported cooperation with the United States in January 2017 when
he proclaimed, “China is committed to working with
the US to build relations featuring no conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation,
and achieve positive interaction and inclusive coordination in the Asia-Pacific.”66 Another aspect of engagement would be facilitating the nascent relationship
between China and ASEAN, initially regarding the
completion of the code of conduct that will govern the
interaction of China and its neighbors. This effort is
ongoing and scheduled to be completed by the middle
of 2018.67 However, the enduring relationship between
China and ASEAN could be based on China’s dualtrack approach that stresses bilateral negotiations
between South China Sea claimants with multilateral
cooperation on regional security.68
There are three risks associated with this alternative. First is the chance that those receiving the messaging, the Chinese government and people and the
U.S. Congress and people, would not accept the information being provided. Second, this action will not be
successful if China refused to participate, thinking this
was simply an attempt to contain it. Both of these risks
could be reduced by clearly and frequently communicating the intent of this increased engagement. Finally,
there is the risk that China may join forces with the
United States only to build its power and challenge the
United States in the future when China becomes economically and militarily stronger. Strengthening the
relationship with China could help minimize this risk.
With the compel option, more coercive actions
would be taken toward China by utilizing all instruments of U.S. national power. The United States would
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publicly and frequently chastise China for bullying its
weaker neighbors and for refusing to accept the July
2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
Diplomatically, concentrate efforts on isolating China
politically and on building international coalitions to
pursue economic and military action against China
if required. Economically, lead and impose multilateral economic sanctions on China to weaken its financial power base. This would also limit China’s ability
to further reform and equip its military forces with
advanced materiel. Militarily, increase U.S., allied,
and partner military presence in the area and lead a
multinational coalition to patrol the South China Sea
to enforce international law according to UNCLOS. To
maintain legitimacy during this process, the United
States should ratify UNCLOS. The two major opportunities with this plan would be exhibiting very strong
U.S. leadership and vigorous support of international
law and order.
However, this option would also clearly be
extremely high risk since it could lead to armed conflict
with China, as it would be seen as an overt challenge to
Chinese state sovereignty and territorial integrity that
are viewed as “core interests.”69 Pursuing this more
aggressive procedure could push the United States into
what has been termed a “Thucydides Trap.” Former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
Dempsey explained this as: “Thucydides, the Greek
historian, described what he called the ‘Thucydides
Trap,’ and it goes something like this: It was Athenian
fear of a rising Sparta that made war inevitable.”70 The
United States would gain little from a military struggle
with China unless the result was a total defeat of China
which would be difficult to achieve and would expend
plenty of U.S. “blood and treasure.” Additionally,
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such an event would likely cause economic ruin for
the United States and the rest of the world. Other risks
include: economic sanctions would negatively impact
the United States, its allies, and partners; enhanced
U.S. actions in the South China Sea would be costly
and require an increase in U.S. military forces, and it
would be politically risky since it could lead to a war
that neither the Congress nor the American people
would likely support. The risks could only be partially
diminished by explaining expectations to China and
by gaining full consensus on action by the coalition,
the U.S. Congress, and the American people.
RECOMMENDATION
While the suggestion to cooperate with China
in the South China Sea runs counter to the current
mainstream American view and is likely to be unpopular among U.S. national decision makers, it should
be adopted for several reasons. First, it is the most
practical of choices. Based on ongoing economic interaction and the participation of China in U.S. military
exchanges and exercises, a positive baseline for further
cooperation has already been set. It simply needs to
be expanded by working initially on non-contentious
common interests until the relationship matures. Once
this occurs, both parties would then be able to work
together on solving tougher issues. Second, this proposal has the most likely chance for enduring success because it would involve China in the process
as a willing and equal participant. It is easy to see
from current Chinese behavior and statements that
their nation longs for the international recognition of
its greater status in the world. Cooperating with the
United States will afford China the opportunity to
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achieve this without limiting its development. As the
Chinese so aptly say, this would truly be a win-win
situation. Third, no matter how much effort the United
States puts behind this aim, it will not be able to stop
the rise of China unless it is willing to go to war to do
so. Although, this will require a mind shift to accept,
the reality of the situation is that China has “come of
age.” It wants to do more in the world, and it is capable of doing more in the world, so why not let it? This
revelation also comes with the understanding that it
would be far easier to influence China by example than
by coercion or through military conflict. It is probable
that most of the American people would not believe
an armed struggle with China to maintain control of
the South China Sea would be worth the effort. Fourth,
the United States declared it “welcomes the emergence
of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China that plays
a responsible role in and contributes to the region’s
security network.”71 If this statement is true, then the
United States must assist China in doing so. The best
way to accomplish this is to provide China with a solid
example by employing collaborative measures.
Fifth, working together with China would raise
the international standing of the United States and
improve respect for its leadership and legitimacy
globally since this action would show a willingness to
work with other nations to achieve regional peace and
stability. Finally, although this proposal may appear
difficult for the Trump administration to accept, it is
actually more possible now than under the previous
administration. Trump has demonstrated the ability to consider unconventional methods and ways of
thinking. In his inauguration speech, he set the stage
for nontraditional policy by proclaiming the United
States was still committed to cooperating with other
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countries, but that it would now be more accepting
of other nations’ interests. The desire to collaborate
implies the United States does not always have to lead
and that it can work with others to develop solutions
to difficult issues. It also indicates a readiness to allow
a more multipolar world where other countries can
contribute more robustly. Furthermore, the President
stated U.S. values would not be forced and the United
States would lead by example. The option to cooperate
with China is just that, an opportunity for the United
States to lead by example.
We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations
of the world, but we do so with the understanding that
it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first.
We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but
rather to let it shine as an example. We will shine for
everyone to follow.72

The United States has nothing to lose, but much to
gain, by pursuing the option to cooperate with China.
Once given the choice to play, the ball will be in China’s
court, and it will be up to China to accept or decline
such a gracious offer.
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CHAPTER 7
PHILIPPINE AMBIVALENCE TOWARD THE
UNITED STATES: LESSONS LEARNED
Romeo S. Brawner, Jr.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte announced his intention to cut military and economic ties with the United States, the Philippines’
long-time ally, during his state visit to China in 2016.
This caught the international community by surprise
and seems to be a significant setback to the U.S. rebalance effort in the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP). For the
Philippines, the rift is based on perceptions of mistreatment by and inequality with its long-standing
ally. The good news, however, is that there seems to be
a strong opportunity for the Trump administration to
mend fences going forward. With a little political and
cultural astuteness, the United States should be able to
restore its friendship with the Philippines and count
on a strong partnership as both countries pursue their
interests in the IAP.
The Philippines’ discontent with its current relationship with the United States is the product of the
following three factors. First, the Filipino identity of
being a fighter for independence makes them staunch
advocates for Philippine sovereignty. Second, the Philippine centralized political culture places great power
on the President to formulate the country’s domestic and foreign policies and thus expects respect and
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political independence. Third, the Filipino resilience to
natural and international challenges makes the Philippines a fair and rules-abiding player in the international arena and therefore expects reciprocity from its
allies and international partners.
In order to mend fences and to engender a more
amicable and stable relationship, the United States
should intervene less with the domestic affairs of the
Philippines based on the international law principle of
non-interference. The United States should respect the
leadership of the Philippines by considering closely
the country’s political culture and respecting its leadership. This is referenced on the principle of mutual
trust. It is also important for the United States to assure
the Philippines and its other allies that they will abide
by their obligations in accordance with their agreements. They should also bolster their credibility in the
international world order by agreeing to, ratifying,
and complying with the provisions of international
conventions and agreements. This lesson is based on
the international relations principle of reciprocity.
The future holds a lot of promise for the reestablishment of a good U.S.-Philippine relationship under
the Trump-Duterte administrations. Both leaders
have displayed a personal liking for each other but
more importantly, both have stated their desire to
find common areas of cooperation. After all, it is all of
humanity that benefits from a peaceful and harmonious world.
INTRODUCTION
Your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation
from the United States, both in military and economics.
—Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte
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The U.S.-Philippine relationship was rocked in
2016 with the pronouncement of then newly elected
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte that he would
cut ties with the United States of America, the Philippines’ long-time ally. He further announced that he
would build stronger ties with China and Russia. He
made these statements during his state visit to Beijing
in October 2016.1
What led to this pronouncement? Is this merely
the rhetoric of an independent-thinking statesman or
is this a shared sentiment among the Filipino people?
What lessons can we learn from this?
This chapter examines this unexpected policy
change by the Philippines toward its long-standing ally, the United States. It aims to answer two
main questions―first, what factors contributed to the
ambivalence of the Philippine government toward the
United States under the administration of Philippine
President Duterte, and second, what lessons in international relations can we derive from this phenomenon. The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy
and Policy (ACFSP) developed by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in 2008 was
used in the analysis.2
This chapter argues that the change of heart by the
Philippines, following a rekindled romance with the
United States during the previous administration of
Philippine President Benigno Aquino III, is the product of three factors: 1) the Filipino identity of being a
fighter for independence makes them staunch advocates for Philippine sovereignty; 2) the Philippine
centralized political culture places great power on
the President to formulate the country’s domestic and
foreign policies and thus expects respect and political
independence; and 3) the Filipino resilience to natural
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and international challenges makes the Philippines a
fair and rules-abiding player in the international arena
and therefore expects reciprocity from its allies and
international partners.
From these factors above, the three lessons in
international relations that may be derived are: 1)
nations should intervene less in the domestic affairs of
another; 2) an understanding of the political culture of
a country and the respect for its political leadership are
imperative to good bilateral relations; and, 3) a country
should be clear and resolute in reassuring its allies and
partners that it will comply with the obligations under
their treaties and agreements.
THE ANALYTICAL CULTURAL FRAMEWORK
FOR STRATEGY AND POLICY
The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy
and Policy (ACFSP) is a systematic and analytical tool
that may assist strategists and policymakers “view the
world through many lenses.”3 It provides a framework
that analyzes the interests of other players in the international arena through the cultural lens, and then considers these interests in the formulation of strategies
and international policies. A country becomes more
effective in dealing with other state or nonstate players
by using this framework.
The ACFSP identifies three basic cultural dimensions. These are identity, political culture, and resilience. The identity of a people comes from their shared
values, principles, norms, and practices, which are
traceable from its history. The most important dimension is identity because this is where the people draw
their purposes and interests, which in turn, determine
their policies and strategies.4
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The political culture of a country is determined
from its structure of power and decision-making. The
structure of power and decision-making determines
where the political power of a country resides, as well
as the extent to which this power is centralized or distributed. By understanding this dimension, a country
can formulate strategies that will enable it to deal constructively with the political leadership of friendly or
hostile nations.5
Finally, resilience is the capacity or ability to resist,
adapt, or succumb to pressures from the external world.
It is determined from its response to globalization,
global environmental issues, and international institutions. This dimension would tell the world how a particular country would react to international pressures
such as economic sanctions or troop contributions to
coalitions. It also gives a glimpse as to how a country
would interact with other countries and how it would
act within or outside international organizations.6
FACTORS LEADING TO THE AMBIVALENCE
The following sections will present an application
of the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and
Policy to determine the factors that led to the ambivalence of the Philippines toward the United States.
Identity: The Filipino Fighting Spirit
Perhaps the best way to determine the identity of
the Filipino people is to look at their history. One striking aspect of the history of the Philippines is that it is
comprised of a compendium of a peoples’ struggle for
independence. This struggle may be categorized into
three eras: Spanish colonialism, American occupation, and post-independence neo-colonialism. In 1892,
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strong patriotic sentiments among the Filipino elite
began a movement for independence that threatened
to end more than 3 centuries of Spanish rule. This was
the first nationalist movement in Southeast Asia.7 This
movement led to a bloody revolution that nearly won
the independence for Filipinos. However, the ceding
of the Philippines to the United States by Spain in 1899
dashed the Filipino dream for self-rule. The American
occupation of the islands followed this period. Another
revolt by the Filipinos greeted the new colonizers, but
the Americans quickly repelled this through military
and diplomatic maneuvers.
The colonization of the Philippines by the United
States was met with dissention from some lawmakers
in the mainland because it went against the very principles that make up the core of American society―freedom and independence. Nonetheless, the arguments
for the spread of democratic values and the need for
economic expansion of American goods prevailed
over the dissenting views.8
In 1935, the United States gave conditional independence to the Filipinos as the Philippines transitioned to
full independence. The Japanese cut this short with the
attack on Manila, a few hours after their attack on Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii. Finally, on July 12, 1946, the United
States granted full independence to the Philippines.
Some Filipinos felt this newfound independence
was not a total independence. Sentiments of skepticism and continued oppression were manifest across
Philippine society. Some scholars called this the “Era
of Neo-Colonialism.”9 The continued presence of
American military bases contributed to this growing
sentiment. In 1991, it was this same feeling of independence from American neo-colonialism that drove the
Philippine Senate to vote against the renewal of the
U.S.-Philippine Bases Agreement.10
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On the other hand, the presence of American forces
brought a cover of security to a country strategically
situated in the Asia-Pacific region. It was only in the
past decade, however, that Philippine sovereignty was
actually threatened with intrusions into the Philippine
exclusive economic zone by China. These aggressive
actions by China spurred debates within the Philippine
congress and judiciary on whether or not U.S. forces
should be allowed to come back to Philippine shores
on a more permanent status and with larger numbers.
Neo-colonialism may also come through economic
ways. Critics of U.S. economic influence on the Philippines stated that:
The ensuing years [after World War II] were characterized
by political manipulations, through the exploitative
maneuverings of U.S. hegemony, that began to hurt
the country’s economic foundation and put in place the
conditions that later pulled the Philippines down the
path of political decadence and, more seriously, economic
retardation.11

Many of these critics believe that the Philippines is
still at the mercy of international lending institutions
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Some sectors of Philippine society see this
as anti-development because of the restrictive economic and financial policies imposed by these financial institutions.12
Coming out of this colorful history, it is evident
that Filipinos have always had a strong desire to be
fully independent, not just from an occupying power,
but also from neo-colonialist influences. Thus, national
pride is engrained in the Filipino identity. This, therefore, results in the Filipinos’ enduring interest for
self-determination and sovereignty.
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Political Culture: Centralized Presidential System
The Philippines follows a democratic system of
government that has three branches: the executive,
the legislative, and the judiciary. Among these three
branches, however, it is the executive branch, led by
the president, which is the most influential. This form
of government is that of a unitary government with
power centralized in the Office of the President.13 The
president determines the national vision, the national
priorities, and the general policies of the state, including its foreign policies.
The incumbency of former President Ferdinand
Marcos from 1966 to 1986 demonstrates how a Philippine president can have great political power. In
1972, President Marcos declared martial law and took
control of almost all facets of government, including
control of key industries and businesses. His political
reign ended after 2 decades, with a bloodless revolution called the “People’s Revolution” when millions of
people gathered in the nation’s capital calling for his
resignation. Marcos went into exile with his family to
Hawaii.14
Because of this experience under a dictatorship,
the newly formed government under former President
Corazon Aquino instituted reforms to limit the powers
of the president. The 1987 Philippine Constitution
embodies these limitations to presidential power.15
Despite the delimiting constitutional provisions, however, the Philippine president still exercises great political powers and the incumbency of Duterte manifests
this trend.
When Duterte took over the seat of power in the
Philippine government, he placed a premium on the
resolution of domestic issues over international concerns. One of his top priorities was to get rid of the
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drug menace and criminality that plagued most of
Philippine society. This “war on drugs and crime” has
resulted in the death of thousands of drug pushers and
users as well as other criminals. However, it also produced critics, both domestic and international.
In August 2016, a rift between Duterte and former
U.S. President Barack Obama sent ripples in the international media. This came about after Obama made
statements criticizing the human rights violations and
extrajudicial killings resulting from Duterte’s war on
drugs and crime. This statement was not taken well
by Duterte and it prompted him to announce that he
was abrogating ties with the United States.16 He further said Russia could be a very important ally of the
Philippines because “they do not insult people, they
do not interfere.”17 Obama was not the only recipient of the tirade from Duterte. United Nations (UN)
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the European Union,
and the Catholic Church also received similar remarks
from the Philippine president for contrary opinions
against the manner of conduct of the “war on drugs
and criminality.”18
From the instances mentioned above, it is clear that
because of the centrality of political power inherent on
the Philippine president, personality and experiences
play an important role. A study made on former U.S.
Presidents demonstrates that the personality of the
national leader played a big role in determining his
vision and priorities for his country, as well his effectiveness as a leader.19 Another study made at the U.S.
Army War College in 2010, argues that the personality and leadership style of the American Chief Executive strongly influences the relationship of the United
States with the Philippines.20
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What was it in Duterte’s experience and personality that led to his change in policy toward the United
States? In several fora, the president admitted to being
“left-leaning,” having been a student of the Communist Party of the Philippines founder, Jose Maria Sison.
This inclination toward the left has instilled in the
president anti-American and anti-colonial sentiments
early on in his life.21 This anti-American sentiment was
fueled further by several not-so-pleasant experiences
with the United States. He claimed that the United
States once denied him a visa, and in another instance,
airport officials detained him at the Los Angeles airport while he was in transit to South America. Perhaps
the more serious matter is his claim that the United
States was behind the bombing of Davao City when he
was still its mayor. He also claims that alleged agents
of the Central Intelligence Agency rescued the bombing suspect who was a U.S. citizen.22
Looking at recent events, it is evident that the president has a disdain for criticism of his policies, but a
liking for anyone or any nation that approves of his
domestic war on drugs. For instance, Duterte made
public his appreciation of two countries in the region,
China and Japan, that declared their support for his
drug and crime policies. On September 29, 2016, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said
in a press briefing, “Under the leadership of President
Duterte, the new Philippine government enacted policies that prioritize combating drug-related crimes.
China understands and supports that.”23 On the other
hand, during Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
visit to the Philippines in January 12, 2017, he declared
his support for Duterte’s war on drugs saying, “on
countering illegal drugs, we want to work together
with the Philippines to think of relevant measures of
support.”24
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These series of statements and incidents certainly
reflect the centralization of political power in the seat
of the Philippine presidency, which, in turn, depends
to a great deal on the personality and experiences of
the president. Consequently, this results in an expectation that the international community will recognize
this Philippine political culture and respect its national
leadership.
Resilience: The Philippine’s Position in the
International Order
Perhaps Filipinos are some of the more resilient
people on this planet considering the number of natural calamities that affect the Philippines annually.
An average of 20 typhoons hit the country per year
because of its geographical location along the Pacific
Rim of Fire. In addition, several earthquakes shake
the country, claiming thousands of lives and millions
of dollars’ worth of properties. Despite these natural
calamities, the Filipino people have risen repeatedly to
recover from destruction to normalcy within a short
period of time.25
This realization of the vulnerability of mankind
against natural disasters led the Philippine government
to set up an extensive network with local and international organizations in order to mitigate the effects
of these disasters. There have been several instances
when this collaborative effort of the Philippine government with international humanitarian institutions has
been demonstrated and proven effective, contributing
to the strengthening of the resilience of the Filipino
people.
Aside from resilience to natural calamities, resilience is also defined as the ability of a nation to resist,
adapt, or succumb to pressures from the external
199

world. It is determined from its response to globalization.26 Thus, the resilience of a nation is measured not
only by how it reacts to international issues, but also
by how it deals with other nations in the international
community.
In the international realm, the Philippines is seen as
one of the pioneering countries that has supported globalization through the establishment of international
institutions. This is manifested in the fact that the Philippines is one of the first countries to join the UN. Manila
was also the venue in the establishment of the South
East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Currently,
aside from the UN, the Philippines is a member of the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), among others.
The Philippines also has bilateral relations with
other countries, but its biggest diplomatic relation is
with its only ally, the United States. This alliance is
clearly established in the Mutual Defense Treaty that
was signed in 1951, but is still in effect today. It stipulates that the two parties should go to the aid of the
other in the event of an attack on its territory or people,
whether on land or on a ship in the Pacific. More than
just a defense agreement, however, the Mutual Defense
Treaty emphasizes the peaceful resolution of international disputes, the development of the capacity, either
separately or jointly, to resist or counter an attack, and
the necessity for collaboration in other areas such as
law enforcement, counterterrorism, and humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief.27
During his visit to the Philippines in April 2014,
Obama said, “[the U.S.] commitment to defend the
Philippines is ironclad and the United States will keep
that commitment, because allies never stand alone.”28
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It was also during this visit where Obama and Aquino
signed the Enhance Defense Cooperation Agreement
(EDCA). The EDCA would allow an increased U.S.
military presence in the Philippines on a rotational
basis, thus enhancing the defense capabilities of both
nations as well as improving the maritime security situation in the region.29
Despite this new defense agreement, however,
there is still the lack of assurance that the United States
will come to the aid of its ally in the event of an attack
by China. According to Pacifico A. Agabin, a former
dean of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines:
our reliance to the Mutual Defense Treaty and assurance
of U.S. is purely illusory. The treaty, which guarantees
mutual support in the event of an attack on either the
Philippines or the U.S., has its limits. For one, the U.S. has
no automatic participation since the U.S. Congress has
yet to pass an operating law for the treaty.30

Another factor to be considered is the perceived
lack of credibility of the United States in its desire to
establish a rules-based order in the region. While the
United States insists that the countries in the region
should adhere to the United Nations Convention on
the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), the U.S. Senate has not
ratified this international convention. This does not
speak well of a global power that considers the establishment of a rules-based international order as one of
its enduring interests. On the contrary, ratification of
the UNCLOS would strengthen the U.S. position as a
global power.31
From these analyses, we deduce that Filipinos are
very resilient as a people, particularly when dealing
with natural disasters as well as when dealing with
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globalization and the international challenges and
issues that go with it. As a member of the international
community, Filipinos are fair and just players, who
honor the rule of international law and thus expect
reciprocity from their international allies and partners.
LESSONS LEARNED
Considering the factors mentioned above, what
then could we learn? The following lessons can be
gleaned from the ambivalence of the Philippines to the
United States: first, states should respect the culture
and identity of other countries and interfere less in their
domestic affairs; second, countries should ascertain
the power culture of the target country and deal with
its political leadership in an appropriate manner; and
third, countries should assure their allies and partners
that they will abide by their obligations as stipulated
in the agreements they may have, while establishing
their credibility as fair and resolute international players. These lessons are discussed, drawing foundational
references from principles in international relations
and international law.
Less Intervention
History is replete with examples of a people’s
victory following a struggle for freedom and independence. The American independence story is one
excellent example. At the end of the struggle, the
American people got what they desired―freedom and
independence from Great Britain. However, in modern
times, countries may still struggle for independence,
not from an occupying power but from a dominant
country trying to impose its will on the other through
intervention.
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As such, the international law principle of non-interference was developed. This principle was also
written into the UN Charter. The Charter states,
“every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without
interference in any form by another State.”32 Thus, a
nation-state acting independently from any external
intervention is able to chart its own course and follow
this in the best way it sees fit. It does this to pursue
fully its national interests in consideration of its culture and resources.33
The newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump
seemed to share this point of view when he said during
his inaugural speech on January 20, 2017:
We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations
of the world, but we do so with the understanding that
it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first.
We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but
rather to let it shine as an example.34

The principle of non-interference is also explicitly
written in the charter of the ASEAN. International
theorists share the view that the principle of absolute
non-interference in the internal affairs of states is a
central pillar of Southeast Asian regionalism.35
During the formal launching of the Philippine
chairmanship of the ASEAN for 2017, Duterte called
on ASEAN Dialogue Partners to:
renew their dedication to the valued purposes and
principles stated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation―
including non-interference―in promoting regional peace
and stability through abiding respect for the rule of law.36

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia is a peace treaty among Southeast Asian countries,
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signed by the founding members of the ASEAN
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand) on February 24, 1976. Today, there are 30
signatories to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia, including the United States, the European Union, and China.
Article I of the Treaty states its purpose as “to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity, and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to
their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.” Article 2 enumerates its fundamental principles as follows:
a.	
Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty,
equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of
all nations;
b.	The right of every State to lead its national existence
free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
d.	
Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful
means;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
f. Effective cooperation among themselves.37

This brings to light the differences in the way the
West views intervention in contrast to how the East
views it: “Western global governance norm of interventionism is being challenged by East Asian norm of
non-interference and territorial integrity.” The West
views interventionism as a way to implement their
role as the governor of the world affairs. On the other
hand, the East translates this seemingly benign act as
an affront to their sovereignty and an act of absolute
intervention.38
Hence, from the discussion above, one lesson that
we could draw is that countries should interfere less
into the domestic issues of another.
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Respect for Political Culture and National
Leadership
In the previous section, one of the factors that contributed to the ambivalence of the Philippines to the
United States is the centralized political culture that
places much power in the Office of the President.
Because of this, the personality and experiences of the
president play a big role in the shaping of national policies. Therefore, a lesson that we can draw from this is
that if a country wishes to have an effective bilateral
relation with another, it has to consider the political
culture of that country and try to deal with its national
leadership in an appropriate manner.
This lesson is based on the principle of mutual
respect. A study made by Reinhard Wolf argues that
the “peoples’ fundamental interest in self-respect
makes them insist on receiving from other people a
proper respect and recognition of their equality.”39
Wolf also claims that when:
U.S. President Barack Obama promised numerous
nations new relationships based ‘on mutual respect’,
many foreign leaders had already begun to insist on being
‘duly respected’ by the United States and other (mostly
Western) countries.40

This principle was deemed violated by the U.S.
President, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, and
the Secretary General of the UN, from the point of view
of Duterte, when the former high officials criticized the
latter’s war on drugs and crime. Considering the political culture of the Philippines, as well as the personality
of Duterte, a more appropriate response to the Philippine’s war on the drugs and crime would have been
an offer of assistance through legally accepted means
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on this campaign to eradicate the drug menace and the
culture of crime from the country.
Assurance for Allies and Partners
The third factor that was identified as contributing
to the ambivalence of the Philippines to the United
States is the resilience or ability to adapt to globalization by the Filipino people. History has proven that Filipinos have embraced globalization even in its infancy
as a nation by joining international organizations,
abiding by their norms, and respecting international
law. It is therefore natural for the Philippines to expect
the same from its ally, partners, and friends.
Unfortunately, the current sentiment in the Philippines is that the United States will not abide by its obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. Therefore, a
lesson learned from this factor is that countries should
be resolute in their relationships with their allies and
partners and should give assurances that they will
abide by obligations as stipulated in their treaties and
agreements. This lesson is based on the principle of
reciprocity.
Generally, reciprocity in international relations is
the appropriate form of behavior of sovereign states
that creates cooperation between them. The principle
of reciprocity as it relates to treaties and agreements
is known as specific reciprocity. It states that a country that has entered into a treaty or agreement with
another must abide by its obligations as it expects the
latter to abide by its obligations as well.41
Another kind of reciprocity is the diffuse reciprocity where a body of norms dictates how nations
should act within alliances, coalitions, and international organizations. One such norm is the expectation
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that nations would comply with its obligations, even
if carried in the future.42 Therefore, an assurance that a
nation will respect and will comply with its obligation
is important. An incentive for such an assurance is the
maintenance of its reputation as a responsible player
in the international arena.43
The United States should likewise establish its credibility as a global power by ratifying the UNCLOS. This
will give credence to the pursuit of its enduring interest
of promoting a rules-based international order. While
it could be argued that the United States has been honoring and adhering to the provisions of the UNCLOS
even without ratification by the U.S. Congress, a formal
approval of the convention will send the signal to the
world that the United States means business when it
comes to protecting the global commons.
CONCLUSION
A lot can be learned from the controversy that was
created by the surprising statements made by Philippine President Duterte. Although dismissed by some
as merely the rhetoric of a strong-minded national
leader, his statements may have wisdom that could
remind nations of some basic principles or concepts in
international relations.
It is useful for a country to consider not only its
own interests but the interests of the other nations as
well, especially when it is formulating its foreign policies and strategies. This is why it is essential to view
the world from the other nation’s lens.
Using the ACFSP, this chapter argues that the
change of policy by the Philippines toward the United
States is the product of decades long of colonialization and neo-colonialization, a centralized Philippine
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political culture, and the resilience of the Filipino
people to national and international challenges. From
these factors, the following lessons can be learned:
First, nations should intervene less with the domestic
affairs of another nation. This is based on the principle in international law of non-interference. Second,
states should respect the leadership of other countries
by considering closely the political culture of the target
country. This is referenced on the principle of mutual
trust. Third, it is important for nations to assure their
allies and partners that they will abide by their obligations in accordance with their agreements. They should
also establish their credibility in the international
world order by agreeing to, ratifying, and complying
with the provisions of international conventions and
agreements. This lesson is based on the international
relations principle of reciprocity. In the end, it all boils
down to how well one nation treats another.
The future holds a lot of promise for the reestablishment of the U.S.-Philippine relationship under the
Trump-Duterte administrations. Both leaders have displayed a personal liking for each other but more importantly, both have stated their desire to find common
areas of cooperation. After all, all of humanity benefits
from a peaceful and harmonious world.
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CHAPTER 8
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE
CYBER DOMAIN: STOP THE
DOWNWARD SPIRAL
Steven M. Pierce

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The cyber domain has the potential to profoundly
influence other domains such as land, maritime, and
space and, consequently, the way nations employ
national power in and across those domains. What
happens in the cyber domain does not stay in the cyber
domain. This is especially significant for U.S.-China
relations. For better or worse, the United States and
China have a contentious cyber relationship. There is
ample evidence that actions taken by the two nations
have affected broader U.S.-China relations negatively
and intensified distrust between the two nations. It is
imperative that the United States and China take measures to stop the downward spiral in cyber space and
find ways to cooperate within the cyber domain to
ensure stability across the other domains. Specifically,
the United States and China should:
• Focus early on cooperation in areas that both
the United States and China view as harmful
or criminal but that are not politically charged.
Examples include cybercrime, protection of
critical infrastructure, supply chain security,
intellectual property theft, and prevention of
proliferation of cyber capabilities to violent

215

extremist organizations and other nonstate
actors.
• Follow-up on the September 2015 U.S.-China
Cyber Espionage Agreement with specific and
actionable measures aimed at curbing cyber-enabled commercial espionage, theft of intellectual property, and cybercrime.
• Increase people-to-people exchanges between
the two countries. Exchanges of U.S. and Chinese citizens in academia and technology related
industries could help build shared understanding and trust at the lowest levels.
• Further discussion of “red lines” in the cyber
domain. The discussion of red lines is essential to avoid miscalculation and misjudgment
during crises that could lead to unintended
escalatory actions on both sides.
INTRODUCTION
Why is it important that the United States and
China get along? While no two nations always agree
completely on every issue, it is important for the
world’s two greatest powers to find common ground
upon which to anchor their relationship because, ultimately, that relationship will have implications for
the other nations of the world. As Travis Tanner and
Wang Dong of the National Bureau of Asian Research
asserts:
Given that the global challenges facing the world today
cannot be resolved without both the United States and
China, calculations in the cyber, maritime, nuclear, and
space domains are increasingly consequential and carry
implications for other nations.1
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Even though the relationship between the United
States and China is currently “stronger than it has ever
been,” there exists an:
increasing number of sources of tension and
disagreement. . . . In addition, general strategic mistrust
plagues the relationship and carries the potential...to
quickly exacerbate tensions and bring about a harmful
deterioration of the relationship or even conflict.2

CYBER DOMAIN STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
As is the case with many emerging, immature
technologies, cyber is a domain that can be at once
an opportunity and a vulnerability. As Sven Sakkov,
Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense
Centre of Excellence, explains it:
Everything that is good and everything that is bad in
human nature have their manifestations in cyberspace. The
ultra-rapid advancement of technology has challenged
and outpaced the development of the normative
frameworks that should limit malicious activities―be it
crime, hacktivism or state-sponsored activities.3

Albert Einstein’s observation that “All our lauded
technological progress―our very civilization―is like
the axe in the hand of the pathological criminal” could
be as true today with respect to the cyber domain as
it was 100 years ago when he penned it in a letter to a
colleague.4 This idea of the duality of the domain—that
it can be both an opportunity and a vulnerability—is
explored in more detail in the analysis of how the U.S.
and China view the domain differently.
The description and characteristics section begins
with a definition of the cyber domain. The 2006 National
Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations defines it
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as “a domain characterized by the use of electronics
and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify
and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”5 As Viktor Nagy of
the National University of Public Service in Budapest,
Hungary, notes, even though the domain is relatively
new when compared to the other strategic domains,
it “has evolved enough to significantly affect geostrategy.”6 The cyber domain is the first man-made domain
and while it exists primarily as a virtual world, nationstates and nonstate actors interact in it in much the
same way as they do in the other physical domains,
and those interactions often result in “very real effects.
Similarly to the advent of human activity in the other
domains, cyberspace is now strongly contested.”7
While much of the domain exists in a virtual space,
there are critical physical infrastructure and nodes
that enable operations, and much of that infrastructure resides within the United States. Adam Segal and
Tang Lan of the National Bureau of Asian Research
explain the structure this way: “A small number of
Internet providers carry the bulk of data over the backbone, and a majority of Internet data is drawn in and
routed through the United States, even if it makes little
geographic sense.”8 Because of the U.S. commitment
to maintaining an open internet and the free flow of
information, the result is that “American cyberspace is
one of the least secure online realms.”9 A major reason
for this is simply the sheer number of users connected
to the internet.
The United States has so many computers and so much
of the Internet’s underlying infrastructure—with perhaps
500 million hosts compared to 20 million for China—it is
not surprising that so many criminal attacks originate or
pass through here.10
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The sheer numbers of connected devices in the United
States is a measure of America’s dependence on the
cyber domain and increases U.S. vulnerability to
attacks in the domain.
Another challenge is the anonymity that the domain
provides. As one expert writes:
it is virtually impossible to differentiate legitimate
Internet traffic from traffic with a malicious purpose.
Information that has been stolen from somewhere, or
that contains commands that will ‘flip a switch’ in such a
way as to cause severe damage to a critical infrastructure
system, is extremely difficult to identify.11

Unlike the other physical domains where actions can
be observed to a great degree with existing systems:
We have no early warning radar system or Coast Guard
to patrol the borders in cyberspace . . . [and] information
of an attack will come first from those being attacked.
Therefore it is highly unlikely that a government
organization, unless it is actually the target of a cyberattack, will have greater situational awareness.12

Although many countries interact in the cyber
domain, there are three primary nations that possess
the majority of cyber capability and cyber power: the
United States, China, and Russia.13 This concentration
of power is an interesting characteristic for a domain
with the potential to connect billions of people around
the world. In a speech given in Seoul, South Korea, in
2015, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated,
“Roughly three out of every five people in the world
today remain without internet access―and in the poorest countries that figure can top 95 percent.”14
Another characteristic of the cyber domain, not
unlike the other domains, is the number of stakeholders with an interest in it. A key attribute of the domain
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is that “states, organizations, corporations, and even
individuals can have major, global impact.”15 The reality is that “a variety of nongovernmental actors are
significant players in each country’s use of and deliberations about the cyber realm.”16 Due to the nascent and
ever-evolving nature of the domain, “it is hard to set
boundaries between the responsibilities of civilian and
military agencies, creating the need for intense coordination between all actors involved.”17 Complicating the multi-stakeholder environment is the fact that
these stakeholders do not all share a common vision
of what “security” or “openness” within the domain
means, even though these concepts affect both developed and developing countries interdependently.18
The cyber domain is also characterized by its dual
nature of providing immense opportunities, while at
the same time allowing nefarious actors to take advantage of its vulnerabilities. One researcher explained it
this way:
In a way, the world has become a victim of its own
developmental successes. Over the last two decades, we
have seen an incredible amount of openness in commerce
and the exchange of ideas. However, with openness
comes much vulnerability.19

On the same topic, former U.S. Secretary of State Kerry remarked, “obviously, the internet is not without
risk―but at the end of the day, if we restricted all technology that could possibly be used for bad purposes,
we’d have to revert to the Stone Age.”20 While actors
in all the strategic domains continue to evolve their
actions to gain advantage, nowhere is this evolution
more pronounced than in the cyber domain where
new opportunities and vulnerabilities seem to emerge
daily. James Clapper, the former Director of Nation-
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al Intelligence, described one such evolution at a U.S.
Congressional hearing in September 2015:
The next frontier in cyberspace will feature the
manipulation of data, rather than theft or destruction.
Such tools could be used to alter decision making, and
prompt business executives and others to question the
credibility of information they receive.21

Another key aspect of the cyber domain is that it:
enables a new sphere for great powers to carry out
conflicts directly among each other (and any other power
for that matter). Previously, their behavior was frozen at
a certain level due to the strategic nuclear stalemate.22

However, the domain is not just occupied by great
powers. While it may be true that “the overwhelming
advantage of developed countries can also be reflected
in distribution and management mechanism of physical facilities of key infrastructures that ensure operation of global cyberspace,” there are also possibilities
for smaller countries to develop significant cyber capabilities that can offset comparative advantages held
by larger powers.23 As one national security author
noted, “Because of its ability to render long-established positions in other domains irrelevant, and the
chance to operate with only the slightest risk of detection, cyberspace is now . . . at the center of global geostrategic struggle.”24 This duality of the cyber domain
is analyzed in relation to U.S. and Chinese views of the
domain.
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DOMAIN’S INFLUENCE ON THE INSTRUMENTS
OF NATIONAL POWER
Unlike actions in some of the other strategic
domains, what happens in the cyber domain does not
remain there. Actions taken in the cyber domain and,
more importantly, their effects, spill over into and can
influence all other domains. The result is that cyber
domain operations influence all of the instruments of
national power, and can do so almost instantaneously.
For that reason, cybersecurity is not only the responsibility of the military but also the civilian national security agencies.25 As Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi of
the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings noted
in a 2012 study, “Recent years have witnessed the dramatic transformation of economic, military, and social
activities in a way that makes the digital world increasingly critical to all three.”26
The United States operates in the cyber domain to
further its interests across all the instruments of power.
As U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Eric Rosenbach
stated recently regarding the U.S. cyber operations:
The place where I think it will be most helpful to senior
policymakers is what I call ‘the space between’. What is
the space between? . . . You have diplomacy, economic
sanctions . . . and then you have military action. In
between there’s this space . . . [and] there are a lot of
things that you can do in that space . . . that can help us
accomplish the national interest.27

Just as the United States operates in the domain to
further its national interests, so do other nations. As
Nagy asserts, “cyberspace is now vital for maintaining national power at its entirety and thus for national
security.”28 He points out that currently the United
States, China, and Russia account for the majority of
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world cyber power and defines cyber power as “the
ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and
influence events in other operational environments
and across the instruments of power.”29 He states that
the reason for the United States and its adversaries to
build up their cyber capabilities is simple: “Whereas
China’s and Russia’s incentive for building national
cyber power was to counterweigh overall Western
power and to catch up, the West’s is to defend that very
power.”30 To do that, China and Russia took advantage
of U.S. dependencies on information technologies:
in increasing areas of the economy, society, politics, and
the military . . . and for a time they managed to turn their
greatest disadvantage―lack of advanced information
infrastructure―to an effective weapon and tool against
the West.31

They did not just focus their efforts on military power,
but across all instruments of national power by “accessing and copying highly sensitive data of direct military, diplomatic, and economic importance.”32
This strategy of near-simultaneously disrupting or
degrading all instruments of power pursued by our
adversaries is no secret. As Segal and Tang reveal:
Chinese open-source writings discuss the importance of
seizing information dominance early in a conflict through
cyberattacks on command-and-control centers. Follow-up
attacks would target transportation, communications,
and logistics networks to slow down an adversary.33

It is important to remember that the cyber domain is
still relatively young and that:
In the near future, the size of the international cyber stage
and the number of actors upon it will grow. Governments
will both want and need to flex their digital muscles in

223

order to gain a comparative advantage in political and
military affairs.34

This analysis of the cyber domain’s influence on the
instruments of national power will now highlight some
examples across the diplomatic, information, military,
and economic instruments of power.
Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Diplomatic Power
The United States uses the cyber domain to enhance
its statecraft and diplomatic efforts around the world.
As then-Secretary of State Kerry explained it in a recent
speech in South Korea:
The internet is, among many other things, an instrument
of freedom. . . . So of course, some leaders are afraid of it.
They’re afraid of the internet in the same way that their
predecessors were afraid of newspapers, books, and the
radio, but even more so because in this case, because of
the interactivity that allows for a free-flowing discussion
and the exchange of views―activities that can, and often
do, lead to change.35

This discussion of the cyber domain as an avenue
to lead change is not simply hollow rhetoric coming
from senior-level U.S. leaders. The United States has
committed resources to supporting change agents in
regions it believes can most benefit. Between 2008 and
2012, the U.S. Department of State spent approximately
$100 million:
to fund activities such as training digital activists in
hostile environments and developing circumvention
tools to bypass state-sponsored Internet filters . . . [and]
in September 2015, U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations Samantha Power announced a $10 million
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venture-capital-like fund for the development of new
circumvention technologies.36

Many of these “circumvention technologies” are
aimed at getting around firewalls that are established
by authoritarian regimes to limit their citizens’ access
to the unfiltered internet.
Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Information Power
The cyber domain’s influence on the information instrument of power is mainly as a conduit for
influence or information operations. As a matter of
policy, the United States has a “stated interest in the
free flow of information.”37 In three speeches between
2010 and 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described information networks as a “new nervous system for our planet” and stated “users must be
assured freedom of expression and religion online, as
well as the right to access the Internet and thereby connect to websites and other people.”38 One expert has
a starker view of information operations specifically
related to U.S.-China interactions when he asserts:
INFOOPS [Information Operations] plays a pivotal role
in the unfolding ‘cold war’ between the United States
and China for the domination of the Western Pacific. Both
American and Chinese military doctrine builds heavily
on INFOOPS.39

He continues with the warning that an information
operation “is considered a basis for the growing Chinese capabilities to execute non-nuclear first strike
against American and Allied military assets in the
Western Pacific theatre of operations.”40 In this sense,
the domain’s influence on the information instrument
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of national power can have a direct influence on the
military instrument of power.
Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Military
Power
The cyber domain’s influence on the military
instrument of national power is arguably the most
profound of the four instruments. Its emerging importance led one observer to note, “National and military
presence in cyberspace has become vital to maintain
presence in all other domains, putting its importance
in supporting land and sea powers on par with air and
space power.”41 An important aspect of the domain is
that, while it is discussed and studied as a stand-alone
domain, “it also affects the [military’s] other four operational domains: land, air, sea, space.”42 Of particular
significance is the fact that the U.S. military is reliant
on not just critical military infrastructure but also critical civilian infrastructure to execute its missions. Forrest Hare of the George Mason University School of
Public Policy notes:
cyber-attacks that degrade the ability to command and
control national security assets and attacks that disrupt
critical infrastructure have direct implications to national
security. This infrastructure may be civilian, military, or
both.

He continues by stating that the “Department of
Defense relies heavily on the nation’s public and private cyber infrastructure backbone for communications purposes.”43
Another example comes from a 2013 study conducted by the U.S. Defense Science Board entitled
“Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber
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Threat.” In its report, the Board warned that the “benefits to an attacker using cyber exploits are potentially
spectacular. . . . U.S. guns, missiles, and bombs may
not fire, or may be directed against our own troops.”44
The report continued with:
Resupply, including food, water, ammunition, and
fuel may not arrive when or where needed. Military
Commanders may rapidly lose trust in the information
and ability to control U.S. systems and forces. Once lost,
that trust is very difficult to regain.45

Not only can the domain influence military power
through attacks and information manipulation, but
also by enabling adversaries to gain advantages
through cyber espionage. As one reporter notes:
China’s cyber-espionage is also of deep concern to
the Pentagon, which fears Beijing is focused both on
stealing plans for advanced armaments to build its own
versions and on using that know-how to develop ways
of countering high-tech American aircraft, drones, and
other battlefield armaments.46

This cyber-enabled espionage allows our adversaries
to counter potentially some of our most cutting-edge,
sophisticated military technology without having to
invest large amounts of resources in costly weapons
systems research and development over many years.
A Washington Post article stated that groups, including China’s People’s Liberation Army hackers, “stole
information from over two dozen Defense Department weapons programs, including the Patriot missile
system and the U.S. Navy’s new littoral combat ship.”47
This theft of sensitive military information happens on
both military and civilian industrial networks, highlighting the fact that the United States cannot simply
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secure its military networks to shield against the threat.
A recent example is the potential loss of design and
capabilities information of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
As Hare explains it:
The information was stolen from private, proprietary
industry networks (meaning no government access or
frequent auditing), and it apparently contained several
terabytes of design data on the future air defense
capability for several nations.48

Because of incidents such as these, the U.S. military
is investing scarce resources to counter the threat. The
U.S. Air Force, for instance, is creating a “new, fulltime office dedicated to protecting its weapons systems from cyber-attacks.”49 The organization, known
as the Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems,
was inaugurated with the acknowledgement that:
even though a modern jet fighter is essentially a flying
network of computing systems that’s vulnerable to cyber
threats, it’s an exquisitely customized one that doesn’t
quite fit the procedures the government usually employs
to protect its traditional IT [information technology]
systems.50

Protecting U.S. military systems from threats in
the cyber domain will require properly identifying
threats and adequately allocating resources during
the acquisition and budgeting processes. As General
Ellen Pawlikowski, Commander, U.S. Air Force Materiel Command, recently noted, “getting weapons systems into a more cyber-secure condition would likely
take another 5 to 7 years, partially because the military’s budgeting process to date has not yet made it a
priority.”51
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Finally, the cyber domain’s influence on military
power must be a consideration of multinational efforts
with U.S. allies. Actions taken by adversaries against
U.S. allies can have consequential outcomes for the
United States. As the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Wales Summit Declaration stated:
We affirm . . . that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core
task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyberattack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would
be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case
basis.52

Domain’s Influence on the Instruments of Economic
Power
There is no doubt about the cyber domain’s influence on the economic instrument of national power.
Profitable businesses and sectors of the economy that
offer cyber-enabled services have flourished, many
without producing any physical product. As discussed
earlier, much of the world’s internet infrastructure
resides in, or is routed through, the United States. This
advantage is reflected in the U.S. position in the cyber
related economy worldwide. One analyst describes the
statistics this way:
The Internet generates 6% of [U.S.] domestic economy.
U.S. technology companies dominate the global Internet
economy, with the United States accounting for 25% of
global telecom revenue in 2015 and capturing close to
25% of the G-20’s Internet economy. In India, nine of
the top-ten websites are U.S.-based sites such as Google,
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn; seven of the top-ten sites
in Brazil are run by U.S. companies. Google is the leader
in search engines, and its Android operating system is on
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over three-quarters of the smartphones being made in the
world.53

The United States is not alone as a beneficiary of the
cyber-enabled economy. China and some of its online
businesses are also major beneficiaries. The Alibaba
Group, owner of two of China’s most popular online
retailers, announced, “during the first 11 months
of 2012, the total transactions of both shopping sites
reached . . . $162 billion, the equivalent of [2] percent of
China’s total GDP.”54
As can be expected, where there is this much potential wealth, there will be actors attempting to gain a
competitive advantage through unscrupulous means.
While there is no accepted measure of the size of cyberenabled theft, it is assumed to significantly affect U.S.
competitiveness. Former NSA head General Keith
Alexander estimated the actual cost to U.S. companies at
$250 billion in stolen information and another $114 billion
in related expenses.55

As with much of the military-related cyber espionage,
adversaries conduct industrial espionage through the
cyber domain aimed at gaining a competitive advantage without having to dedicate significant resources
to close the economic and technological gaps. Larry
Wortzel, a member of the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, contends that:
Chinese entities engaging in cyber and other forms
of economic espionage likely conclude that stealing
intellectual property and proprietary information is
much more cost-effective than investing in lengthy R&D
[research and development] programs.56

He further asserts, “these thefts support national science and technology development plans that are
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centrally managed and directed by the PRC [People’s
Republic of China] government.”57 The Chinese hackers in turn give the proprietary information and intellectual property to Chinese state owned enterprises,
which gives those companies “an unfair advantage
over their American competitors.”58 To address this
growing problem, in September 2015, the U.S. and
China agreed, in principle, to the U.S.-China Cyber
Espionage Agreement that pledges, among other
things, to:
refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyberenabled theft of intellectual property, pursue efforts
to further identify and promote appropriate norms of
state behavior in cyberspace within the international
community, and establish a high-level joint dialogue
mechanism on fighting cybercrime.59

An unfortunate outcome of China’s cyber espionage against the United States for economic gain is
that it is furthering strategic mistrust on both sides.
As a recent discussion panel at the Carnegie-Tsinghua
Center for Global Policy explained the downside, “it is
the potential for distrust in the cyber domain to erode
economic relations, which normally help to mitigate
security tensions.”60
U.S. AND CHINESE VIEWS ON CYBER DOMAIN
As stated earlier, “There is perhaps no relationship as significant to the future of world politics as
that between the United States and China,” and in that
relationship:
there is no issue that has risen so quickly and generated
so much friction as cybersecurity. Distrust of each other’s
actions in the cyber realm is growing and starting to
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generate deeply negative assessments of each country’s
long-term strategic intentions.61

In short, the United States and China represent the two
most significant nations in the domain and their views
of the domain are very different from one another.62
Before addressing each nation’s views of the domain,
it is important to note an interesting observation from
Segal and Tang regarding the U.S. and Chinese positions within the domain:
The two countries are at different stages of technological
development. All China does today is what the United
States has already accomplished. China tends to learn and
absorb U.S. best practices and lessons and has followed
the U.S. model, which one might perhaps call a latestarting advantage. The United States, for its part, keeps
a close eye on the measures China takes to improve its
defense capabilities in the cyber domain and views these
as a challenge. The root cause is absence of strategic trust
between both sides.63

The sections below analyze how both the United
States and China view the cyber domain. These views
are significant to how each nation approaches behavior within the domain.
The United States has been involved in the cyber
domain from its infancy. As early as February 2003, it
published the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the
first national strategy of its kind.64 In 2011, the Obama
administration released the International Strategy on
Cyberspace that declared that the United States would:
work internationally to promote an open, interoperable,
secure, and reliable information and communications
infrastructure that supports international trade and
commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters
free expression and innovation.65
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In 2015, former U.S. Secretary of State Kerry reiterated
that strategy when he stated, “To begin with, America believes . . . that the internet should be open and
accessible to everyone” and that “it matters to all of
us how the technology is used and how it’s governed.
That is precisely why the United States considers the
promotion of an open and secure internet to be a key
component of our foreign policy.”66 He highlighted the
differing viewpoints of the domain and tied the U.S.
view to its national values when he said:
We will have a lot of choices about technology among
and between nations. Let me tell you something: How
we choose begins with what we believe. And what we
believe about the internet hinges to a great extent on how
we feel . . . about freedom.67

This American notion of freedom pervades U.S.
national institutions and is one reason for distrust
of China’s intent. As Lieberthal and Wang explain,
Americans:
tend to be deeply suspicious of countries that trample
on the civil rights of their own citizens. For historical
reasons, the fact that China is governed by a communist
party in a one-party system inherently creates misgivings
among many Americans, including high level officials,
and makes it still harder to establish full mutual trust.68

Another difference is the U.S. viewpoint of conducting operations (either offensive or defensive)
within the domain. As one expert observed:
U.S. cyber-operations are extremely different from
their Chinese equivalents. . . . When the U.S. military or
intelligence community conducts cyber-operations, they
are quiet, coordinated, exceptionally well targeted, and
under the strict control of senior officers and government
executives. Lawyers review every stage.69
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He completed his explanation by reiterating, “The
White House keeps a close hold on cyber-operations
through senior executives, generals, and political
appointees throughout the bureaucracy.”70 This tight
control of operations is meant to prevent unintended
consequences and miscalculations that could lead to
escalation in the domain.
China’s views on the cyber domain are quite different from the United States and, as addressed earlier,
can be traced back to historical mistrust between the
two nations dating back nearly 70 years. As a pair of
experts reveal:
Chinese distrust of the United States has persisted ever
since the founding of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in 1949. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the PRC viewed
the U.S. as the most ferocious imperial power and the
gravest political and military threat.71

More recently, China saw the 2008-2009 world financial crisis as an indictment on U.S. economic and political systems.72 The Chinese view the open, democratic,
and laissez-faire approaches and policies of the United
States as a structural cause of the global crisis.
As previously noted, China was not an early power
in the cyber domain but has evolved into one. From the
time that Chinese citizens first began going online, government officials and policymakers viewed the internet as a “double-edged sword—essential to economic
growth and good governance but also the source of
threats to domestic stability and regime legitimacy.”73
Even over 10 years ago, James Keith, a U.S. Department of State senior advisor on China and Mongolia,
recognized that China’s regulation of the internet was
aimed at ensuring that “ideas that do not have the government’s imprimatur or that challenge its authority
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do not take root in China.”74 Some Chinese analysts
view U.S. efforts in the domain not only as a desire
to maintain a strategic advantage, but also as a threat
to the communist regime. These analysts “believe that
the United States has soaked itself in Cold War and
hegemonic thinking and wants to compete with China
in all aspects of cyberspace, even wanting to jeopardize the current regime.”75
Perhaps because of this viewpoint, in early 2014,
Chinese President Xi Jinping began to elevate cyber
issues in importance in the national security dialogue.
He stated, “network and information security is a
major strategic issue that relates to national security,
development and the broad masses of working life”
and that there is “no national security without cybersecurity.”76 A year-and-a-half later in July 2015, China
passed a national security law which:
viewed cybersecurity as an imminent and severe security
risk that requires China to ‘build an assurance system to
protect network and information security, promote the
defense capability, [and] safeguard sovereignty, security,
and development benefits for the country in cyberspace’.77

This marked the first time that China codified the
importance of cybersecurity in law.78 While the United
States seeks an open and secure internet, China seeks
a secure regime. A recent National Bureau of Asian
Research report asserts, “In the eyes of the Chinese government, the stability of the regime is the core security
concern. Some scholars argue that Internet freedom
is used as an excuse to intervene in China’s internal
affairs.”79 To address this security concern, “the Chinese government has built an Internet management
system that has an external and domestic face. Offending material from outside China is filtered and blocked
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by a number of technologies colloquially known as the
‘great firewall’.”80 This censorship can take the form of
simply blacklisting certain terms or phrases and, “in
extreme cases, whole regions can be removed from the
Internet as happened for 10 months after riots in Xinjiang in 2009.”81
SOVEREIGNTY: A KEY ISSUE IN THE DOMAIN
The differences in viewpoints noted above have
profound effects on how the United States and China
approach issues relating to the domain. This section
addresses a few issues in the cyber domain and ends
with a focus on a key issue in the domain—sovereignty. While the domain is increasingly important to
overall U.S.-China relations, both countries:
still have significant differences over the free flow of
information and the openness of the Internet, cyberattacks
and norms of behavior in cyberspace, Internet governance,
and the security of supply chains and information and
communications equipment.82

The result of these significant differences is that “each
country is likely to see the other as an important, if not
the main, competitor to the pursuit of its interests in
cyberspace.”83
At the heart of the disagreements is the question of who gets to determine the norms of the cyber
domain.84 In China, analysts believe “this authority belongs solely to the state, while the West incorporates multiple stakeholders, including technology
companies and civil society.”85 One of the ways the
United States and its allies are attempting to establish
norms in the domain is through the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD
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COE). This organization “has been addressing the subject of ‘cyber norms’ since its establishment in 2008,”
and has focused on “the question of how existing international legal norms apply to cyberspace by hosting
and facilitating the Tallinn Manual process.”86 China
has criticized the Tallinn Manual as an effort by the
United States and its allies “to manipulate cyberspace
through law.”87 In 2011 (revised in 2015), China, along
with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan—known collectively as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—introduced an alternative
position to the Tallinn Manual to the United Nations
General Assembly.88 The common belief among the
SCO countries is in “the primacy of the nation state,
which should be carried over into cyberspace.”89 But,
as Michael Schmitt and Liis Vihul note in a 2014 Tallinn Paper, “a ‘code of conduct’, like that proposed by
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seldom qualifies as international law because it is aspirational or
exhortational in nature, but not compulsory.”90
A topic that has bearing on the issue of sovereignty
in the cyber domain is that of borders. As Hare sets
the stage, “Because actors in cyberspace enjoy relative
anonymity and can threaten interconnected targets
around the globe, there is considerable debate whether
the concept of borders is relevant to the challenges of
cyber security.”91 He concludes by stating, “Regardless the focus of the debate, the concept of borders is
important because they define the territory in which
national governments can employ sovereign measures.”92 Hare also relates the broader discussion of
borders to the cyber domain when he argues that:
whether the problem is addressed from the standpoint of
criminal behavior like drug trafficking, or cyber-attacks
in an interdependent, global domain, borders can be a
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potentially useful construct to address cyber security
issues and inform national policy decisions, regardless of
the physical location of relevant nodes.93

Another topic with bearing on the issue of sovereignty in the cyber domain related to borders is
whether or not the cyber domain is a global common.
One expert notes that global commons are:
considered to be out of the jurisdiction of any state,
international organization, company, or person, and to be
fundamental in supporting human existence. The oceans,
the atmosphere, space, and lately cyberspace are typically
listed as part of the global commons, constituting the
fabric or connective tissue of the international system.94

He further notes, “Many refer to cyberspace as a new
‘global common’ at its entirety.”95
The U.S. position on cyber sovereignty is that
actors within the domain should not take any actions
to affect the openness or security of the domain. As one
observer explains the differences between the United
States and Chinese positions:
the United States believes that online content should
flow freely across borders. China, in contrast, promotes a
sovereignty-driven concept of cybersecurity, which gives
governments the right to develop, regulate, manage, and
censor Internet networks, as well as news, information,
and data within their national boundaries.96

Another expert says simply, “The United States is
committed to an open and global Internet, while China
pushes a darker vision with strong national borders
cutting out any objectionable material.”97 As outlined
in the SCO alternative to principles found in the Tallinn Manual, “Russia and China both would like to see
more government involvement in Internet governance
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and are pushing a . . . model of cyber sovereignty
where, in effect, each country can maintain its own
‘intranet’.”98
As Mikk Raud writes in one of the 2016 Tallinn
Papers:
China is particularly sensitive in exercising its right
to sovereignty in cyberspace and does not want it to
be interfered with by any other state or international
organization. . . . China does not see international law as
the main regulator of cyberspace, but prefers each state
setting its own rules.99

A recent Carnegie-Tsinghua panel of experts tied China’s position on cyber sovereignty to “its long-standing policies advocating for noninterference in other
states’ domestic affairs.”100 In that statement, one can
clearly identify similar Chinese complaints over U.S.
“interference” in China’s domestic affairs, specifically
regarding Taiwan.
Another reason for China’s position on cyber sovereignty is the threat it feels the domain poses to the
security of the regime. As one Chinese expert notes:
One of the main reasons why Beijing prefers sovereignty
in cyberspace is stimulation from the actions launched
by the [United] States in which the Internet served as the
tools of US diplomacy, especially after 2009 when the
term Internet Freedom has been produced to encourage
NGO’s to launch peaceful regime change all around the
world.101

To support a secure regime, China’s position on sovereignty even extends beyond its own citizens. Mikk
Raud writes of China’s position:
the users of cyberspace, both domestic and foreign
citizens within a state’s territory, should be controlled
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by the host state, a clear contradiction of the Western
position which supports a liberal cyberspace respecting
human rights. In China’s political culture, maintaining
social order is unquestionably more important than
individual privacy.102

As outlined in the July 2015 National Security Law of
China, “Cyber sovereignty occupies the central position of China’s cyber security strategy,” and the protection of sovereignty in cyber space is a critical national security task.103 In 2014, Chinese President Xi detailed the components of cyber sovereignty that were
the foundation for cyber sovereignty’s importance in
China’s 2015 National Security Law:
The first key part of cyber sovereignty refers to the
sovereignty of the state to manage the information flow
inside the territory; the second is that every single state has
the power to make cyber related policy independently;
the third is that every state should have roughly equalized
rights to participate in the decision making process of
the rules, norms, or code of conduct that governs global
cyberspace; and the respect of sovereignty should be one
of the most important guiding principles to deal with
cyber related issues internationally.104

President Xi’s version of cyber sovereignty is essential
to enabling China to achieve its goal in the domain,
namely, to become a cyber power.105 At end-state, this
goal will ensure that China:
develops from an important actor to a great power
in cyberspace which means China should not only
effectively defend possible threats from/by cyberspace,
but also become more influential in the building of the
rules that govern global cyberspace.106

This vision of Chinese prominence in the cyber domain reflects the perspective of many leaders in China
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that “the shifting power balance between China and
the United States is part of an emerging new structure
in today’s world.” This is due in part to the outlook
that “the United States is seen in China generally as a
declining power over the long run.”107
In order for China to achieve its goal of becoming a
premier cyber power, one expert predicts that its main
challenge will be:
to provide a more precisely defined cyber sovereignty
and develop a sophisticated national strategy on cyber
security so that it would be taken as a workable guiding
principle when China becomes more and more actively
participatory in a creating process of code of conduct in
the global cyberspace.108

From a U.S. perspective, it has concerns that China
is attempting to undo its decades-long efforts to establish norms in the still immature cyber domain. A pair
of experts summed it up this way:
Moreover, the United States worries that China will push
to rewrite the rules . . . by promoting ‘an alternative to the
borderless Internet embraced by Americans.’ Preventing
Chinese challenges to the U.S.-led cyber order is now a
major task for the White House.109

These vastly different and competing positions on
issues within the cyber domain and, more specifically,
of the interpretation of sovereignty within the domain
ultimately lead to a greater strategic mistrust between
the two countries.
The reasons for that distrust differ. On the Chinese side
these doubts stem more from Beijing’s application of
lessons from past history, while on the U.S. side the doubts
tend more to derive from Washington’s uncertainties
as to how a more powerful China will use its growing
capabilities.110
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Not helping matters is the fact that in this emerging,
nascent domain with very few, if any, established
norms of behavior, there is plenty of room for misjudgment and miscalculation by all actors operating within
the cyber domain and that “neither the U.S. nor China
clearly understands each other’s red lines in this arena.”111
Based on the information presented thus far, the
final section of this project will propose some broad
U.S. policy recommendations.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Although there are many issues facing the United
States and China in the cyber domain, there are also
areas where the countries can cooperate in an attempt
to build some level of trust. As Segal and Tang identify,
“Despite the wide ideological gulf between the two
sides, both China and the United States have identified
cyberspace as an area that requires cooperation.”112
There is also a cautious optimism that the two powers
realize that they must work together on certain issues.
As one analyst notes:
Both sides have a pragmatic awareness of the issues on
which they disagree, and both appreciate the importance
of not permitting those specific disagreements to prevent
cooperation on major issues where cooperation can be
mutually beneficial.113

Common across all of these recommendations is the
belief that maintaining open lines of communications
at the highest levels of governmental and nongovernmental organizations is essential to signal the importance of the issues to the United States.114 Additionally,
the two sides must “ensure that discussions on norms
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of behavior in cyberspace continue at the highest level
and are not suspended during times of tension.”115 It is
these potential areas of cooperation on which this final
section will propose recommendations with the hope
of improving U.S.-China relations in not only the cyber
domain but also the overall strategic relationship.
Perhaps one of the easiest areas of cooperation is
where the United States and China already have an
agreement. The United States should engage with
Chinese leadership and actively follow-up on the September 2015 U.S.-China Cyber Espionage Agreement
(described in the section on the domain’s effect on the
economic instrument of national power) with specific
and actionable measures aimed at curbing cyber-enabled commercial espionage, theft of intellectual property, and cybercrime.116
The focus of early cooperation should be on shared
interests and activities that both the United States
and China view as harmful or criminal but that “do
not have a significant political component to them.”117
Examples include cybercrime, intellectual property
theft, supply chain security, and protection of critical
infrastructure.118
One specific issue in the national interest of both
the United States and China, and where both nations
could benefit from cooperation, is the prevention of
proliferation of cyber capabilities to violent extremist
organizations and other nonstate actors. The two have
already begun a cyber dialogue aimed at countering
such actors. Two experts provide the concept that:
the two sides agreed to work together to combat the
posting on the Internet of instructions on how to build
improvised explosive devices. As the discussions
progress, the two sides could exchange intelligence on
the capabilities of specific groups and share ideas on how
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to disrupt the development and distribution of cyber
weapons.119

Another recommendation is to increase what are
known as people-to-people exchanges between the
two countries. Exchanges of U.S. and Chinese citizens to conduct research at universities and in other
technology related industries could help build shared
understanding and trust at the lowest levels.120
A final recommendation is that the United States
and China must further discussion of “red lines” in the
cyber domain. A difficulty in these discussions is that,
as outlined earlier, actions taken in the cyber domain
can have near simultaneous effects in the other strategic domains. These cyber red lines are not isolated to
the cyber domain. The discussion of red lines is essential to avoid miscalculation and misjudgment during
crises that could lead to unintended escalatory actions
on both sides.121 Discussions could also lead to the
development of norms and implementing measures
that would take riskier actions off the table.122 As one
analyst related:
From the United Nations to the ASEAN Regional Forum
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, there has been a growing interest in applying the
concept of confidence building measures from the Cold
War to the digital age.123

As the United States and China develop their relationship and enter into additional agreements, it will
be important to have the backing of U.S. allies and
partners in the region. In the advice of a recent task
force from the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations, “Expanding the scope of agreements beyond
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the bilateral relationship to multilateral organizations can help reinforce the Chinese government’s
commitments.”124
All of the recommendations above are made with
the desired end-state of expanding and strengthening the overall U.S.-China strategic relationship. Ultimately, improved relations will not end iniquitous
actions or eliminate nefarious actors from the cyber
domain, but will:
put a framework in place that will not only help prevent
disagreements in cyberspace from spilling over into other
parts of the bilateral relationship, but also help both sides
to get closer to an understanding of what constitutes
strategic stability, i.e., peace, in cyberspace.125

CONCLUSION
The relationship between the United States and
China in the cyber domain matters. From a cyber
domain perspective, “Trust is currently a rare commodity in the Sino-U.S. bilateral relationship, and it
is especially difficult to sustain in cyberspace.”126 That
lack of trust in the domain matters because the consequences of a poor relationship affect more than just
the cyber domain and more than just the two nations.
From a broader perspective, this strategic mistrust
holds an ominous potential if not improved. Lieberthal
and Wang assess the potential this way:
The United States and China are the two most
consequential countries in the world over the coming
decades. The nature of their relationship will have a
profound impact on the citizens of both countries, on the
Asia-Pacific region, and indeed on the world.127
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The two nations must find ways to cooperate within
the cyber domain to ensure strategic stability within all
of the other domains.
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CHAPTER 9
U.S. ECONOMIC REBALANCE
TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: IS IT
STILL POSSIBLE?
Jeffrey M. Zaiser

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
With the abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), it is necessary to examine what, if any,
mechanisms remain available for the U.S. Government
(USG) to expand its economic engagement and integration with the TPP signatory countries and others,
including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in the
region. A “re-branding” of the TPP appears to be the
“best second choice” for the United States to continue
its economic engagement with countries in the region,
to reassure our allies and partners that the United
States remains committed to an increased economic
integration, and to the avoidance of damaging trade
wars.
If that is not possible, then the United States could
negotiate and conclude bilateral free trade agreements
(FTAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with
TPP signatories and other countries in the region,
hopefully in a relatively uniform and consistent
manner. Additionally, the United States would need
to encourage those countries to conclude similar bilateral agreements with each other, to build a network
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of non-conflicting bilateral agreements to replace the
TPP.
At the same time, the United States should consider
participation in some of the other Asian initiatives
promoted by China. These include the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation (APEC), including the
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the “One
Belt, One Road” Initiative, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The latter
would necessitate conclusion of an FTA with ASEAN,
which probably is not feasible. Doing so could enable
the USG to influence the policies and practices of those
organizations in a positive way and to enhance U.S.
business opportunities.
INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 2011, in Canberra, Australia,
former U.S. President Barack Obama announced a
“deliberate and strategic decision” regarding U.S.
policy toward the Asia-Pacific region: “the United
States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and
friends.” The President described the Asia-Pacific as
“the world’s fastest-growing region” that was “home
to more than half the global economy” and was “critical to achieving my highest priority, and that’s creating jobs and opportunity for the American people.” To
advance those economic goals for the United States,
the President said he would pursue development of
“an open international economic system where rules
are clear and every nation plays by them.” More specifically, for the Asia-Pacific region, he said the United

258

States, Australia, and other countries would soon complete the world’s most ambitious trade agreement to
date, the TPP.1
While Obama did not include the PRC in his TPP
comments, he noted that the United States would “continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship with
China” because the United States and other countries
had “a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and
prosperous China.” That said, however, the President
clearly sought to create a new trading system “that is
free and fair” and in an “open international economic
system, where rules are clear and every nation plays
by them.” He also added that this system would have
to include protections for workers’ rights, intellectual
property, and consumers, with “balanced growth,”
environmental protection, and good governance, and
without manipulation of exchange rates, all implicitly
but not explicitly referring to China.2
On October 5, 2015, the partners signed a final
agreement on the TPP in Atlanta, GA. In his congratulatory note, Obama hailed the achievement that:
when more than 95 percent of our potential customers
live outside our borders, we can’t let countries like China
write the rules of the global economy. We should write
those rules, opening new markets to American products
while setting high standards for protecting workers and
preserving our environment.3

On January 23, 2017, however, consideration of the
merits and deficiencies of the TPP became moot when
newly-elected President Donald Trump rejected the
draft agreement, saying, “we’re going to stop the ridiculous trade deals that have taken everybody out of our
country and taken companies out of our country.”4
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ECONOMICS: THE WEAKEST PILLAR?
Despite the Obama administration’s glowing
assessments of the strong and growing economic
importance of the Asia-Pacific region to the United
States, the USG’s ability to support that pillar of the
rebalance:
is arguably the most problematic instrument in the
nation’s repertoire, [and this] problem is especially acute
among Asian governments . . . that still blame the United
States for mismanagement of the 1997 Asian Financial
Crisis and for causing the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.5

Over the past 2 decades, those same Asian nations
have witnessed the rapid economic growth and
development of China, with which they have become
increasingly intertwined and interdependent. From
their perspectives, they might agree, “Washington’s
military instruments dwarf its diplomatic, information, and economic instruments” while China “has
economic resources that eclipse its other elements of
power.”6
WHAT WOULD THE TPP HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED?
The USG intended the TPP to cement U.S. status
as the leader of a global, rules-based economic system,
which, over time, would have been extended to additional members able and willing to meet its new, higher
standards for international economic activity within
a reasonable time frame. The TPP negotiators sought
to “create a 21st-century agreement” for the “increasingly globalized economy” that would “eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade in goods, services,
and agriculture, and to establish or expand rules on
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a wide range of issues including intellectual property
rights, foreign direct investment, and other trade-related issues.”7 As such, it was far broader in scope than
typical bilateral or even multilateral FTAs or BITs, and
it extended into areas not normally covered by those
treaties, such as government procurement, intellectual
property rights (IPR), state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
labor, environment, and regulatory coherence. Perhaps more importantly, while the treaty clearly was
intended to “strengthen and deepen trade and investment ties among its participants,” the United States―
and perhaps some other participants―also viewed it
as a valuable means to advance non-economic “U.S.
strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.”8
Had it been realized, the TPP immediately would
have become the largest U.S. FTA by trade flows,
including $727 billion in U.S. goods exports and $882
billion in U.S. goods imports (2014 figures). The potential value of the agreement was greatly enhanced when
Japan, which did not (and still does not) have an FTA
with the United States, agreed to participate. Japan’s
potential membership reportedly attracted interest and
support from a wide range of U.S. industries, including sectors like agriculture, automotive, and services.
With the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, it would be
useful for the USG to translate Japan’s comprehensive
TPP agreement into a bilateral FTA, thus consolidating
the TPP objectives between its two largest members.
CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL
At the broadest level, U.S. refusal to ratify the
laboriously negotiated TPP―which actually required
major concessions by other members and very little
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change from the United States―may have undermined
U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific region. The USG
“expended serious political capital” with the other
participants to negotiate the TPP in order to establish “U.S. rules and standards at the center of Asian
trade.”9 It is likely that many Asian governments and
people will link U.S. inaction on the strategic rebal
ance’s economic pillar to the broader commitment of
the United States to diplomatic, political, and security interests in the region. In other words, all aspects
of the Obama administration’s “strategic rebalance”
to the region could be negatively affected by the collapse of the TPP. Within the United States, the business community broadly supported the TPP because
it would have forced foreign competitors―including
SOEs―to follow the same set of rules as U.S. companies. Some of those U.S. businesses now believe they
have been undercut by Trump’s decision to abandon
the draft agreement and fear their future operations in
Asia could be negatively affected. The Trump administration has not specified its concerns about the TPP,
simply claiming that the agreement disadvantaged the
United States by shifting production and employment
to other countries.
By withdrawing from the TPP, the USG could
encourage or even force some Asian countries to
“take sides” and join alternative economic structures
designed and dominated by China, rather than the
stronger and more advanced U.S.-led system. During
the TPP negotiation process, relatively progressive
officials in some of those countries had been able to
argue that the benefits of trade liberalization, including enhanced market access not only to the United
States but also to other TPP members, outweighed the
near-term costs of sweeping legislative, regulatory,
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and bureaucratic changes to their economic regimes.
Without U.S. TPP participation, those marginal signatories are unlikely to implement all the reform measures to which they agreed, and may even be tempted
to reverse the course of reform in some areas. In Vietnam, for example, negotiators “had hoped to use the
deal to pressure sluggish state-owned companies to
modernize and reform,” which now may be deferred
or not even take place.10 Even Japan, a democratic ally
with a modern capitalist economy that had endured
a difficult internal political struggle to meet some of
the agricultural market access requirements and other
reforms required by the TPP, now may not be willing
to implement those commitments.
Reform-averse officials in some TPP member
nations, particularly the relatively less advanced
and more state sector-dominated countries such as
Burma and Vietnam, probably were relieved to see the
agreement’s demise, which in their view would have
imposed burdensome requirements on their governments. They are likely to view the much less ambitious
Chinese approach to regional economic architecture
modernization, which generally focuses simply on
trade in goods, as much “simpler and less controversial.”11 The collapse of the TPP in those countries could
even cause governments to move backward in multiple
respects: one Vietnamese labor activist recently said
she feared her government would “use this [the U.S.
withdrawal from the TPP] as an excuse to suppress
the labor movement.” A 10-page bilateral side agreement between the United States and Vietnam “would
have required Vietnam to criminalize the use of forced
labor and broaden enforcement to cases of debt bondage,” both of which remain prevalent in that country. Furthermore, the TPP would have stipulated that
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workers “would be allowed to form their own grassroots unions that could bargain collectively and lead
strikes,” a right not currently available in Vietnam.12
WHAT ABOUT CHINA?
The PRC was not one of the 12 TPP signatories, in
part because it was widely viewed by the USG and
others as being unable and/or unwilling to implement
the sweeping changes in its economic structure and
regulatory regimes to meet TPP standards within a
reasonable time frame. The USG and other TPP country negotiators were also cognizant of China’s historic
modes of participation in the United Nations (UN) and
other international organizations: “When it becomes
a member of an international organization, China
applies a high priority to national sovereignty and
may therefore act as a brake on that organization,” and
would be “hostile to . . . any new and legally binding
standard.”13 More fundamentally, at least one analyst
also noted, “China will not be hasty to join the TPP, as
the high standards and terms in [the] TPP are incompatible with China’s economic reality.”14
Throughout the TPP negotiation process, USG officials were careful to characterize the agreement as:
primarily about increasing ties to Asia, not containing
China, [and they emphasized that] building a
constructive and productive relationship with China has
been an important part of the Pivot ever since it was first
announced.15

They also noted that if and when the PRC eventually
joined the TPP, the agreement would prove “extremely
beneficial” to that country, not only by generating
“income gains of $800 billion over the next 10 years,”
but more fundamentally by pushing the Chinese
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government to implement wide-ranging reforms to its
economic system.16 At least some of the increasingly
nationalistic Chinese leaders and citizenry, however,
probably viewed their exclusion from the TPP process
as part of yet another U.S. and Japan-organized plan to
contain the rise of China; some observers even believe
“China’s attention to [the] TPP was piqued more by
Japan than by the U.S.”17
CHINA’S ALTERNATIVE PLANS
In recent years, believing the United States and
some of its allies were rewriting the economic rulebook
for the Asia-Pacific region without their participation
or input, the PRC government has been “meticulously
constructing an alternative architecture to the postwar Western order.” Their developing system already
includes the New Development Bank (a multilateral
development bank founded by China and the other
four BRICS nations [Russia, India, Brazil, and South
Africa]), the AIIB, and the “New Silk Road Initiative”
(also known as the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,”
the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” or the “One Belt, One
Road”). To achieve that end, “Beijing is using the strongest instrument in its soft-power toolbox: money,” and
has begun to “sign huge trade and investment deals,
extend generous loans, and dole out hefty aid packages.”18 The U.S. response to these initiatives has been
one of indifference (New Silk Road Initiative) or opposition (AIIB), a position that the USG should reconsider
due to the demise of the TPP.
The most prominent of these new institutions is
the AIIB, which the Chinese government announced
officially in late 2013 as a “key arm of the New Silk
Road Initiative.”19 China launched the AIIB over USG
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objections that it was redundant and would lack the
“environmental, labor and procurement standards
that are essential to the mission of development lenders.” As China’s economic power has grown rapidly
in recent decades, it has become particularly unhappy
with the Asian Development Bank (ADB): “although
China is the biggest economy in Asia, the ADB is dominated by Japan; Japan’s voting share is more than
twice China’s; and the bank’s president has always
been Japanese.”20 The PRC “insisted that AIIB will be
rigorous in adopting the best practices of institutions
such as the World Bank.” The Chinese also noted that
“Asia has a massive infrastructure gap” which even
the ADB had estimated could be as much as $8 trillion,
something which “existing institutions cannot hope to
fill.”21 The USG has not disputed that need for investment, nor has it claimed that the ADP and World Bank
could meet the demand for capital.
In addition to its own denunciations of the new
AIIB, the USG also urged its allies and leading trading
partners to resist participation in the new lending institution, for reasons noted above. These “clumsy efforts”
to impede success of the AIIB, however, “gave the
impression that Washington was indeed committed
to constraining China’s rise.”22 An (at least publicly)
unstated concern for the USG and probably others,
however, was that “China will use the new bank to
expand its influence at the expense of America and
Japan.”23 Despite USG efforts, approximately 50 countries, including the United Kingdom and other western
European nations, decided to participate in the AIIB,
something that seemingly “validates China’s strategy of mixing international integration with its own
shadow organization competing with the post-World
War II Bretton Woods international institutions.”24
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While it may be too soon to evaluate the AIIB’s performance, initial reports suggest that it is operating
in a responsible and high-standard manner. China
has opened its membership to European countries,
recruited many U.S. and European professionals with
World Bank backgrounds to manage its operations,
and―perhaps most importantly―has not structured
the AIIB’s rules and procedures “to give it [China] an
effective veto power over loan decisions.”25 Given the
positive development of the AIIB since its inception,
the USG could seek to participate in the institution in
some way, thereby gaining influence in its decision
making and reassuring regional allies of the continuing U.S. economic commitment to the region. Any Chinese resistance to U.S. participation would undermine
China’s professed openness to the widest possible foreign involvement in the AIIB.
China’s New Silk Road Initiative―including
both land-based and maritime components―was
announced by PRC President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan
in September 2013. Since then, the Chinese government and Communist Party leadership has reaffirmed
their support for the plan on multiple occasions. In
addition to its foreign economic and security policy
value, however, the New Silk Road initiative also is
designed to “drum up development fever in the less
developed regions in China” and to further “important internal development priorities.” The overland
route would extend from the relatively wealthy coastal
cities of eastern and southern China through industrial
centers in central and western China and continue on
to central and south Asian destinations. Large Chinese
state-owned enterprises, such as CITIC Bank and the
Central Tourism Group, also would benefit significantly from the project and thus have supported it.26
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Although to date, the USG has not commented publicly on the feasibility or usefulness of this initiative,
cautious encouragement of U.S. companies to participate in the program could help ensure the infrastructure projects meet global standards and avoid creating
a perception that the USG simply wants to prevent the
PRC from advancing its own economic agenda.
THE ROLE OF ASEAN
In addition to these PRC-created organizations, Beijing also has supported ASEAN’s plan for a Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which
would include the 10 ASEAN member states as well
as the 6 nations with which ASEAN already has FTAs
(Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New
Zealand). China “initially showed little interest in the
RCEP . . . until Japan joined TPP, upon which point
China spared nothing in cooperating with other Asian
nations on the RCEP.”27 In actuality, however, some
analysts believe “domestic support for RCEP is weak
in China” and the plan primarily “was viewed as a
counterweight to TPP.”28
While negotiation of RCEP reportedly is close to
completion, if and when it enters into force, it will be
“far less ambitious [than the TPP], focusing on the
basic business of cutting tariffs.”29 For that reason,
it will be far easier for some ASEAN members to
accept because it, like ASEAN in general, will operate under the prevalent “ASEAN strategy,” which
is more commonly described as the “principle of the
lowest common denominator.”30 More specifically,
RCEP would largely focus on “trade and investment
promotion”31 and would reduce or eliminate many
tariffs, but it would provide a far less comprehensive
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and less far-reaching trade framework than the TPP,
and it would not address a number of significant U.S.
concerns in areas such as labor, food safety, the environment, and government procurement. Nevertheless,
some governments that have been involved in both the
RCEP and the TPP―including Australia, Brunei, Japan,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam―
view the two agreements as “complementary” rather
than mutually exclusive, and believe conclusion of the
RCEP could be useful.32 The USG has not commented
publicly on the merits or shortcomings of the RCEP,
possibly because the United States does not have a
Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN and is therefore
not eligible to participate in the RCEP.
From the PRC’s perspective, participation in
ASEAN and its component structures has “incurred
virtually no cost―in terms of national autonomy and
discretion―for Beijing, while still providing her with
significant benefits.” More specifically, “joining ASEAN-led institutions did not require China to forfeit her
freedom of movement on any of the issues considered
important to Chinese interests,” while at the same time
“it was granted a de facto veto right on decisions and
developments that Beijing might consider . . . adverse
to its interests.” Such status within ASEAN also gave
the PRC “the possibility of playing on each country’s
eagerness to benefit from China’s economic growth.”33
China also has used its ability to provide “no strings
attached” loans and investments to ASEAN’s poorer
members, such as Cambodia, in return for which Beijing has received a “proxy” within ASEAN to prevent
that consensus-bound organization from even issuing
“statements that criticize China’s expansive territorial
claims in the South China Sea.”34
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The United States has the same observer status as
China in ASEAN, and during the Obama administration, the USG significantly elevated its participation in
ASEAN meetings, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF). At one of those meetings, in Hanoi, North Vietnam, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
together with most of the ARF membership, openly
criticized Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, to
the visible dismay of the PRC Foreign Minister.
CHINA’S DOMINANCE IN ASIA
As its economy has enjoyed high GDP growth rates
over the past 3 decades, the PRC has become “the top
trading partner for most other Asian nations,” which
in turn “has strengthened Beijing’s ability to use its
market power to reward its friends and punish those
opposing its policies.”35 The interest of some of the
smaller Asian countries in the TPP was at least in part
based on their growing concern that “their significant dependence on China’s economy exposes them
to attempts at economic coercion by Beijing.” This is a
policy instrument that China in the past has employed
“to pressure the Philippines over fruit, Japan over
rare earths, Norway over fish, and even the U.S. over
aircraft.”36
The PRC’s leaders are probably also aware that:
unlike other leading countries, whose national strength
emanates from the confluence of military, economic, social,
and geopolitical vectors, Chinese power is inexorably tied
to the expansion of the Chinese economy.37

In other words, China’s “soft power” is a combination
of “commercial diplomacy and the mutual benefit of
partnership with China.”38
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Unfortunately, for China, some analysts believe the
“halcyon days of China’s unbridled economic growth
are coming to an end,” and China’s leaders are “wrestling with how to translate the nation’s economic clout
into increased influence, especially in Asia.”39 While
some would dispute that China’s slowing GDP growth
rate―from 8 to 10 percent annually to a still robust 6
to 7 percent―is cause for alarm in Beijing, most would
agree that the Chinese government increasingly would
have to devote attention and resources to serious internal social-political issues in the near future. These
include rising labor costs that are eroding China’s
competitive advantages in lower-tech sectors, an aging
population, enormous environmental destruction, and
the potential for social discontent tied to any of those
problems that could undermine the legitimacy of the
ruling party and government. Were China’s neighbors
to perceive it and its economic growth model as faltering, then they might become less willing to tie their
own future economic prospects to it. As long as the
Chinese economy continues to grow at a respectable
rate, however, those regional trading partners will
continue to “wish above all for a stable China.”40 For at
least the near term, however, China “has become the
largest trade and investment partner of virtually every
country in Central Asia and the largest trade partner of
every country in East and Southeast Asia,”41 and there
is no imminent danger of that status diminishing.
CHINA: THE WORLD’S ECONOMIC ENGINE?
Most recently, PRC government officials have publicly promised to continue to pursue a more open global
economic system. At the January 2017 World Economic
Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, PRC President
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Xi Jinping―the first Chinese president to attend this
annual gathering of the capitalist world’s political and
business elite―announced that his country “will keep
its door wide open and not close it” because “no one
will emerge as a winner in a trade war.”42 That assessment almost certainly is correct: virtually all Western
economists agree that trade wars are “no-win” situations for all participants, resulting in reduced economic activity and higher prices for consumers in the
participating countries. Given the enormous volume
of trade between the United States and China, a trade
war between the two countries would be devastating
to both economies and would have major negative
repercussions on the global economy.
The Chinese government has said publicly that
they “welcome continued participation by all countries for mutually beneficial outcomes” in their initiatives such as the “One Belt, One Road,” the AIIB, and
the Silk Road Fund.43 Some Chinese officials also have
said they plan to support the Free Trade Area of the
Asia Pacific (FTAAP) negotiations among the 21 APEC
member countries, including the United States, which
would create an “even larger regional pact” than the
TPP.44 In 2010, APEC leaders agreed to push for the
FTAAP as a “broad vision for the group,”45 but its realization probably would require even more protracted
negotiations and compromise than the TPP. Former
U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman previously
stated, “the TPP could serve as a ‘building block’”
for the FTAAP,46 but without the TPP, it is not clear
if the FTAAP has any chance to be concluded in the
near future. With the Trump administration’s public
comments against multilateral trade agreements, it is
not likely that it would support any involvement in
FTAAP negotiations.
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CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES:
INCREASINGLY INTERDEPENDENT
Despite their negative views regarding the existing international economic institutions and structures
in the Asia-Pacific region, and their apparent belief
that, in the longer-term, western (including Japanese)
economic dominance will decline, China’s leadership
certainly is cognizant of their country’s increasing economic interdependence with the United States. Some
Chinese leaders and their economic advisors would
acknowledge that their country’s rapid economic
growth and development since the late 1970s has
been enabled and facilitated to a considerable extent
by the existing, western-designed economic institutions―first the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), then the World Trade Organization
(WTO)―even though the design of those agreements
had been “fundamentally antithetical to closed societies and command economies.”47 The PRC had been
able to transition from “one of the world’s most isolated countries” in the late 1960s and to overcome the
enormous “damage to the economy” inflicted by Mao
Zedong during the 1966-1976 “Cultural Revolution” in
large part through participation in that international
economic system.48 By 1986, as the benefits of state capitalist economic reform under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping were becoming apparent, even PRC President
Li Xiannian―a product of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Communist Party system―publicly acknowledged
that China’s leaders “should have focused our forces
more on economic development and reconstruction”
rather than ideology.49
Even during the onset of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, high-level Chinese economic and financial
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leaders frequently voiced the opinion that “we’re in
the same boat” with the United States and therefore
needed to cooperate to resolve the crisis.50 That interdependence has only grown since the crisis, to the point
where China now is the second largest trading partner
of the United States, which in turn is China’s largest
trading partner.51 Despite that ever-increasing interdependence, however, for Beijing “sovereignty remains
an absolute priority,” and China has “balked at more
convergence” in areas such as human rights, trade, or
disarmament. One analyst characterized this behavior
as a desire to keep “one foot in the international system
and one foot outside.”52
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. withdrawal from the TPP obviously
“removes the main economic plank” of the strategic rebalance to Asia and “leaves a gaping hole in
the architecture of Asian commerce.”53 With the TPP
off the table politically for the foreseeable future, the
question becomes what could the USG offer as a viable
economic component of the strategic rebalance (if the
Trump administration decides to continue support
for the rebalance in some form). This is a critical issue
because the economic importance of the Asia-Pacific
has not declined, and in all probability will only continue to increase both absolutely and relatively.
First, it should be emphasized that nothing else
could fully replace the TPP. Some of the TPP’s objectives could be achieved through bilateral mechanisms
such as FTAs among Asia-Pacific countries; there
already are 147 FTAs in force in Asia with another 68
at some stage of negotiation,54 and the USG has FTAs
with 6 of the other TPP countries (Australia, Canada,
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Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Singapore).55 Such a piecemeal system, however, would be “a jumbled, overlapping mess,”56 also known as the “noodle bowl effect,”
of non-uniform or even incompatible arrangements
that would not approach the TPP’s comprehensiveness. Furthermore, such a conglomeration of bilateral
arrangements would simply expand the current U.S.
hub-and-spoke system with allies and partners, without addressing the economic arrangements among
those other nations. Assuming the interested states
then negotiated their own bilateral or regional agreements with their non-U.S. trading partners―some of
which already exist or are under negotiation―there is
no reason to believe that those new systems would be
consistent with each other.
A better option, which at this time does not appear
to be politically feasible in the United States, would be
to re-brand and revise the existing draft TPP to address
the criticisms levied against it by its U.S. opponents.
Some key members of the U.S. Congress, including the
Republican chairmen of the Senate Finance Committee
and the House Ways and Means Committee, reportedly still “strongly support” the TPP, as do “many other
members of Congress.”57 Since Trump took office on
January 20, 2017, several well-reasoned pro-TPP arguments by both Democratic and Republican-affiliated
authors have been published. In early January 2016, a
study by a bipartisan group of former high-level USG
officials detailed the benefits of a “cooperative U.S.China relationship” but also the need for a “revitalized
U.S. economic strategy” that would serve U.S. interests through a “trans-Pacific order supported by transparent institutions and rules.” More explicitly, the
study recommended that the USG should “complete
the TPP,” “take action to ensure that the U.S.-China
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relationship is mutually beneficial,” and “update and
uphold the Asia-Pacific economic architecture,” none
of which it viewed as mutually exclusive. By “revitalized,” the group of former USG officials clearly meant
that the USG needed to openly reassert―and then back
up that assertion with concrete measures―its continuing interest in greater economic integration between
the United States and Asia. The reference to “update
and uphold the Asia-Pacific architecture” referred to
the TPP as a replacement for the existing weak and
haphazard arrangements.58
In early February 2017, another group of prominent former officials and academics published a list
of political, economic, and security recommendations
for the new U.S. administration’s Asia and China policies. The authors explicitly stated, “our future prosperity depends on staying actively involved there”
and that U.S. “economic and security interests in the
region have long been intertwined.”59 They also noted
that many Asian countries, including major U.S. trading partners such as India and Indonesia, “continue to
pursue protectionist policies that limit opportunities for
U.S. exporters and investors.”60 The authors explicitly
addressed the “special opportunities and challenges”
presented by China’s rapid―but now slowing―economic growth and its emergence as a regional power
willing and able to use its economic influence to further its interests. This nationalistic activism, said the
authors, “has troubled neighboring countries” which
were now “wary of overdependence and eager for
the United States to play an active counterbalancing
role.”61
During China’s rise over the past 2 decades, however, “Washington has been distracted and inconsistent
in its approach to Asia while realities on the ground
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have not stood still.”62 With regard to economic policy,
measures such as the TPP “have been left to languish”
due to internal U.S. political differences. At the same
time, U.S. responses to Chinese initiatives such as the
AIIB at best have been ineffective and at worst, self-defeating; in retrospect, the USG clearly underestimated
global interest in the AIIB and overestimated its ability
to prevent other nations, including close allies, from
joining that initiative. U.S. national interests would
have been better served by U.S. participation in the
AIIB from the outset.
Of the six priorities detailed in the paper, two were
directly relevant to the economic component of the
strategic rebalance. First, with regard to the Asia-Pacific region, the USG should focus on “rising concerns
among allies and friends about the dependability and
reliability of U.S. economic and security commitments
in the Asia-Pacific region.” Another priority was more
directly linked to China: the United States should be
“deploying effective tools to address the lack of reciprocity in U.S. trade and investment relations with
China.” The need for both these two and the other four
priorities was based on four vital U.S. national interests:
1) ”a fair and market-based global economic system”
in which there is “deep U.S. economic integration with
China”; 2) “a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region”
supported by our “substantial security presence”; 3)
“a liberal rules-based international order”; and, 4) “a
positive and sustainable relationship with China.”63 To
further these interests and address what they view as
the priorities for the new administration, the authors
strongly recommended a “revised Trans-Pacific Partnership treaty that can command bipartisan support in
the U.S. Congress . . . and catalyze reform in China.” If
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China is not included in the new TPP, it “will not have
a clear international standard for which to aim.”64
Looking further into the future, some advocates of
greater economic liberalization envision even greater
changes to the Asia-Pacific economic architecture. They
regard the TPP, the RCEP, and other modernizations
as “way stations on the path to the ultimate destination, which is a massive though still distant agreement
for the entire region, known as the Free Trade Area for
the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).”65
RECOMMENDATIONS
With the TPP off the table, at least during the current administration, the USG needs to identify and
implement the next best option, to both avoid damaging trade wars and demonstrate its continuing economic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. First,
the United States could negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements―FTAs and/or BITs―with key countries in the region, while also encouraging those trade
partners to negotiate similar and consistent bilateral
agreements with each other. Second, the United States
could participate in some of the other Asian initiatives
promoted by China, ASEAN, and APEC, such as the
AIIB, the One Belt One Road, and the RCEP (although
the latter would necessitate conclusion of an FTA with
ASEAN, which probably is not feasible). Taking some
or all of these steps could help construct an improved
rules-based economic architecture between the United
States and its Asian partners, and also could promote
U.S. exports and encourage Asian investment in the
United States.
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CONCLUSION
The TPP was the best option for comprehensive
improvement to the economic system. It addressed
not only trade but also environment, labor, the role of
SOEs, and government procurement; it also pushed
some Asian countries to commit to domestic reforms.
As a multilateral agreement, it would have set identical standards for all participants, and it would have
demonstrated the continuing U.S. engagement in the
region. With the new administration’s official and
public affirmation that it would not join the TPP, the
United States now needs to find other ways to improve
the Asia-Pacific trading system and environment, support U.S. companies that are active in the region, and
promote U.S. job creation and foreign investment in
the United States.
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PART IV:
MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF POWER
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CHAPTER 10
A NEW U.S. INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
SECURITY STRATEGY
Ryan M. Finn and David B. Moore

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
If China is allowed to continue its systematic expansionist strategy, what some might term “coercive gradualism” in the South China Sea, its regional neighbors
risk becoming increasingly indebted to China. Regional
nations all have some degree of economic dependency
on China, and when this dependency is coupled with
an increasing military capabilities gap their ability
to object to China’s aggressiveness is further eroded.
China is exploiting this situation to further leverage
its economic and security dealings with these nations,
and make it more difficult for them to balance against
China by partnering with the United States.
U.S. forces are of the right size and composition to
meet current challenges. However, while U.S. forces
must be of the right quantity and postured appropriately, quality will increasingly take on special meaning
when facing the transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional (TMM) threat of the future. Furthermore,
the United States must develop a national policy and
cohesive joint military strategy to respond to regional
actors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific who do not comply with
the accepted world order, or be prepared to accept the
erosion of the existing world order and the U.S. preeminent role in it. While the United States certainly
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has the means available, it lacks a comprehensive, joint
vision on how to engage below the line of conflict, or in
the “gray zone.” In order to remedy this condition, the
United States should do the following:
• The United States should continue to pursue
and maintain an insurmountable technological
edge over potential competitors that is focused
on a qualitative, vice quantitative, advantage
and focused on the TMM threat of the future.
• The United States must invite regional allies and
partners, including China, into a broadened collective security architecture, and regularly exercise and demonstrate its qualitative advantage
to allies and competitors.
• The United States must develop and implement
responses to China’s use of gray zone strategies. Failure to act will only allow the practice
to propagate and continue to threaten U.S. vital
interests in the region.
• The United States must unambiguously determine where the “redlines” are and clearly
demonstrate the will and capacity to enforce
them.
• The United States should increase unannounced
Freedom of Navigation Operations in accordance with international laws and rulings.
• The United States needs to consider a cohesive joint strategy as it continues to redistribute
military forces in the southern Pacific that will
impose multiple strategic dilemmas against China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past 70 years, America has not only helped
heal the wounds of World War II. We’ve helped create
the stability that has allowed people, economies, and
countries throughout the Asia-Pacific to make incredible
progress. . . . The rebalance―in a nutshell―is about
sustaining this progress and helping the region continue
to fulfill its promise.
—Secretary Ashton Carter1

As former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter so
aptly summarized, the world has enjoyed a historically
high degree of stability in Europe and Asia. The American-led world order, backed up by America’s military
might, has largely enabled this remarkable stability.
The nation’s policy goals are represented in military
procurements, deployments, and strategies. With the
resulting military advantage, the threat of action has
often been sufficient to compel acquiescence to international rules or norms. However, what happens when
compellence fails? If an adversary is not convinced of a
credible U.S. intent and the readiness to use the force,
it can be tempted to break the rules and practice military adventurism.
There are signs in the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP)
region that certain countries are pursuing this course
of action. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Joseph Dunford has identified five strategic challenges
he termed the “4+1.” These are Russia, China, North
Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations. Dun
ford further assesses that “future conflict with an
adversary or combination of adversaries is taking on
an increasingly [TMM] nature.”2 Therefore, while U.S.
forces are deployed worldwide, U.S.-led order must
be of the right quantity and postured appropriately,
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quality will increasingly take on special meaning
when facing this TMM threat of the future. Four of the
4+1 threats—China, North Korea, Russia, and violent
extremist organizations—are present in the Asia-Pacific region, making the advance of U.S. interests there
a significant challenge.
China’s unprecedented economic growth over the
last few decades, combined with its recent military
growth, modernization, and innovations, have put it in
a position to threaten U.S. influence, deny U.S. access,
and weaken U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.
China’s rise has emboldened it to take assertive actions
to strengthen its territorial claims in the East and South
China Seas.
Of particular note is that China has employed
“gray zone” tactics to pursue its objectives.3 These
Chinese assertive acts require a serious U.S. response.
The United States must develop a national policy and
cohesive joint military strategy to respond to regional
actors in the IAP who do not comply with the existing
rules-based international world order, or be prepared
to accept the erosion of the existing world order and
the United States’ preeminent role in it.
STRATEGIC FOCUS
To study the role of the military in the IAP, one
must start with an examination of the previous administration’s strategic “pivot to the Pacific,” or strategic
“rebalance,” as it became known. The term “rebalance” itself was adopted to indicate more accurately
that the United States has always been deeply engaged
in the Pacific region and is merely returning to a
more historic posture following the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Indeed, it is important to remember that
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enduring U.S. interests in the region to ensure freedom
of navigation and freedom from coercion date back to
the post-World War II and Korean war treaty alliances
with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.4 In the
early months of his presidency, George W. Bush began
efforts at a “rebalancing” of his own, until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) diverted all
attention to the Middle East.5 Former President Barack
Obama announced the rebalance as a distinct transition from focusing on the Middle East, to a post-war
focus on America’s economic interests in the vitally
important Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
The objectives of the American policy toward the
region are the maintenance of peace, prosperity, and
stability, respect for international law, unimpeded
lawful commerce, and freedom of navigation. The
United States is committed to supporting its allies in
the region to ensure peaceful resolution of disputes, in
accordance with widely accepted rules, standards, and
international laws. The United States, however, does
not take a position on competing territorial claims over
land features in the South China Sea.6
The United States asserts that the Western Pacific
is a region with vital American interests, thus necessitating the strategic rebalance the Obama administration began.7 First, more than half of the world’s trade
is shipped through the region. Second, by 2020, more
than half the world’s population will reside within the
region.8 Third, several regional actors, to include the
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea and the Peoples’ Republic of China, are acting in ways which contest accepted international norms. In China’s case, this
behavior jeopardizes not only U.S. interests, but also
allies’ interests and territorial claims.
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Many of the atolls in this region hardly classify
officially as islands, but their strategic significance is
extraordinary. The United States Information Agency
estimates that in these contested areas are 11 billion
barrels of oil, 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
deposits, and fisheries that account for 10 percent of
the global total, $5.3 trillion in trade moving through
annually.9 The requirement to focus on the region,
therefore, becomes evident, and in pursuing American interests, all elements of national power have been
augmented in the region for a more robust capability.
These rebalance initiatives prepare the United States
to better respond to the broad range of anticipated
requirements in the region, from assisting an ally or
partner to countering a competitor.
The Problem
U.S. policies in the Asia-Pacific have been lacking
in actual enforcement mechanisms. Many critics blast
the Pacific “rebalance” as being overly militaristic,
potentially causing the escalation of tensions between
the United States and a rising China.10 However, in
fact, the military instrument has not been able to dissuade China from pursuing its increasing assertions to
Nine-Dash Line claims, or even to its far more aspirant
claims out to the Second Island Chain.
For example, in July of 2016, the Permanent Court
of Arbitrations at The Hague (PCA) ruled against China’s claims to disputed land features, “rocks,” in the
South China Sea, including the Scarborough Shoals.
Yet, China has rejected this ruling and continues to
maintain a Scarborough Shoals presence. The United
Nations (UN) took no action to enforce the PCA ruling,
and since China is a permanent member of the UN
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Security Council, it never will. Moreover, since this
period of peaceful prosperity is largely backed by U.S.
military might, it seems to fall upon the United States
to enforce this decision or see this world order begin
to erode.
The threat that exists today in the region is largely
from the same two actors that existed when the rebalance was designed in 2011, although several new
developments have occurred. The North Korean threat
will be examined extensively in subsequent chapters;
therefore, this chapter will not address further policy
options with regard to North Korea, but will focus on
the military options to maintain deterrence and protection for regional allies in the South and East China
Seas, and support other instruments of national power
to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
China has embarked upon a significant modernization effort to expand its military capabilities toward
power projection in not only the East and South China
Seas, but also worldwide.11 Analysts suggest that China
will continue its military expansion to allow not only
the realization of its claims in the region, but also to
project power world-wide as it seeks to offer an alternative to the current world order.12
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has
developed to the point of warranting a hard look at
force posturing and strategy in the southern region.
When the rebalance was announced in 2011, the Chinese began land reclamation activities on seven reefs
in the Spratly Islands, creating several man-made
“islands.” China continues to assert its Nine-Dash
Line claim that would give it sovereignty over the
entire chain despite the objections of its neighbors and
the international community.13 China has promised
non-military use of the man-made islands, offering
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humanitarian response, environmental protection,
search and rescue, scientific research, and other types
of international assistance as to their intended uses.14
However, China’s firm control of the islands and other
forceful behavior in and around the Senkaku Islands
in the East China Sea, Scarborough Shoals, Fiery Cross
Reef, and other Spratly Islands in the South China Sea
signal other intentions. Additionally, recent satellite
images reveal runways and hangars suitable for military jets and bombers, radars, anti-aircraft artillery,
anti-missile systems, ports and docks for naval shipping, and indications of potential for a naval base on
Mischief Reef. Incidentally, Mischief Reef was specifically deemed to belong to the Philippines, according
to the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
on July 12, 2016. All of the islands have military facilities for housing troops and cement plants for future
construction.15
All of this gives further indication of China’s intent
to become the regional hegemon, despite its stated
intentions of peaceful prosperity. Besides building up
islands from undersea features, China has created an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that covers
the Japanese Senkaku Islands.16 There are indications
that China intends to build on Scarborough Shoals as
it has on seven other Spratly Islands. An ADIZ on that
shoal would cover a large portion of the Philippines
mainland, including Manila.17 The type of intimidation
that China has applied to the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal situation is illustrative of how it sees
its neighbors. If China is allowed to continue unimpeded in the South China Sea while it modernizes its
military and grows economically, all while gradually
gaining a buffer zone and edging out competitors, the
rest of its neighbors will be indebted to China before
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long. Regional nations all have some degree of economic dependency on China; coupled with an increasing military capabilities gap, this further erodes their
ability to object to China’s assertions. China exploits
these situations to leverage further economic and
security dealings with these nations, and hedges them
against similar partnerships with the United States as
evidenced by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s
recent stated intentions to push away from the United
States.18
China utilizes classic gray zone tactics, conducting
activities below a level which would prompt a military response from any claimant, and to which the
United States has few response options. The Chinese
strategic expansion in the South China Sea has thus
been described as a very effective, “peacefully coercive . . . salami slice” strategy as it takes small, incremental steps that will not provoke a military response,
but will “over time gradually change the status-quo
regarding disputed claims in its favor.”19 This step-bystep expansionist strategy, or “coercive gradualism,”
whereby a nation expands its influence and control
over the sovereign territories of others, or international
waters, falls right in the heart of the gray zone, and
has left neighbors and the United States perplexed and
devoid of options.
Further, China seems prepared to escalate the situation, perhaps due to a lack of U.S. response to its
moves. Regarding China’s recent seizure of a U.S.
Navy underwater drone, “Chinese political experts
said China seized [the underwater drone] in the South
China Sea . . . to send a strong warning to Trump not
to test Beijing’s resolve over the sensitive issue of
Taiwan.” Meanwhile, smaller countries in Southeast
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Asia are watching the back-and-forth closely for signs
that U.S. naval dominance might be diminishing.20
The Current Strategy
A key document created to execute the Obama
administration’s policy for the Asia-Pacific region,
and nested under the National Security Strategy and
National Military Strategy, is the Department of Defense
(DoD) Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. Published
in 2015, the strategy delineates the perceived threats
and opportunities for the Asia-Pacific region and
defines the military strategy to achieve U.S. goals. The
Maritime Security Strategy represents a cornerstone in
U.S. engagement in the region and is complemented
by a series of classified theater strategy documents.
It describes four regional challenges and calls for
four lines of effort to overcome those challenges by
deterring conflict and coercion and promoting international standards and adherence to the rule of law.
The Maritime Security Strategy describes the regional
challenges:
“[1] Competing Territorial and Maritime Claims.”
The region is replete with a high number of territorial disputes that cover the East China Sea, South
China Sea, and to a lesser extent, the Indian Ocean.21
“[2] Military and Maritime Law Enforcement
(MLE) Modernization.” As the nations in the region
advance economically and see their territorial claims
unresolved, they have begun developing navy and
coast guard-like capabilities to protect their interests. This build-up of capability, while having the
potential to contribute to good order at sea, also
increases the potential for escalation to conflict.22
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“[3] Maritime Challenges” are described:
“Expanded Use of Non-Military Assets to
Coerce Rivals.”23 Policies like China’s “cabbage
strategy” (coercive gradualism) are examples
of activities the Maritime Security Strategy seeks
to deter. The goal of the strategy is to assert
China’s sovereignty over these areas through
a slow accumulation of small incremental
changes, none of which in itself constitutes a
casus belli but together substantiate China’s
claims of sovereignty over the long term.24
“Unsafe Air and Maritime Maneuvers.”
Attempts to intimidate ships or aircraft by
maneuvering into their space and force them
from their intended path.
“Land Reclamation on Disputed Features.”
China’s reclamation of over 2,900 acres on features not recognized as anything more than
rocks by international law demonstrates this
point. Last summer’s Permanent Court of
Arbitration ruling clearly stated that China’s
claims of historic rights within the Nine-Dash
Line were without legal foundation. The panel
also concluded that China’s activities within
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of other
nations were illegal per international law.25
“[4] Dispute Resolution.” Although multi-lateral
negotiations for resolution are the preferred solution for other regional actors, China eschews multilateral fora for bilateral talks where it can more
effectively coerce its opponent in order to achieve
the outcome that benefits China.26
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The Maritime Security Strategy describes the Lines of
Effort (LOE):
LOE 1; strengthening military capacity to ensure
the United States can successfully deter conflict and
coercion and respond decisively when needed.
LOE 2; working together with allies and partners
from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their
maritime capacity.
LOE 3; leveraging military diplomacy to build
greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation
or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the
road.
LOE 4; working to strengthen regional security
institutions and encourage the development of an
open and effective regional security architecture.27
LOE Analysis
The U.S. military, after the planned rebalancing is
complete, will have the capacity to deter conflict and
coercion, and respond when needed, if faced with the
current threat. However, as China’s A2/AD capacity
increases in effectiveness, volume, and reach, the traditionally unfettered access of the United States is challenged and cannot be countered through an already lost
quantitative matchup.28 Further, due to the immense
distances concerned, being in the right place if needed
is key. The new distributed laydowns resulting from
the rebalance should allow a more timely response and
add to the deterrence factor.29 The pre-rebalance force
posture and basing was a post-World War II, post-Korean war laydown with a strong focus on the North
West Pacific, enabling the United States to respond
to potential Korean aggression.30 As that situation
remains relatively stabilized, and as other regional
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threats arise, it is prudent to seek a more distributed
posture, as the rebalance does to some degree. However, the limited distribution of forces in the rebalance
was one of required convenience more than it was a
strategic decision.31 The deterrence capacity is present
in force numbers; what is lacking is the policy that uses
said capacity to effectively deter unlawful behavior.
With the notable exception of Cambodia, which
since 2013 has been strongly influenced by China,
and the recent dramatic reversal of sentiment toward
the United States in the Philippines, U.S. engagement
appears to be achieving its goal.32 The United States
enjoys more access than it has since its bases in the
Philippines were closed in 1991.33 This access will assist
the United States in its pursuit of continued regional
security and stability. However, with China’s growing
influence in the region through economic enticements
and forceful coercion, U.S. ready access and influence
with allies and partners has become more complicated
by their relationships with China.
The United States is falling short of the goal in the
third LOE. One example of an attempt to reduce miscalculation is the creation of the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), a standard set of signals used
to communicate one’s intentions clearly. Although
there have been instances whereby the CUES was utilized, China is still conducting unsafe, unprofessional,
and potentially escalatory actions.34 This is evidenced
by the recent People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN)
shadowing of a U.S. destroyer and subsequent recovery of the undersea drone, by the 2001 collision of a
Chinese jet with a U.S. EP-3C, and multiple collisions
or near collisions of Chinese vessels with other nations’
vessels in the East and South China Seas.35
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Significant efforts have gone forth in LOE 4. The
Maritime Security Initiative, aimed at developing
a Common Operating Picture (COP) by outfitting
regional allies with required equipment is a promising start toward a regional security architecture.
Such a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability has application also to counter illegal fishing,
transnational crime, and respond to natural disasters,
and would help level the technological playing field
between regional countries and China, enabling them
to detect better gray zone tactics employed by Beijing,
both individually and collectively. Funded at only
$425 million over a 5-year period, opponents point
out that, while it is a nice gesture, such low funding
will scarcely produce such capability in reality. Other
efforts have included helping the Philippines build
a National Coast Watch Center; assisting Vietnam’s
establishment of a Coast Guard training center; and
bolstering maritime surveillance and radar capabilities
in Indonesia and Malaysia.36
The LOEs do an admirable job of attempting to
combat the perceived threats within the constraints
levied upon the current operational environment.
There is a missing element, however, that will prevent
successful continuance of the peace and stability of the
past few decades. That element is the ability to contest the actions an opponent takes which fall below the
current level of conflict. As Dunford stated before the
Senate Armed Services Committee:
these actors are advancing their interests through
competition with a military dimension that falls short
of traditional armed conflict and the threshold for a
traditional military response. This is exemplified by
Russian actions in Ukraine, Chinese activities in the South
China Sea, and malicious cyber activities.37
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As mentioned, regional actors, most notably China
and North Korea, use these gray zone activities, furthering their national interests, often at the cost of U.S.
and allied interests, without an overt response.
THE 60 PERCENT
There has been much focus on the right size of
the military in the Asia-Pacific. In 2012, Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta first stated, “60% of the U.S.
Navy will be homeported in the Pacific by 2024.”38 The
new strategy calls for an allocation of 60 percent of
U.S. Air and Naval forces to the Pacific region by 2020.
There is a perception that the military instrument is
disproportionately, and therefore unnecessarily, large
in proportion to the diplomatic, information, and economic instruments of power, which can be attributed
to the fact that the military is the most visible part of
the rebalance, as Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., PACOM
commander, has noted.39
One might question the calculus or factors that contributed to the arrival at the 60 percent number. It is
a number based on quantities, not necessarily qualities, of forces, equipment, aircraft, ships, and vehicles.
A detailed assessment of the regional threats in the
Pacific and other regions led to the conclusion that 6
of the 10 operational aircraft carriers should be in the
Pacific. This number was based upon multiple inputs,
including size and scope of the regions covered, maintenance and training cycles, anticipated requirements,
and level of perceived and expected threat.40 Seven of
the 10 would have undermined the ability to support
the other combatant commanders, while a 5-5 split
would not be commensurate to the requirement.41
Navy force posture planners considered the remainder
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of the maritime fleet weighing the same factors. When
the calculus was complete, planners had determined
that 60 percent was a sustainable force posture requirement for the Pacific that would satisfy the strategic
requirement. Under the rebalance, the Navy’s plan
was to increase the total number of ships in the region
from about 150 ships to 180, which would equate to
60 percent. However, if sequestration cuts called for in
the Budget Control Act of 2011 were to continue, that
number would stay at 150, or roughly 50 percent, effectively canceling the rebalance.42
As with anything, the 60 percent number is costly
on an already strained defense budget. According to
Michael Green, a senior Asia advisor in the George W.
Bush administration who is now with the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the sustainability
of the 60 percent number is a significant question, given
defense budget issues. According to an anonymous
Senior State Department official, the rebalance intends
to “take advantage of revenues that will be somewhat
freed up” by the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan.43
This is the scenario when a nation coming off a long
period of war normally enjoys a “peace dividend,”
where it can refocus on domestic issues that have taken
the back burner. In this case, that dividend is committed to the rebalance, and potentially at risk if other
global requirements were to emerge or re-emerge.
There are also those who believe that a military
ramp up in the form of the rebalance is not necessary,
and might even damage efforts in other areas. John
Kerry, during his confirmation hearing to become Secretary of State in 2013, noted, “I’m not convinced that
increased military ramp-up [in the Asia-Pacific] is critical yet . . . that’s something I’d want to look at very
carefully.”44 The suggestion is that the United States
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would now focus more on diplomatic engagements in
the region and avoid any provocations that an increase
in military forces might bring. In addition, as the
United States has been a Pacific power for more than
a century and has played a key role in Asia’s security
and prosperity, Kerry was implying that a physical
change in posture is not necessary. The new Secretary
of Defense, James Mattis, tended to agree early in his
tenure, stating that “there is no need right now at this
time for military maneuvers or something like that,
that would solve something that’s best solved by the
diplomats.”45 According to this position, it might actually damage current accomplishments and jeopardize
future opportunities in the diplomatic and economic
areas. A rebalance to the region is really more of a
refocus on the world’s most economically dynamic
region.46
Mattis has seemingly reaffirmed the Trump administration’s commitment to the rebalance, as evidenced
by his first series of visits. He has visited the Republic
of Korea and Japan, and has met with the Indian, Singaporean, and Australian Defense Ministers. In each
case, he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to each country and U.S. obligations in the region, promising continued security cooperation in the region.47
The magnitude of the military instrument of power,
or “M,” is more than just a number of forces, ships, or
aircraft. The “M” pertains to military activities in the
region, including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief Operations, training exercises with or without
foreign partners, movement of supplies or forces, port
visits, Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS),
or even just residing in regional homeports. Determining whether the “M” is too large or too small is a
question of both the forces and associated activities in
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relation to the other instruments of power, and how it
can assist or damage the achievement of U.S. strategic
objectives in theater. Kerry and other State Department
officials noted above have concerns that a military
buildup could cause damage to U.S. interests. A military buildup would be damaging only if it is a temporary show of force that allies cannot depend on long
term, or it generates feelings of containment by China
resulting in provocations against regional allies. Therefore, regardless of the size of the “M,” it is important to
ensure that military diplomacy and diplomatic, or “D”
efforts by State Department officials, are synchronized
to reinforce the proper strategic message.
Today, the true significance of the 60 percent rebalance figure is the strategic message therein: the United
States is focused on the region, and has permanently
changed force allocations, deployment schedules, and
strategic plans to reinforce the message. The informational aspect of a U.S. overbalanced focus to the region
must synchronize with and reinforce the diplomatic
and economic instruments. In fact, the recommendations posed later can be considered packaged in with
these instruments of power. Furthermore, will 60 percent really bring the needed change to the region, or is
something still missing in the rebalance?
THE REBALANCE BY SERVICE
The rebalance seeks to provide a joint force that is
capable of responding to any threat in a suitable timeframe. In light of the transregional, multi-domain,
multifunctional fight envisioned for the future, the
United States faces serious challenges in this theater.
The IAP is so vast that planners have coined the term
“tyranny of distance” to describe the challenges one
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faces in responding to events. Consequently, one key
element of the rebalance is force posture. Each service
is attempting to increase their distribution from the
focus on Korea to one that expands U.S. force presence
across a larger share of the region.
Coupled with this distribution effort, the joint
force seeks to maintain a qualitative advantage, as
the United States cannot reasonably expect to maintain a long-term quantitative advantage. Thus, the
services are deploying the newest technologies to the
IAP region first, as U.S. competitors in this region are
advancing most quickly to narrow the technology gap
and bring that fight into the multi-domain, multifunctional fight. A brief synopsis of each service’s post-rebalance posture will help lay the foundations for a
means-informed discussion on possible strategic goals
and achievable ends.
The Navy
The Navy’s response to the rebalance is to employ
60 percent of its “battle force” vessels in the Pacific
Command Area of Responsibility (AOR).48 This is an
increase from a pre-rebalance number closer to 50 percent.49 To do this, the Navy has aggressively freed up
capacity from other locations worldwide. For example, four destroyers now stationed at Rota, vice Norfolk, frees up six other destroyers for other worldwide
applications.50
Another initiative the Navy has pursued is development and eventual deployment of new capabilities
that will help deter or fight the particular threats anticipated in the region. Weapons systems including the
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the P-8 Poseidon, and
new nuclear submarines will field first to the Pacific
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theater. The most modern surface ships, with the most
advanced capabilities have already begun entering
the theater, allowing a more advantageous capability-to-threat posture if conflict is unavoidable. A focus
on maintaining capabilities that best counter the perceived threat is exactly the right policy to pursue and
must continue as regional actors continue to develop
their own technologies.
Finally, emphasizing the importance of understanding the human element, the Navy has developed a program of regional experts. These sailors will
be subject matter experts in their particular region,
enabling a fuller understanding of the cultures, customs, and ways of thinking of the local populace. This
will contribute significantly to preventing conflict and
enabling dialogue that is more cooperative.51
The Marine Corps
The Marine Corps’ response to the rebalance is
more of a realignment of Marine forces within the
Pacific. Much of the impetus for the realignment is the
perpetual displeasure of the local Okinawan populace
to a U.S. military presence dating back to World War
II. Many Okinawans are vocal in their opposition to the
Americans stationed there and have pushed the Government of Japan to request a reduction in U.S. troop
presence on Okinawa.52 The Marine Corps is in the process of reducing the troop strength on Okinawa from
20,600 to 11,500. In order to keep the desired number of
Marines west of the International Dateline, the Marine
Corps redirected 5,000 Marines to Guam, and 2,500
to Marine Rotational Force-Darwin in Australia, with
the remaining 8,800 going to Hawaii.53 The Marines
took advantage of the requirement to constitute one
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additional rotational Marine Air-Ground Task Forces
(MAGTF) for Darwin, and two additional MAGTFs
based in Guam. Turning this requirement into operational capability, however, requires additional lift.
The service plans to operate an unspecified number
of MV-22B Ospreys for the Darwin MAGTF, and the
Navy’s plans for additional Amphibious Ready Group
(ARG) shipping by 2020 will make the Guam Marines
a viable responsive force.54
While pursuing this plan, the Marine Corps has
also focused on resiliency of forces in light of the substantial A2/AD threat China poses to the first island
chain currently. This resiliency features both a hardening of installations and an increase in their quantity,
creating redundancy.
Another feature of the rebalance is the placement
of emerging technologies in the Pacific theater. For
instance, the Marine Corps is the first service to field
the F-35 in the Pacific region, as their arrival in January delivers 5th generation capabilities to counter the
advancing capabilities of regional actors.55
The last feature of the Marine Corps rebalance plan
is the attempt to provide more partner access to highend training to increase their capacity. This includes
expanding the number of training areas for realistic,
live fire amphibious assault training with partners and
applicable activities allowed in regional training areas
within the Northern Marianas Islands. This effort is
commendable, but is currently subject to multiple
bureaucratic delays, from environmental study concerns to foreign complaints, which stymie the process.56
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The Army
The Army’s rebalance measures are primarily a
return of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to their
habitual bases in the Pacific region. Complementing
the troop strength numbers, the Army created the
concept entitled Pacific Pathways, which stresses the
importance of rapid, scalable response to this vast
region covering 14 time zones. The Pathways concept offers regional partners additional opportunity
for engagement with the U.S. military and offers the
Army more exposure to the region. This creates familiarity, enhances interoperability, and reassures select
partners and allies in the region of U.S. commitment.57
Further, in its role as theater anti-missile defense,
the Army is relocating its Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) capabilities to the Republic of
Korea. This is in an effort to negate the missile threat
from North Korea, as the rogue nation threatens the
region through continual advancement of its nuclear
ballistic missile capability.58 THAAD brings the additional benefit of offering a potential counter to China’s growing A2/AD capability that will eventually
threaten the second island chain.
Finally, the Army is expanding into the multi-domain fight. The Army is exploring ways to use groundbased weapons systems to exert control into other
domains. For example, using missile and artillery batteries to extend control over adjacent sea-lanes is one
course of action being explored, and ground control
of air space is another.59 Advances into the multi-domain fight would enhance the joint capabilities for
the PACOM commander as the assets committed to
counter these threats today are freed.
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The Air Force
The Air Force has also committed to placing 60 percent of its strike aircraft to the Pacific theater. The rebalance is akin to that of the Marine Corps in that the Air
Force seeks to disperse its current forces over a much
wider geographic area.60 Current Air Force posture
focuses on Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam, but the rebalance is causing the Air Force to look south, to other
allies in the region who might offer basing opportunities for both distribution and resiliency.
The Air Force is also focusing on force modernization and ensuring it deploys the most capable assets to
the Pacific theater. This poses a significant challenge
to the technology-focused Air Force, however, as that
technology carries a high price tag and the post-sequestration budgetary environment is greatly influencing the Air Force’s plans.61
Another key contribution the Air Force provides
is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
The need for continued advances in this area is especially compelling in light of adversary advances to
contest U.S. technological advantages and a growing
A2/AD threat. “In particular, this means an increased
emphasis upon stealth capabilities, unmanned systems
and technologies which enable air platforms to succeed
in highly challenged environments,” said Lieutenant
General Robert Otto, deputy chief of staff, ISR.62
RECOMMENDATIONS
While the United States has been focused heavily
on other global commitments for nearly 2 decades,
mired in political issues and challenged economically,
China has taken full advantage of the period to turn its
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inward focus into a more overt, assertive one, enjoying
a “period of strategic opportunity.”63
Beijing has made clear that no one will stand in
its way as it focuses on its core interests and claims of
sovereignty. While great strides have been made in the
region thus far in the rebalance, three things are apparent. First, U.S. allies either question our commitment
to the region for the long term or feel that China is a
more attractive ally. Second, the United States’ will to
employ its vastly superior military power as part of
a compellence or deterrence strategy is in question by
China and the region. Third, military response options
to China’s gray zone expansion through coercive gradualism given current U.S. policy and capabilities are
non-existent. The new administration should update
its military posture and strategy in the region, to nullify any capability that a regional actor may develop
with significant overmatch, such that there is an unmistakably negative consequence to any action taken that
goes against established international rules and norms.
No one will disagree that the United States has a
clear technological and capability advantage across
the globe. While there are close matches in any single
capability by various military powers, there is no one
superpower on the planet that is even close to matching
U.S. capabilities and capacity in their entirety. Add to
that the unmatched degree of experience in projecting
power and operating as a synergistic joint or combined
force across all domains in the swift achievement of
military objectives, and the gap widens from the nearest competitor. Furthermore, U.S. defense industries
are second-to-none, its private technological innovations are unsurpassed, and the two grow closer daily
as our military leaders are beginning to understand the
technological edge Silicon Valley has to offer in military
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innovation.64 Topping it all off, there is no other nation
on the planet that enjoys such an expansive network of
allies and partners as the United States.65
In this theater, the United States faces a potential
adversary in China that is making a strong attempt
to gain ground militarily, but whose real advantage
lays in its economic power and willingness to use that
power to entice or coerce U.S. allies.66 The question
then becomes, how does the United States counter China’s big “E” with a big “M”? The following recommendations focus the military instrument of power against
that problem in an effort to reestablish a strong United
States influence in the region in the attainment of policy
objectives. For a summary of these recommendations,
see Table 10-1.
Recommendation:

Amplifying information:

1

Maintain insurmountable technological edge and lethality.

Focus on a qualitative, vice quantitative, advantage, focusing on the TMM threat without excluding the gray zone.

2

Bring allies and partners under this superior U.S.-provided
collective security architecture.

Broadens deterrence of China’s coercive activities while
further reassuring allies/partners. Offer more Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) agreements to enhance regional
interoperability and compete with China’s monetary
enticements.

3

Compete in the gray zone.

Develop nonlethal technologies for use in maritime and
aviation scenarios. Explore whole-of-government areas of
leverage using other instruments of national power.

4

Exercise and demonstrate U.S. superior qualitative
advantage with allies and partners through multinational
exercises.

Focus on capacity building and interoperability, refinement
of TTPs in collective defense/support scenarios while
demonstrating superior capabilities.

5

Determine the “redlines” and clearly demonstrate the will
and capacity to enforce them.

Determine unambiguous strategic objectives to defend;
define adversary actions that cross clear redline
thresholds; and predetermine escalation of force response
options. This is paired with information campaign that
demonstrates resolve while communicating soft power
inclusivity with China.

6

Increase unannounced FONOPS in accordance with
international laws and international rulings.

Remove bureaucratic obstacles and more frequently conduct FONOPS inside of 12 nautical miles from reclaimed
land features that do not rate territorial waters according to
international laws and rulings.

7

Distribute U.S. forces strategically across the region and
develop strategies to expeditiously employ them as a joint/
combined force.

Consider a cohesive, joint/combined strategy in securing
rotational force agreements across the region that will
impose multiple strategic dilemmas and frustrate China’s
A2/AD efforts.

Table 10-1. Summary of Recommendations.
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First, the United States must maintain an unmatched
technological edge and lethality. This does not mean
entering into a Cold War-style arms race. In the simple
counting of ships, aircraft, and military personnel in
the Asia-Pacific region, the United States comes up
quantitatively well short of what China already has in
place. The amount of spending to compete quantitatively in that region would not be in the interest of the
United States. As the economies of the United States
and China are both global and interdependent upon
one another, this type of expensive arms race could
have an adverse effect on the world economy, not to
mention the damage it would do to each country as
they attempt to best the other. Furthermore, as the
United States and its allies and partners widen their
focus to include the gray zone tactic “du jour” to the
TMM fight of the future, quantitative estimates of force
numbers will be less relevant than qualitative ones.
Maintaining an unquestionable qualitative capability gap serves to either dissuade China’s efforts at
trying to match, or causes them to spend large amounts
in wasted efforts to match. The United States should
combine this dissuasion with immediate actions to
bring to rapid production those technologies that
are the closest to fielding, and those for which China
has no immediate counter. An example is unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUV) or non-lethal undersea
capabilities.67
Second, allies and partners should be brought into
this U.S. provided security envelope in the form of a
collective security architecture. China already has the
quantitative advantage in the region that will continue
to widen, even when the assets of the United States and
allies are combined.68 Therefore, the key to effective
balance in the region shared by all allies and partners
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will be to offer them the umbrella of protection by the
United States—protection that they know is and will
be technologically and qualitatively superior for the
long term. Furthermore, China’s ability to match competitors qualitatively is largely through copycatting
those advances, whether in technology, doctrine, procedures, practices, or force structure. The United States
has, and must maintain, this advantage. To implement,
the United States should consider the collective security needs of the region, and individual security needs
of partners, and negotiate individualized security and
economic trade package deals across the region.
As stated earlier, China has had success in enticing long-standing allies, such as the Philippines, from
alliance with the United States. China has given every
indication that this will be their model at weakening
U.S. influence with allies for the near future.69 Again,
U.S. diplomatic and information efforts must reinforce both a commitment to collective security, a clear
technological military advantage, and the will to act
on behalf of our allies and partners in defense of U.S.
interests in accordance with treaty or security agreements, as well as international rules and norms. Much
of that same technology can be delivered into the
hands of U.S. allies and partners through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements. Furthermore, Foreign
Military Funding (FMF) arrangements could be made
to offset defense-spending hardships, allowing allies
and partners a method of financing these capabilities.
This initiative has several advantages. First, it
directly competes with China’s monetary offerings
that serve to weaken the U.S. position with allies and
partners. Second, FMS contracts with partners immediately increase joint and combined force interoperability in the region, an extremely beneficial aspect of
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this collective security strategy. Third, entering into
FMS contracts with partners sends an immediate message of long-term commitment with that partner, as
there is typically training and sustainment aspects to
the contracts. Fourth, FMS contracts have the added
benefit of supporting the U.S. domestic economy,
encouraging overseas satellite cells of those industries,
and reducing costs through economies of scale of the
same equipment for the U.S. military by increasing
the numbers of buyers. Fifth, the partner buys more
security for less overall defense spending, as it brings
them into a collective security arrangement that not
only includes the distinct advantage of U.S. forces,
but those of other regional partners. This would allow
more of their remaining budget to be used for domestic expenditures.
Opponents argue that China’s perception of U.S.
containment of China further provoke unpredictable
actions. The authors contend that the benefits listed
above outweigh the risks and that an effective and
supportive information strategy will also stress the
security and stability being offered, not containment.
The resulting increased commitment to regional allies
can be used as leverage against China to compel them
to align with international rules and norms.
Third, the strategy of late whereby large powers
achieve their will or cause smaller powers to submit
without triggering U.S. intervention is through mastery of the gray zone. Indeed, as Russia took Crimea
with zero response through gray zone operations,
China seems to write its own rules in the South China
Sea. The United States needs to enter the gray zone.
One option for response to gray zone aggression is with non-lethal technology. These capabilities
offer great promise in maritime escalation of force
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situations. The lack of response in enforcing international laws thus far has caused an erosion of U.S. strategy since the rebalance was announced. As mentioned
previously, China continues to claim sovereignty over
Scarborough Shoal, completely ignoring the international ruling in favor of the Philippines. Recognizing
that U.S. strategy to date has been an ineffectual one
that tends to appease China, even if the United States
wanted to back the Philippines, there are few options
short of escalating to acts of war to support our ally in
this example. A solution could lie in non-lethal methods of escalation, such as the use of directed electromagnetic emissions or sound waves, to deter Chinese
patrolling those waters.70 The United States needs to
continue development of these and similar technologies for use in maritime as well as aviation scenarios
for use in the gray zone.
Other options for the gray zone include non-military, whole-of-government approaches. Ultimately,
the United States needs to find areas of leverage that it
can use to bring about more cost on the part of China
than is caused to the United States, to include second
and third order effects of such actions. Ideally, through
economic and diplomatic outreaches to regional and
worldwide partners, the United States can leverage the
large advantage it enjoys over China in networks of
international and regional partners to form coalitions
in these approaches. Examples of areas to explore for
leverage include student visas, trade, technology, and
environmental sanctions.71
Fourth, the United States needs to exercise and
demonstrate these capabilities with and among
regional partners/allies. Annual U.S.-led multinational exercises focused on capacity building and
training, training to real world combined scenarios,
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interoperability, as well as high-end technological,
state of the art capability demonstrations such as forcible entry, Integrated Air Defense penetration strikes,
counter-ballistic missile capabilities and counter A2/
AD will accomplish many objectives. The first is the
training of partners and the exercising of interoperability. This will not only serve to increase the capacity of
partners, but it will also strengthen the web of collective security amongst allies and reassure them of continued U.S. commitment. Second, it allows all involved
to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures in the use
of collective defense scenarios. Third, this serves as a
demonstration of capabilities inherent within the collective defense architecture. This will increase the confidence level of individual partners, build a sense of
camaraderie among regional partners, and serve as a
deterrent to potential adversaries. Finally, through a
high-end, state of the art “culmination” demonstration, near-peer competitors get a yearly glimpse of
exactly how far ahead the United States is in its innovative, technological edge. This serves as a clear strategic
deterrence; as noted in the Center for a New American
Security November 2016 report, “Counterbalance,”
Chinese leaders are “most likely to update their perceptions of the United States when Washington pairs
clearly stated intentions with capabilities.”72
Fifth, the United States and the international community need to unambiguously determine and communicate where the red lines are and clearly demonstrate
the will and capability to enforce them. Lack of clarity
on a specific defensive objective has been noted as a
shortfall in U.S. efforts in the Western Pacific, perhaps
leading to ambiguity. A suggestion from the “Counterbalance” article is for the United States to prevent
Chinese control of the First Island Chain, thereby
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protecting U.S. allies and interests in the region.73 This
is in keeping with the historical U.S. strategic approach
in the region while acknowledging China’s growing
capabilities. While the United States has no intent to
fall back from this objective, despite China’s touts of
a U.S. strategic retreat, a clear signal of this as a strategic objective that supports the aforementioned policy
objectives is much more unambiguous to regional
allies and partners. While U.S. policy has been to avoid
taking sides in conflict resolutions between opposing
claimants, and to allow claimants to resolve disputes
peacefully, there should be no question that the United
States will enforce international laws and rulings, particularly in the defense of current and future allies and
partners.74
Beyond more clearly defined strategic redlines the
United States and the international community need
more clarity in adversary actions that cross redlines.
U.S. and partner actions need to be predetermined
in escalation of force scenarios and ensure that those
forces who would execute are empowered to do so.75
In a collective security architecture, this might require
combined action among partners and allies, depending
on the situation. This will require close command and
control among the combined force for coordination
and to manage unnecessary escalation.76 As actions
and procedures are developed, consideration should
be given to the fact that conflict might escalate from
within the gray zone into actual armed engagements
or standoffs.77
A renewed U.S. resolve to act in support of allies and
partners and undeniably assert itself in the attainment
of its interests will undoubtedly cause great alarm and
suspicion on the part of China, as the regional power.
While that is partly the objective, the other aspect is to
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create a path to peaceful coexistence. This will require a
new information campaign that both demonstrates the
new resolve and communicates inclusivity with China.
Therefore, high-level diplomacy will be focused on
this as well as reassuring U.S. allies and partners that
the two powers will work together and do everything
possible to avoid armed conflict. It is also important to
communicate and demonstrate the two superpowers
cohabitating in the region and cooperating militarily on
as many soft power areas of common interest as possible. Several references note that this is a major interest
of ASEAN nations, who do not want to be forced to
take sides between the United States and China, and
desire relations with both powers.78
Sixth, increase unannounced FONOPS, in accordance with international laws and international rulings. While PACOM strategy and numerous speeches
highlight the fact that the United States will continue
to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows,” the truth is that this is a very sensitive area
with multiple bureaucratic obstacles.79 In addition, it
has been internationally recognized that not all of the
reclaimed land features in the South China Sea rate
an EEZ, and many do not even qualify as territorial
waters. The United States has essentially condoned
the illegal land reclamation and construction activities of China by remaining outside of 12 nautical miles
(NM) from such features in the conduct of FONOPS.
The bureaucratic obstacles to internationally legal
FONOPS should be removed in order to facilitate their
frequent execution, such that it is a regular enough
occurrence to soften the sensitivities and make it the
new (or renewed) norm. If these land features have
been defined by a recognized, independent tribunal as
nothing more than fixed objects in the open ocean, then
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treat them as such. The only way the United States can
set the example of promoting international law and
international rulings is to operate air and naval forces
wherever international law allows, including inside
12 NM, and support or accompany allies and partners
who do so.
Seventh, continue to distribute U.S. forces and
develop realistic, resource-able strategies to utilize
these forces across the range of military operations
in rapid, expeditionary, joint and combined scenarios. Work out more rotational force agreements across
the South Pacific, placing forces in a strategic manner
and planning lift assets and logistics support in a way
that supports rapid aggregation and disaggregation in
accordance with emerging joint concepts. As alluded
to previously, the re-posturing of forces that resulted
after the rebalance was announced was largely reactive in nature, and executed as a result of pre-existing
requirements (i.e., the Okinawa drawdown), and reallocations from the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Said
another way, the United States militarily rebalanced
forces from other commitments and opportunities, conveniently meeting a requirement to rebalance through
happenstance instead of strategic realignment. In what
could be termed a “next phase” of the rebalance, the
United States needs to consider a cohesive joint strategy in securing rotational force agreements throughout
the southern Pacific region that will impose multiple
strategic dilemmas against China’s A2/AD efforts.
CONCLUSION
While the United States has made great strides
in its rebalance to the Pacific after 15 years of hard
fought efforts in the GWOT, there is much room for
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improvement in the achievement of policy objectives
in the region. In effect, if one were to look at the policy
objectives―maintenance of peace, prosperity, and stability in the region; respect for international law; unimpeded lawful commerce; and freedom of navigation in
the South and East China Seas―it is not difficult to conclude that, regardless of any progress that might have
been made, overall, the United States is largely failing.
True, out of these, commerce has continued unimpeded through this region thus far. How long, though,
before China has the ability to become selective about
which nations can conduct trade or military exercises
with Asian nations as leverage against the international community? Through coercive gradualism,
China slowly places its pieces throughout the region
in an effort to gain this type of influence. The United
States, with unmatched military power and a unique
ability to project it wherever and whenever needed,
runs its traditional plays, employing hope that good
will ultimately prevail while seemingly unaware of
what is happening right under its nose. Once a threshold is crossed, the United States will by that time have
already been placed in an operationally unwinnable
situation, or worse, be forced to become the offensive
provocateur on the world stage; potentially a strategically unwinnable situation. To get ahead of the game
that is being played, the United States needs to get in
the game.
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CHAPTER 11
A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE
NORTH KOREA PROBLEM
Frazariel I. Castro

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Kim Jong Un is unlikely to give up his ballistic
missile and nuclear weapons program in the current
environment. The leader of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) has declared that the United
States and South Korea are existential threats to North
Korea and has sought to build a nuclear capability that
he views as essential to defending his country.
The United States, under former President Barack
Obama, pursued a policy of strategic patience in which
the United States maintained an open hand to North
Korea. The United States was prepared to welcome
the country back to the international community as
a participant in a rules-based international order as
long as DPRK ceased provocations and committed to
a change in behavior as a precondition for formal diplomatic discussions. This policy, however, has failed
to produce the desired results. Given this fact, President Donald Trump should consider pursuing dialogue with Kim Jong Un and remove pre-conditions
for a North Korean commitment of denuclearization
in order to allow diplomacy to start. The United States
and South Korea must attempt to change Kim Jong
Un’s mindset and strive to have him understand and
publicly acknowledge that the United States is not
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seeking regime change. The United States should seek
to first normalize relations, and then take nascent steps
to limit Kim Jong Un’s nuclear aims.
INTRODUCTION
The strength of the U.S. military supports a diplomatic option to address the persistent problems of
ballistic missile testing, nuclear weapons development, and hostile provocation that the DPRK or North
Korea has created on the Korean peninsula.1 It is an
option that removes the conditional requirement for
Kim Jong Un, revered as North Korea’s Great Successor, Supreme Commander, or Great Leader to commit
first to denuclearization before any dialogue between
the United States and North Korea occurs.2 Both the
Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea and U.S.
forces stationed in South Korea are highly trained and
ready to defeat any North Korean aggression. Armed
with technologically superior equipment and weapons, they provide a formidable military deterrence
while enjoying an overwhelming overmatch in capability over North Korean forces despite the size of the
North Korean army. Moreover, the resolve of U.S.
regional allies, South Korea and Japan, is unfaltering
in their support for conflict resolution on the Korean
peninsula. However, this alternate diplomatic option
has neither been attempted nor advocated since Kim
Jong Un came into power, and the North Korean threat
lingers today. Indeed, Kim Jong Un ushered in 2017
and the new year with a buoyant proclamation to his
people that North Korea had entered a final stage for
the test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).3
The message in Kim Jong Un’s New Year’s address
continues the belligerent threats toward South Korea,
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Japan, and United States. His proclamation for an
ICBM test later this year is in line with North Korea’s
aggressive ballistic missile and nuclear weapons testing of 2016. Kim Jong Un also reflected that it was a
year in which North Korea “achieved the status of a
nuclear power, a military giant, in the East which no
enemy, however formidable, would dare to provoke.”4
While Kim Jong Un begins the 6th year of his lifetime
rule of North Korea, there is some political uncertainty
ahead with regard to the leadership of his perceived
enemies. The impeachment of South Korean President Park Geun Hye over allegations that she violated
their laws by conspiring with an old friend to extort
private companies for personal gain has left the country in transition as the citizens prepare to elect a new
president.5
It remains to be seen how the impact of President
Park’s impeachment will change South Korean policy
toward North Korea. In the United States, Trump
assumed the office of president with the responsibility for shaping and developing U.S. foreign policy on
North Korea. The current situation in Northeast Asia
raises many questions and presents a few opportunities for consideration. How will U.S. policy change
under Trump? How would Kim Jong Un respond to an
offer of a different olive branch? What more can China
do to help resolve the tension between its two southern
neighbors?
This chapter argues for a U.S. approach beyond
what was tried previously for resuming dialogue with
North Korea in order to set conditions that will lead
to formal diplomatic discussions and eventual talks
to acknowledge and perhaps find options to meet
each country’s national interests.6 This would include
assuring North Korea that the United States does not
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pose an existential threat to either the Kim regime
or the North Korean people.7 The security, stability,
and their return to the international community as a
member of a rules-based society are in the best interest
of all nations. With their security affirmed, this chapter further argues that, if these initial diplomatic talks
are successful in convincing North Korea of U.S. good
will, they would no longer have a need or justification
for their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the
United States, South Korea, or Japan.
To better understand Kim Jong Un and North Korea
today, it is necessary to understand their background
and the foundation of their past. This chapter will first,
briefly summarize critical periods of North Korea’s
recent history, starting with Japan’s annexation of the
Korean peninsula early in the 20th century. It focuses
on North Korea’s three prominent leaders, Kim Il
Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, and how they
established North Korea’s national identity, framed its
political culture, and developed its ideological belief
that greatly contributed to its resilience.8 Second, it
will attempt to present Kim Jong Un’s worldview and
perceptions with which he rationalizes the methods he
is pursuing to ensure his regime’s survival. A review
of the capabilities of North Korea’s conventional military and the advancement and of its nuclear development will further highlight the current threat it poses
to South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Third,
it will assess previous and developing U.S. strategies
and options used and considered to dissuade North
Korea from pursuing its nuclear weapons program.
This includes United Nations (UN) sanctions, with
specific emphasis on UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 2321. It also looks at the previous U.S. policy
of strategic patience, current efforts at deterrence and
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assurance, and Trump’s developing foreign policy.9
Finally, a recommendation is out forward that diplomacy supported by the strength of the U.S. military
is an option to consider for achieving peace through
strength.10
BACKGROUND
A brief historical review beginning in the early 20th
century provides necessary context for understanding
both South Korea and North Korea. Having won its
war with China in 1894-1895 and later was victorious
over Russia in 1904-1905, Japan assumed control over
the Korean peninsula in 1905, formally annexing the
entire peninsula in 1910. The Korean people underwent
a harsh and brutal existence under Japan’s colonial
rule until the end of World War II.11 The Allied victory
over Japan and the beginning of the Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union brought forth
the division between North Korea and South Korea.12
As North Korea and its founding leader Kim Il Sung
developed under Soviet communist influence, South
Korea benefitted from western and U.S. assistance.13
The Korean war, fought from 1950-1953, resulted in an
armistice which brought an end to the fighting, but not
the war.14
Kim Il Sung established the foundations for the
Kim regime and North Korea’s ideological and autocratic rule. He introduced the core concepts of juche
(self-reliance) and songun (military first) politics.15 Kim
Il Sung remained in power until his death in 1994. His
son, Kim Jong Il had already assumed control in 1980
but only formally became North Korea’s Dear Leader
when his father died.16 Kim Jong Un inherited control

335

and the current rule of North Korea when Kim Jong Il
died in 2011.17
Identity
Kim Jong Un’s rule, the family legacy of the Kim
Regime, and the authoritarian state government are
the foundation of North Korea’s collective and national
identity. North Koreans are culturally tied to and share
a transnational identity with their South Korean neighbors. North Korea is often labeled as a hermit kingdom. Its population is quite homogeneous and reflects
North Korea’s regional identity.18
The North Korean government fosters a cult of personality in Kim Jong Un, and it is an essential element
of its propaganda apparatus. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong
Il are immortalized with tributes and statues throughout the country, a strategy they used to solidify their
power and position as leaders. They intertwined their
background with their country’s history and mythology.19 It now appears Kim Jong Un is developing his
own cult of personality as he, too, will be honored
along with his father and grandfather in a monument
that will be built on Mount Paektu, a sacred mythological point of origin site that links them to a bloodline
that legitimizes their leadership.20
North Korea is an autocratic communist country.
There is no democracy in the DPRK. Kim Jong Un
has ruled with absolute power since he became the
country’s leader on December 17, 2011. Hence, North
Koreans lack many basic freedoms. For example, the
North Korean government does not allow its people to
practice freedom of religion to include its traditional
religions of Buddhism or Confucianism.21 The North
Korean government sponsors religious groups in order
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to create a façade that the country allows religious freedom. This is an example of North Korea’s oppressive
political culture.
Kim Jong Un is the leader of North Korea’s major
political party, the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP).
He ran unopposed during the country’s last election
held in March 2014. While there are two other minor
political parties, the KWP controls both the Chondoist Chongu Party and the Social Democratic Party.
Even the attempt to conduct elections highlights the
hollowness of the North Korean government toward
a democratic process. Likewise, the members of the
Supreme People’s Assembly, a unicameral legislative
body, are really selected by the KWP. The KWP also
chooses Supreme Court judges, although indirectly, as
the Supreme People’s Assembly designates the judges
to their positions.22
The North Korean government maintains a staterun media. It includes the Korean Central Broadcasting
Station and the Voice of Korea that are instrumental
in communicating government propaganda to the
masses.23 The government prohibits independent
media outlets from operating. The government takes
steps to ensure radios and televisions are pre-tuned to
the government stations. In addition, the government
blocks foreign radio and television broadcasts to prevent outside influence.24
North Korea, notwithstanding its insulated
national identity and its dictatorial political culture,
has remained quite resilient. It appears that globalization has not had a great impact on North Korea and
its people. As stated previously, North Korea’s staterun media and propaganda contributes greatly to this
desired state. North Korea has been surprisingly successful at keeping itself relatively isolated from the
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international community. There are only a few privileged to have access to a fledging intranet, North
Korea’s equivalent of the Internet. The ruling elite,
primarily those who live in North Korea’s capital city
of Pyongyang, are among the 30 percent of the population that have routine access to electricity. They also
enjoy a better standard of living than the rest of the
population. In contrast, the majority of North Korea’s
people have endured deprivation due to famine and
the shortage of food.25
North Korea’s economic structure does not provide
them needed relief. The North Korean government centrally manages all aspects of its economy and receives
most of the revenue. There is no private enterprise.
China is North Korea’s largest trading partner. North
Korea exports include coal, iron, iron ore, and weaponry. Its imports include petroleum, cooking coal,
textiles, and grain.26 North Korea, at the expense and
labor of its people, also generates a significant amount
of revenue by maintaining an extensive workforce
employed abroad. Even with these limited business
and economic dealings, North Korea’s engagement
with the rest of the world remains marginal.
However, it must also be noted that North Korea
does have formal diplomatic relations with select
nations. North Korea has a Permanent Mission to the
United Nations as well as in other countries. There is
no mutual diplomatic representation between North
Korea and the United States. The Swedish Embassy
in North Korea represents the United States. It serves
as its consular protecting power for American interests.27 Even if North Korea wanted to seek diplomacy
and engage in dialogue with the international community, its continued ballistic missile and nuclear weapon
testing have impeded future opportunities. This is
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apparent with the routine worldwide condemnation
of North Korean provocations.
NORTH KOREA’S WORLDVIEW AND ITS
PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Kim Jong Un and the North Korean Government
have espoused a view of the United States and South
Korea as existential threats. They see themselves under
a nuclear threat, and the annual joint U.S. and South
Korean military training exercises, for example, are
actually seen as wargames for a prelude to an attack
on their nation.28 They also see U.S. forces in South
Korea as an aggressive interventionist and occupying
force that is a challenge to North Korea’s reunification goals.29 Therefore, North Korea focuses its strategic policy on building up its self-defense capability.
North Korea believes that having a nuclear force and
pre-emptive strike capability is essential to defend
their peace and security.30 Additionally, the North
Korean constitution, updated in 2012, makes tribute to
Kim Jong Il’s achievement in administering songun or
“military first” politics which led to North Korea’s successful achievement of becoming a nuclear state and
an unchallengeable military power.31
The North Korean military is the source of power
for Kim Jong Un and the country’s ruling elite. They
maintain control of the people through the military.
With an estimated strength of 1.19 million active military personnel, North Korea has the third largest
armed force in Asia.32 China has the largest armed
force with 2.33 million and India is second, with 1.34
million active personnel.33 The Korean People’s Army
has an estimated 1.02 million service members, the
navy has an estimated 60,000 personnel, the air force
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has 110,000, and the active paramilitary force (security troops including border guards and public safety
personnel) is at 189,000. North Korea also has approximately 600,000 reservists and a 5.7 million reserve
paramilitary force (provincial workers and peasant red
guard).34
The number of personnel in North Korea’s armed
forces appears quite formidable. However, in order
to offset its mostly aged and obsolescent equipment,
North Korea would need a large armed force to counter
the technologically superior military equipment of
the United States and South Korean military.35 North
Korea also maintains a credible deterrent of its own
with the thousands of artillery pieces it has positioned
across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). This poses a
great concern to the United States and South Korea as
they have the range to reach Seoul and its millions of
inhabitants.36
North Korea has four types of ballistic missiles
that have been previously tested and deemed operational. The Hwasong-5 has a range of 300 kilometers
(km) and the capacity to carry a 1,000 kilogram (kg)
warhead. The Hwasong-6 has a range of 500 km and
the capacity to carry a 700 kg warhead. The Rodong,
capable of striking Japan, has a range of 1,300 km and
the capacity to carry a 700 kg warhead. The Musudan
has an even further range of 3,000 km and the capacity
to carry a 650 kg warhead. The Taepodong-1, flighttested but not deemed operational, has a range of 2,500
km and the capacity to carry a 500 kg warhead. Two
potential ICBMs still under development and testing
include the KN-08 and Taepodong-2. The KN-08 may
have a potential range of 6,000 km and the capacity to
carry a 750-1,000 kg warhead. The Taepodong-2 may
have a potential range of 6,700 km and the capacity to
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carry a 700-1,000 kg warhead.37 In addition to the platform based launched missiles, North Korea continues
to develop its capabilities with mobile launchers and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests to
date, two under Kim Jong Il and three under Kim Jong
Un. Kim Jong Il’s first test occurred on October 9, 2006,
which had a yield of .48 kilotons and a 4.3 magnitude.
For comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima yielded about 15 kilotons. On May 25, 2009,
North Korea conducted a second nuclear test resulting in a 7-kiloton yield and a 4.7 magnitude. The three
tests under Kim Jong Un occurred on February 12,
2013 (12.2 kilotons/5.1 magnitude), January 6, 2016
(11.3 kilotons/5.1 magnitude), and September 9, 2016
(17.8 kilotons/5.3 magnitude). During their respective
periods of nuclear testing, Kim Jong Il launched 19 ballistic missiles, 7 in 2006 and 12 in 2009. Kim Jong Un, in
stark contrast, launched 71 ballistic missiles from 2013
through 2016. Thirty-four of these launches occurred
in 2016 alone.38
It is obvious that the technological advancement of
the North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program is a priority for Kim Jong Un. It is believed
that North Korea may already have a nuclear arsenal
inventory of 10 to 16 nuclear weapons.39 Moreover,
North Korea may have enough fissile material capable of producing an additional 35 nuclear warheads
as early as 2020.40 Fortunately, recent North Korean
ballistic missile testing appears to indicate that North
Korea has yet to perfect their technological advances.41
While North Korea does not yet have a capable ICBM
delivery system that can be armed with a miniaturized nuclear warhead, they continue to learn more and
become bolder with every new test. Kim Jong Un will

341

continue the aggressive development and testing of
rocket engine and propulsion systems, missile re-entry, guidance targeting, and warhead miniaturization
in order to attain a credible threat.
U.S. POLICY, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
AND DETERRENCE
Early in his first administration, former President
Obama expressed a desire and willingness to engage
in dialogue with North Korea. Rather than returning
the sentiment, North Korea responded with provocative missile tests. Since then, the United States followed a policy of strategic patience. The United States
maintained an open hand to North Korea and would
welcome the country back to the international community as a participant in a rules-based world society
as long as they ceased provocations and committed
to a change in behavior, as a precondition for formal
diplomatic discussions.42 Obviously, this has not happened. Shortly after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in
September 2016, then Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper made the assessment that U.S. policy
has failed and that North Korea would not willingly
give up its nuclear program as it ensures their survival.43 This would be a continuing problem for Trump
and his administration to address.
Kim Jong Un managed to occupy much of Trump’s
attention during his first few months in office. On
February 11, 2017, North Korea launched a mediumor intermediate range ballistic missile that flew for
310 miles before falling into the sea. This was North
Korea’s first missile launch of 2017 and the first challenge for Trump.44 A few days later, on February 13,
2017, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, was
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killed in Malaysia. North Korea allegedly ordered the
assassination.45 On March 6, 2017, North Korea simultaneously launched four ballistic missiles. Three fell
into the Sea of Japan and the fourth fell close to the
waters of Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).46 On
March 19, 2017, North Korea celebrated the testing of
a rocket engine that could be further developed for an
ICBM to reach the United States.47 Although another
missile launch on March 22, 2017, failed when the
rocket exploded upon launch, the test occurring just a
few days after a rocket engine test highlighted North
Korea’s increased technological capability in their ballistic missile program.48 Despite all these events, the
Trump administration reiterated U.S. unyielding support to South Korea and Japan against North Korean
aggression.
Upon taking office, Trump spoke with the South
Korean Acting President Hwang Kyo Ahn to assure
him of the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea
with all means to include extended military deterrence.49 Immediately after the February North Korea
missile launch, Trump, in a joint statement with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, stated the security
of Japan against the North Korean ballistic missile and
nuclear threat remains crucial to the United States.50
All three leaders agreed to sustain bilateral and trilateral cooperation in order to counter North Korea’s confrontational and hostile actions.51
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis also reaffirmed U.S.
commitment to the security of South Korea and Japan,
and emphasized the importance of the region by
making his first overseas visit as Secretary of Defense
to meet with these important allies in February 2017. In
South Korea, Mattis cited the threat of North Korea’s
continued missile and nuclear weapons program
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development. He guaranteed the U.S. commitment for
defending its ally, and pointedly remarked, “any attack
on the United States or on our allies will be defeated
and any use of nuclear weapons would be met with
the response that would be effective and overwhelming.”52 In Japan, Mattis assured Prime Minister Abe
that the mutual defense treaty between the United
States and Japan held firm now and would remain so
well into the future.53 While Trump and Mattis echoed
the U.S. long-standing commitment for the security
of South Korea and Japan, it is through Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson and his visit to the East Asia and
Pacific region in March 2017 that perhaps a burgeoning U.S. policy toward North Korea may be seen as
forthcoming.
At this point, it is prudent first to understand the
basic underpinnings of Trump’s direction for U.S. foreign policy. American interests and American national
security are at the forefront of the Trump administration’s America First Foreign Policy. Essential to this
policy is the principle of “peace through strength,”
which “will make possible a stable, more peaceful
world with less conflict and more common ground.”54
The policy highlights the defeat of the Islamic States
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as the highest priority and
requires the rebuilding of the U.S. armed forces in
order to attain military dominance. In support of this,
Trump, in a presidential memorandum, directed: “to
pursue peace through strength, it shall be the policy of
the United States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces.”55
Notably, foreign policy places emphasis on diplomacy.
“The world must know that we do not go abroad in
search of enemies, that we are always happy when
old enemies become friends, and when old friends
become allies.”56 Yet, diplomacy does not appear to be
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the primary approach voiced by either Tillerson or the
U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, in dealing
with North Korea.
On his first official visit to Japan, South Korea,
and China, Tillerson met with senior leaders from
each country and reaffirmed Trump’s commitment to
strengthen alliances and partnerships, and to increase
and improve U.S. security interests in the region.57
During a press conference with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, Tillerson advocated for the development of a different approach to address the North
Korean threat. He also extended indirect assurances to
North Korea.
North Korea and its people need not fear the United States
or their neighbors in the region who seek only to live in
peace with North Korea. With this in mind, the United
States calls on North Korea to abandon its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs and refrain from any further
provocations.58

In addition, Tillerson believes that U.S. efforts
toward diplomacy over the last 20 years have failed
to change North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. He stated
a new approach is required to encourage North Korea
to take a different path.59 During his engagement with
South Korean Foreign Minister Yun, Byung Se, Tillerson stated, “let me be very clear: the policy of strategic
patience has ended.”60 The United States would keep all
options, to include military, on the table while exploring new diplomatic, security, and economic measures
to counter the escalating North Korean threat.61 It is still
too early to determine any specifics of how Trump’s
North Korean policy will differ from his predecessors,
but the initial statements from Tillerson have not indicated anything new. On his last stop in China, which
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included a meeting with President Xi Jinping, Tillerson
and Foreign Minister Wang Yi highlighted the mutual
need for both countries to prevent any type of conflict
on the Korean peninsula.62
Furthermore, Haley stated the United States is
unwilling to revive and enter into Six-Party Talks. On
engagement with North Korea, she acknowledged
she does not interact with the North Korean envoy to
the UN because North Korea has not yet displayed
any positive action to address U.S. concerns. Rather,
Haley outlined U.S. plans to engage China and Russia
to become more involved in pressuring North Korea
to stop its weapons development program.63 Tillerson,
on China’s role to encourage North Korea to give up
its nuclear weapons program, stated that “China is a
major source of economic trade and activity with North
Korea,” and the United States expects the Chinese “to
fulfill its obligations and fully implement the sanctions
called for in the UN resolutions.”64
With regard to economic sanctions, the United
States has always led efforts to compel North Korea to
stop its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program.
On November 30, 2016, the UN approved UNSCR
2321. This UN resolution approved additional economic sanctions against North Korea as a response to
the fifth nuclear test it conducted on September 9, 2016.
The sanctions were designed to eliminate significant
sources of North Korean revenue such as its exports of
coal, iron, and iron ore.65 Time will tell if the UNSCR
2321 will be successful. Kim Jong Un and North Korea
have weathered previous UNSCR sanctions imposed
against their country. This is evidence of both the Kim
Regime and North Korea’s resiliency.
The United States also recognized China’s influence,
albeit waning, over North Korea. China supported
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UNSCR 2321 and made it known to North Korea that it
opposed its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches.
Moreover, in January 2017, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China issued a
white paper on China’s policies on Asia-Pacific security cooperation. It recognized the nuclear issue on
the Korean Peninsula as a destabilizing situation for
the region. It also stated as its position that “China is
committed to the denuclearization of the peninsula, its
peace and stability, and settlement of the issue through
dialogue and consultation.”66 Both the North Korean
New Year’s announcement of launching an ICBM and
the U.S. counter of threatening to shoot them down
prompted the Chinese Foreign Ministry to pronounce
their concern and urged both sides not to intensify
already heightened tensions.67
The strongest and most visible U.S. deterrence are
the 28,500 U.S. armed forces personnel stationed in
South Korea. The U.S. 8th Army strength is at 19,200
and the 7th Air Force is at 8,800 personnel.68 South
Korea has an active armed force of 655,000 personnel.
Of that, 522,000 are in the army, 68,000 in the navy,
and 4,500 are paramilitary. South Korea also has 4.5
million in the reserve and another 3 million as reserve
paramilitary (Civilian Defense Corps).69 In response
to North Korea’s September 2016 nuclear weapons
test, the United States and South Korea conducted a
show of force with a combined low-level flight with
two B-1 strategic bombers that flew from Andersen
Air Force Base, Guam. A South Korean F-15K fighter
jet and U.S. F-16 fighter accompanied the B-1Bs during
their flight over Osan Air Base on September 13, 2016.70
This demonstrated U.S. resolve in support of its South
Korean ally and its ability to respond to North Korean
provocation.
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As a deterrent, South Korea is also accelerating
the deployment of a three-pronged defensive system
developed to counter a North Korean nuclear attack.
The three components of this defensive system are
comprised of a pre-emptive strike system referred to
as a Kill Chain, the Korean Air and Missile Defense
(KAMD), and the Korea Massive Punishment and
Retaliation (KMPR) plan. The Kill Chain, requiring surveillance satellites, cruise missiles, and air-to-ground
missiles will target North Korean missile and nuclear
weapons facilities if they pose an imminent threat. The
KAMD will provide anti-ballistic missile defense. The
KMPR response, using surface-to-surface ballistic and
cruise missiles will target North Korea’s military leadership. Originally planned for deployment in the mid2020s, South Korea is taking steps to have all systems
in place as soon as possible.71 The South Koreans also
have another deterrent focused on Kim Jong Un and
his military elite. The South Korean Defense Ministry,
as a signal to Pyongyang, also announced it would
hasten plans to establish a brigade with a specific mission to target the North Korean command and control
if wartime hostilities resumed. Often referred to as a
“decapitation unit,” if activated, their targets include
Kim Jong Un and his military leaders.72
In July 2016, the United States and South Korea
agreed to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) missile battery to South Korea as an
added protective measure against any North Korea ballistic missile threats.73 Former Secretary of Defense Ash
Carter stated the North Korean “nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile defense programs are a serious threat”
and the United States, in order to defend the Korean
peninsula, its friends and U.S. interests, would shoot
down any missiles that threatened the United States
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or its allies.74 Both China and Russia have opposed the
introduction of THAAD onto the Korean Peninsula,
stating it would destabilize the security in the region,
increase the potential for conflict, and further an arms
race.75 China stated the deployment of THAAD would
undermine efforts to maintain the peace and stability
on the Korean Peninsula.76 In light of this, what other
options can the United States consider to address the
North Korean threat?
RECOMMENDATION FOR AN ALTERNATE
OPTION
Trump should consider pursuing dialogue with
Kim Jong Un and remove pre-conditions for a North
Korean commitment of denuclearization in order to
allow diplomacy to start. The U.S. policy of strategic
patience should not be continued. Kim Jong Un will
not willingly give up his ballistic missile and nuclear
weapons program. North Korean leaders will continue
to opine the United States and South Korea are an existential threat. Kim Jong Un believes having a strong
military and a credible nuclear capability allows him to
counter this threat. The United States and South Korea
must attempt to change Kim Jong Un’s narrative and
mindset and strive to have him understand and publicly acknowledge that the United States is not seeking
regime change. Rather, the United States welcomes
North Korea’s return to the international community.
Although the United States has always maintained
its willingness for diplomacy with North Korea, it has
been contingent on North Korea’s full commitment for
denuclearization before dialogue could even begin.
To date, this pre-conditional requirement has not led
to effective talks with North Korea. While the United
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States and South Korea maintain a formidable military
deterrent, which likely keeps Kim Jong Un from going
beyond brinkmanship displays and provocation, they
have not changed North Korea’s current path. Additionally, the UNSCR’s imposing economic sanctions,
as well as the unilateral economic sanctions imposed
by the United States, South Korea, and Japan have
yet to bring North Korea back to negotiations.77 Of
note, the belief that the Kim regime would simply collapse has long been hoped for by many, but has yet to
materialize.
Initiating dialogue with the intent of beginning the
normalization of relations and diplomacy should be
pursued in order to reduce tension in this region. This
does not weaken the U.S. position in any manner. To
be sure, the United States has the military advantage
and capability to execute a change in the North Korean
regime if it so desired. However, diplomacy and direct
engagement is the better approach. Furthermore, other
western nations such as the United Kingdom have
formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. This certainly warrants further investigation, and the United
States should consider doing the same. In normalizing relations, it would allow all parties to understand
their respective interests. The U.S. intent is not to overthrow the Kim regime, but rather to have North Korea
return to the world community and participate in a
rules-based society. If North Korea publicly acknowledges this U.S. position, North Korea would no longer
have the argument to attempt to justify its own nuclear
deterrent against the United States. Normalized relations may lead to an end to the Korean war.
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CONCLUSION
It will not be an easy task to begin any type of dialogue with North Korea. This recommendation will
not likely be a popular option for consideration particularly considering the North Korean withdrawal from
the Six-Party talks in 2009. After all, for many years
now, the United States has attempted to address the
North Korean threat using an unsuccessful policy of
strategic patience, international and unilateral economic sanctions that have not been enforced by all
countries, and through strong military deterrence.
Many are likely to argue that any negotiation without
first attaining a North Korean commitment for denuclearization weakens the U.S. position. This is a fallacy.
The United States has the military capability to destroy
North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear facilities as
well as the ability to essentially end Kim Jong Un’s
reign. This comes with significant risk. Therefore, the
United States should seek to first normalize relations
and then take nascent steps to limit Kim Jong Un’s
nuclear aims.
If the United States does not consider this recommendation, it will likely end up where it is presently
heading. The United States and North Korea will not
engage in dialogue or diplomacy, belligerent overtures
and brinkmanship will continue, and Kim Jong Un will
steadily increase his ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology. It is plausible that, within the next 5
to 10 years, North Korea will attain the technological capability to launch successfully an ICBM armed
with a nuclear warhead that can strike the United
States. Minimizing options for diplomacy will lead
the United States toward a path of increased tension,
greater chances of miscalculation, and likely hostile

351

military engagement that could reignite the conflict on
the Korean peninsula. It is a future that must not come
to fruition.
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CHAPTER 12
KOREAN PENINSULA: UPGRADING
THE DENUCLEARIZATION STATUS QUO
James L. Conner

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite years of concerted effort, the United States
and the international community have been unable to
persuade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK or North Korea) to abandon its quest for
nuclear weapons. To date, there is little to no progress toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,
and the DPRK remains a key challenge for the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is time the United
States and the international community admit that the
current approach is not working. Rather than continue
the policy of strategic patience, which is obviously
inadequate, the United States must change course
and pursue a three-pronged approach to dealing with
North Korea that includes pressuring China to do
more, enabling the South Koreans to have more military control, and applying new economic pressures to
the North.
INTRODUCTION
For years, the United States has led international
efforts to pressure the DPRK to abandon its nuclear
weapon and missile development and stop its export
of ballistic missile technology. These extensive efforts
have not deterred the DPRK from further development
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and procurement of nuclear capabilities. Indeed, the
DPRK carried out tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, and in January and September 2016.1 To date, there has been little
to no progress toward denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula and the DPRK remains a key challenge to
the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.2
Each successive North Korean experiment and test
causes a greater potential for catastrophic results and
failure. Further, the DPRK is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with the capability to
strike the Continental United States (CONUS). This
development could further destabilize East Asia and
enhance the risk of uncontrolled proliferation in and
beyond the region. This potential reality may force the
new U.S. president into an even more difficult decision concerning deterring the DPRK. Furthermore, the
DPRK’s ability to evade sanctions increases year after
year. Even with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) expanded legal authority,
sanctions have had little to no effect on stopping the
DPRK from further nuclear weapons research, devel
opment, and testing.3 In short, the options available to
the United States are narrowing and those available to
the DPRK are expanding. Reversing these trends will
require an urgent shift in U.S. policy.4
It should be clear that the status quo policy is not
enough to achieve the goal of a denuclearized Korean
Peninsula. The crucial question, therefore, is what are
the requirements necessary for updating the current
approach? Diplomatically, the United States must
persuade China to take a tougher stance with its policies toward the DPRK. A denuclearized Korean Peninsula is accomplished through a renewed dialogue
and collaboration with China. China, as the DPRK’s
number one supporter, must effectively engage the
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DPRK through a series of collaborative steps designed
to pressure the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons
program. Militarily, the United States must accelerate
the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON)
to South Korea. Doing so will ensure that the Republic of Korea (ROK) has the military it needs, assisted
by U.S. enduring and bridging capabilities. Further,
OPCON transfer will allow for U.S. strategic flexibility
with its forces in the Korea Theater of operations and
allows for a ROK-led unified Korea if the conditions
permit. Finally, economically, the United States and
the international community must do more in disrupting the DPRK’s Royal Court Economy System. This
system brings in millions of dollars of luxury goods
for paying off the DPRK elite. Excessive sanctions and
penalties for those who support this economic system
may assist in eliminating DPRK’s access to hard currency and luxury goods.
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS: TAKING CHINA TO
TASK
The United States and the international community have failed to meet their critical denuclearization objectives: to stop or end the DPRK’s expanding
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and
prevent it from proliferating nuclear weapon and
missile technology to dangerous states around the
world. The DPRK continues to refuse any risks to their
nuclear weapons development by adopting political or
economic reforms. Kim Jong Un’s byungjin policy sets
DPRK economic growth with nuclear development as
equal priorities.5 Despite the tensions paramount in
this policy, the fear for regime survival discourages
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any kind of genuine North Korean rapprochement
with the ROK.
China’s reluctance to pressure the DPRK has
allowed the regime to destabilize further a region critical to U.S. national security interests and to threaten
the safety of U.S. allies. China has accounted for
approximately half of the DPRK’s overseas trade in
the past decade. In 2014, bilateral trade between China
and the DPRK amounted to $6.86 billion, and made up
about 70 percent of the DPRK’s external trade (exports
$2.84 billion, imports $4.02 billion).6 Since the early
1990s, China has accounted for almost 90 percent of
the DPRK’s energy imports and as much as 45 percent
of its food imports. Mineral exports to China produce a
major revenue stream for the DPRK; exports of anthracite, a higher-grade quality coal used for power generation, for example, have brought in more than one
billion dollars annually since 2011.7
The diplomatic, economic, and military steps
required to deter and contain the DPRK regime also
threaten to aggravate U.S. tensions with China. Developments within the past year have altered the DPRK
problem in many ways. Although China did consent to
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
2321 to strengthen significantly the sanctions regime
that restricts arms transfers and limits trade with the
DPRK, China remains the DPRK’s number one trading
partner. Pyongyang’s actions and Beijing’s reluctance
to support fully the UNSC resolutions in the past have
provided incentive for closer military cooperation
between the United States and the ROK. For example,
the United States and the ROK have agreed to deploy
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
battery to strengthen missile defense on the peninsula.8 To counter this alliance cohesiveness, the DPRK
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is accelerating the development of a capability to strike
CONUS, as well as U.S. allies, with a nuclear capable
warhead delivered by an ICBM. These developments
present the United States with an exigent threat of a
DPRK that can strike at the United States—but also
with new opportunities to halt the cycle of provocation and prevent the DPRK from achieving this capability. China’s policy toward the DPRK can critically
affect change and the fate of the region. If China, the
United States, and the international community can
work together to pressure the DPRK to abandon its
nuclear weapons program and mitigate its threatening
military posture, a stable and prosperous Northeast
Asia led by China and U.S. allies can emerge. If they
cannot, the DPRK’s recklessness will further strain the
U.S.-China relationship and destabilize a region vital
to both countries’ interests.
For this reason, encouraging a transformation of
China’s policy toward the DPRK should be the administration’s top priority in its relations with China. This
transformation should be accomplished through a
sequence of steps to increase gradually the pressure
on China to support a cooperative approach, which,
in turn, would pressure the DPRK to eliminate its
nuclear capability. The United States, in collaboration
with China, should present the DPRK with a sharper
choice: seek a negotiated settlement to return to compliance with UN resolutions on nuclear weapons or
face severe and escalating consequences. These steps
should be sequenced carefully and deliberately so as
to ramp up pressure incrementally on the DPRK. This
will send a direct and credible signal to the DPRK
that the United States and the international community will continually increase pressure until serious
talks or negotiations resume. In addition, the United
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States should also expand the trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan cooperation to enforce sanctions on the DPRK and
strengthen its joint deterrence profile.
On a parallel course, the United States and the international community should offer restructured negotiations that provide genuine incentives for the DPRK
to participate in substantive talks in the face of the
increased pressure discussed earlier through the strict
enforcement of sanctions to include the new UNSCR
2321. Such incentives may include a multilateral security assurance arrangement. This arrangement could
include an initiation of a diplomatic process toward
normalization of DPRK’s relations with the United
States and other nations. It may also include removal
of economic, trade, and investment sanctions. Doing
so will target the DPRK’s illicit activity, and encourages other nations in the region—including China—to
join this effort. If the DPRK refuses this proposal, the
United States should seek new multilateral sanctions
to restrict the regime’s funding sources and enact additional military measures, e.g., U.S.-ROK alliance show
of force exercises to strengthen allied deterrence of military attacks. New nuclear tests or military attacks by
the DPRK would definitely accelerate this timetable.
It is important to ensure that the DPRK does not
use any talks or negotiations as a way of distracting
attention from bad behavior, a tactic used in the past.
Abrogation of the testing ban, new attacks, or stalled
talks should result in their termination. The United
States should also create a new approach to China. The
objective is to enlist China in the effort to bring about
a stable and nonnuclear Korean Peninsula. The United
States should propose new dialogues on the future of
the Korean Peninsula to demonstrate that it is in both
countries’ security interests to find a comprehensive
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resolution to the problem. A unified response to the
DPRK stands the greatest chance of finding a lasting
solution on the peninsula and of forging a stable and
prosperous Northeast Asia, and is by far the preferable
course of action. If the DPRK retains a nuclear weapons
capability, the U.S.-China relationship will be strained.
MILITARY EFFORTS: ACCELERATE OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON)
Combined Forces Command (CFC) was established
on November 7, 1978. CFC is the ROK and U.S. warfighting headquarters with the role of deterrence or
defeat, as necessary, of outside aggression against the
ROK.9 After almost 30 years in existence, the United
States and ROK agreed in 2007 to disestablish CFC and
replace it with separate United States and ROK military
commands by April 2012.10 This would allow the ROK
to command ROK forces under wartime conditions
with the United States as the supporting command.11
Plans for this new command arrangement are referred
to as OPCON (Operational Control) transfer. In 2010,
the OPCON transfer was postponed to December
2015 after a series of provocations from the DPRK and
concerns about the readiness of the ROK military on
assuming responsibility. As 2015 grew closer, concerns
again emerged about the timing and readiness of ROK
forces. Reportedly, ROK officials worried that their
military was not fully prepared to cope with DPRK
threats and that Pyongyang might interpret OPCON
transfer as a weakening of the alliance’s deterrence.12
In October 2014, the United States and the ROK
announced in a joint statement that the allies would
take a conditions-based approach to OPCON transfer
and determine the appropriate timing based on the
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acquisition and readiness of ROK military capabilities
and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.
In 2014, the ROK Minister of National Defense (MND)
reportedly announced that the goal was to transfer
OPCON in 2023. The ROK MND stressed that the completion of the Korean Air and Missile Defense System
(KAMD) by 2020 was an important step in the transfer process. To that effect, the ROK MND announced
it would invest $1.36 billion in the KAMD system in
2017. The KAMD includes the establishment of the
“Kill Chain,” capable of immediate find, fix, target, and
engage to prepare effectively for DPRK missile threats.
In testimony to Congress in April 2015, thenUnited States Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti explained the three general
conditions for OPCON transfer. South Korea must
develop the command and control capacity to lead a
combined and multinational force in high-intensity
conflict; South Korea must improve its capabilities to
respond to the growing nuclear and missile threat in
North Korea; and OPCON transition should take place
at a time that is conducive to a transition.13 In order
for a seamless and accelerated OPCON transfer, the
United States must support the ROK with bridging
capabilities and supplying “big-ticket” items allowing
the ROK military to focus on improving command,
control, communications, and computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). These items
include command and control platforms, ballistic missile defense, and precision munitions.
As DPRK provocation persists, it remains critically
important that the United States continue to support
the ROK military with these capabilities until the
announced completion of the KAMD by 2020. Further,
this allows U.S. forces to act as a deterrent against the
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DPRK while allowing time for the ROK military to
strengthen and reinforce its capabilities. Additionally,
the ROK must share more of the burden of acquiring
improved equipment and weapon systems that are
compatible with U.S. systems. More resource spending
is necessary for state of the art C4ISR. The ROK MND
must stay committed to the ROK Defense Reform Plan
of 2005 (DRP). This plan necessitated approximately
$505 billion over the course of 15 years (9.9 percent
military budget increase annually) for key C4ISR and
missile defense spending. The average increase over
those years remains at 7.2 percent.14 The DRP is now
dangerously underfunded and behind schedule. This
becomes increasingly important as these resources
become technologically advanced and expensive
as time goes by. Further, the fact that DPRK nuclear
weapons are involved makes the stakes much higher
for cohesiveness in operations. The ROK military
needs the capability to secure the weapons quickly and
safely with U.S. supervision. Currently, the ROK military has not mastered operational planning or logistics
for these types of nuclear-recovery operations. Nor has
it mastered the ability to coordinate sufficiently with
the civilian sector.15
Finally, OPCON transfer will allow the use of U.S.
forces stationed in the ROK to be deployed for global
contingencies and will transition USFK from leading
to supporting the ROK military. Currently, U.S. forces
in the ROK cannot deploy for purposes beyond conflicts on the Korean peninsula. OPCON transfer will
allow for the strategic flexibility with the expansion
within the pool of U.S. forces to support the Asia-Pacific or other global contingencies.16 This strategic flexibility will not only address the DPRK problem but
will also support security challenges within the entire
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U.S. Pacific Command area of operations (USPACOM AOR).17 The OPCON transition will strengthen
the U.S.-ROK alliance while ensuring the proper U.S.
bridging capabilities, compatible ROK C4ISR, and
increasing strategic flexibility for the United States.
These recommendations will result in a stronger
and more self-sustaining ROK military. The key points
as outlined will also prove to the ROK that the United
States remains committed to South Korea’s security,
even when the United States no longer holds OPCON.
The transfer will also require the United States to
rethink its force structure in the region. This reevaluation will benefit U.S. force posture in preparation for
support of other contingencies. Despite OPCON transfer, the Commander, United Nations Command (CDR
UNC) will continue to serve as the commander of an
international command responsible for maintaining
the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. His
primary tasks will remain to provide strategic direction, guidance, and acceptance and integration of UNC
member nations’ forces during contingencies. This is
essential in enabling access to the seven UNC bases in
Japan.18
USFK must provide the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) with recommendations to the ROK military’s acquisition of the KAMD and assessments on
the ROK’s ability to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both the U.S. SECDEF and ROK MND
must reevaluate the current conditions for a successful
OPCON transfer to ensure the DPRK is deterred properly. Finally, the Presidents of the United States and
ROK must agree upon the appropriate timing based
on South Korean military capabilities and the security
environment on the Korean Peninsula.
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ECONOMIC EFFORTS: DISRUPTING THE
DPRK’S ROYAL COURT ECONOMY SYSTEM
The Royal Court Economy, or the Kim Family
Fund, is a slush fund for the Kim family’s personal
use, as well as to buy the loyalty of elites. To that end,
the Korea Worker’s Party (KWP) Central Committee
Bureau 39 (“Office 39”) plays a critical role.19 Under
KWP, the bureau reported directly to Kim Jong-il, who
set up the office in 1974. It now reports directly to Kim
Jong Un. The activities of Office 39 are not subject to
the cabinet for central planning and control. Office 39
directs smuggling, counterfeiting, and trafficking in
order to generate hard currency, while using sovereignty as a shield. The regime heads a state-sanctioned
criminal organization used to generate revenue from
abroad. Kim Kwang-jin, a North Korean defector and
former “revolution fund” manager, estimates that this
Royal Court Economy produces 200 times the foreign
cash revenue of the centrally-directed economy.20 The
proceeds are used to support the opulent lifestyle of
the Kim family, purchase luxury goods for the elites to
obtain their support for the regime, and invest in the
military including its nuclear weapons programs.
Despite UN sanctions on luxury goods imports,
Kim Jong Un spent $645.8 million importing luxury
goods in 2012. This far exceeded his father’s, Kim
Jong-Il, annual spending average of $300 million.21
These luxury imports include $30 million worth of
high-end alcohol, $37 million in electronic goods, and
$8.2 million in luxury watches. While the regime spends
hundreds of millions of dollars on luxury products for
the Kim family and his elite, North Koreans continue
to suffer from malnutrition and stunting, despite the
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DPRK receiving international assistance for the past 20
years.
The Royal Court Economy is essential in sustaining
the regime because it buys elite support. It also enables
the DPRK’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program,
which the regime considers a crucial card in regime
survival. Since the Royal Court Economy is crucial
to regime survival and has no benefits for the people,
it is a prime target for sanctions. The UNSC and the
international community should enforce measures
to prevent the supply of revenues and luxury goods
from reaching the DPRK. The mandatory inspection of
cargo with any possible connection to DPRK, enacted
in UNSC Resolution 2270, is a good example of such a
measure.22
Targeting the DPRK’s Royal Court Economy
through excessive sanctions would assist in eliminating access to hard currency and luxury goods. Further, these targeted sanctions would assist in crippling
upper echelons of the DPRK government and promote
instability within the regime. Compliance becomes
reality when targeted sanctions hurt the DPRK elite
and lead to domestic and political instability.23 A continual strain on Kim Jong Un’s Royal Court Economy
is a potential strategic lever that the international
community can pull to negotiate an end to the DPRK
nuclear weapons program.
CONCLUSION
The United States and the international community must continue to employ a full range of diplomatic, military, and economic responses to counter
and put an end to Kim Jong Un’s nuclear weapons
development. Diplomatically, the United States and
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the international community must persuade China
to place greater pressure on DPRK to dismantle their
nuclear weapons program. Continued DPRK provocations, to include nuclear weapons testing and ICBM
development that further destabilizes the region,
should incentivize China to do more. Incentives such
as the United States, ROK, and Japan working closer
together (diplomatically and militarily) and increase in
military capabilities to the region (deployment of the
THAAD Battery) should also motivate China toward
DPRK denuclearization. In the end, China can assist
in getting the DPRK back to the negotiating table.
Examples of China’s assistance include withdrawing
material support, enforcing sanctions, and applying
diplomatic pressure.
Militarily, the U.S. and ROK alliance must review
all options pertaining to the acceleration of OPCON
transfer. This will ensure strategic flexibility for the
USPACOM commander allowing for the employment
of U.S. forces in place for the defense of the ROK to
employ off the peninsula in support of other regional
contingencies. Further OPCON transfer will allow the
ROK to control its own forces should reunification of
the Korean Peninsula occur. Finally, OPCON transfer
will ensure the ROK has a credible and capable military through U.S. bridging and enduring capabilities
that can deter further DPRK aggression.
Finally, the United States and the international
community must continue to escalate economic pressure on DPRK’s Royal Court Economy. Efforts such
as financial measures taken against the Macao-based
Banco Delta in 2005 are critical examples that have
worked in the past, but are inconsistent unless the
entire international community is involved. Severe economic pressure on the DPRK’s Royal Court Economy
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is a necessary way to compel compliance with its
nuclear, military, and human rights obligations to the
UN and a central instrument of U.S. and international
coercive power. However, sanctions prohibiting the
DPRK’s Royal Court Economy alone are not enough.
The United States must with work with China and the
international community to apply more assertive and
consistent pressure to sanction the full range of DPRK
illicit behavior. Implementation of multilateral sanctions from China and the international community
should accompany U.S. financial sanctions that further apply escalating pressure to the DPRK’s source of
funding.
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CHAPTER 13
PEOPLE-FOCUSED ACTIVITIES: A MEASURE TO
PRESERVE AMERICAN STRENGTH
Joel M. Buenaflor

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
People-focused activities provide tangible, convincing reassurance to foreign partner nations of security
and other benefits that come with a relationship with
the United States. These kinds of activities reinforce
persistent impressions of the United States as a benevolent leader of a peaceful world order by delivering
opportunity and assistance in improving human welfare. As China and other global competitors actively
work to degrade the prevalence of the worldview that
sees the United States in the lead, continued support
for people-focused activities sustain the credibility of
and respect for the United States as an engaged world
power. Leveraging people-focused activities, however,
requires employing a more diversified government
approach in implementation and funding beyond
reliance on just security and defense initiatives. Deep
funding cuts planned for the Department of State and
United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) seem problematic in terms of how involved
these entities are in implementing America’s people-focused activities. Given the expected increase of
Department of Defense (DoD) manning and resourcing by the Trump administration, the U.S. military
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should sustain and expand its own portfolio of people-focused activities.
The current administration’s direction of planned
budget cuts to diplomacy and increased spending in
defense should be reconsidered to ensure appropriate
and sufficient foreign policy advantage is available
whether the situations at hand involve military force.
The Chinese ability to bypass U.S. military advantages in achieving strategic goals should encourage
additional investment in people-focused activities.
Specifically, the United States should invest more into
English language and education programs, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, food security, and
peacekeeping operations.
INTRODUCTION
With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increasing its defense spending and demonstrating a growing willingness to utilize the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) as an assertive tool of its foreign policy, U.S.
national and military strategies need to address how
best to retain influence and initiative in the Asia-Pacific
region. President Donald Trump has promised to revitalize the U.S. military with increases of funding and
human resources.1 In formulating a U.S. stance toward
China, the current strategic context, particularly from
a military perspective, seems to fall most easily into an
adversarial Cold War-style calculation of battle lines
delineated purely through a balance of hard military
power, with each side accruing as much coercive military capability as possible. While potential to leverage
traditional military force certainly plays an important role in today’s regional balance of power in the
Asia-Pacific, more unexpected and nuanced areas of
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competition appear to be emerging into which China
is eagerly placing emphasis and resources. This chapter considers approaches for how some of these people-focused activities can best be utilized in response
to China’s strengthening posture in Asia.
China found, from recent foreign policy maneuvering, that its overreliance on hard power in the South
China Sea triggered an arms-buying spree in Asia,
caused Japan to loosen its self-imposed military useof-force restraints, and generally deepened its competitors’ military cooperation with each other.2 As a
correction to halt the momentum toward its isolation,
China initiated a well-documented “charm offensive” that includes loans for infrastructure development, free trade agreements, sponsoring dialogs, and
cultivating ties across a broad range of endeavors.3
These reactive policies reveal a China “attempting to
rebrand itself as a peaceful partner” and strengthening its case for being a desirable regional hegemon to
supplant the United States.4 For example, the remarks
made by Chinese President Xi at the World Economic
Forum at Davos, Switzerland, in January 2017 serve
as an interesting data point of where and how this
U.S.-PRC competition for acceptance as a hegemonic
power is occurring. At this high-profile event attended
by the world’s economic leaders, Xi advocated for free
trade and investment liberalization while demonizing
protectionism—all appeals that traditionally would
have been expected from an American leader, and
which also notably contrasted quite starkly with the
protectionist “America first” rhetoric instrumental to
Trump’s ascendance to the White House.5
Xi’s comments, which usurped a narrative usually associated with American global economic influence, transcended the economic forum in which they
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occurred, and actually reveal a broader Chinese aspiration to compete with the United States as the world’s
preferred partner nation of choice. To attain this goal,
however, the Chinese face an uphill struggle. Since
many of the realities and systems of international
interaction were shaped under American leadership
in the post-World War II-era, decades of success and
confidence on the world stage have made the United
States a long-standing powerhouse in this courtship of
international favor. On some level, however, projecting
national power departs from just fostering diplomatic,
military, and economic ties between formal, institutional collectives and begins to make connections
between people. The United States enjoys a considerable lead and asymmetric advantage in the people-focused aspect of its foreign policy that deliberately and
systematically should be preserved.
Simply put, for a nation to win over other nations
requires a full spectrum of activities that create a strong
affinity and attraction for the citizens of those other
nations toward the nation looking for partnership, and
the United States has traditionally excelled in doing
so. Much of the gravitational pull exerted by America
comes naturally from the domestic vigor of its society,
economy, and political systems. The U.S. Government
also rightfully nurtures America’s appeal internationally as a foreign policy tool that wins admirers, friends,
and influence. A whole-of-government approach—in
which military contributions are effectively nested—
toward conducting effective people-focused activities
can sustain the U.S. lead in this area. Cultivating and
preserving preference for assistance, opportunities,
and self-determination championed by the United
States would in turn retain respect for a U.S.-led world
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order and provide advantage for America remaining a
capable, globally engaged superpower.
ENSURING AMERICA WEARS THE WHITE HAT
In the global competition to be the world’s preferred
partner nation of choice, victory goes to the country
that most credibly establishes itself as the provider of
the best available portfolio of benefits for the populations of its partner nations. Put another way, the leadership and citizens of nations around the world should
be convinced that throwing their lots in with a given
global hegemon would reliably yield the greatest good.
To substantiate such a claim in the eyes of world
opinion requires that a global hegemon establish a
proven track record as a responsible international
player that can be trusted to serve the greater good;
and people-focused activities provide a critical metric
that allows the world to assess any would-be hegemon’s trustworthiness in this regard. To characterize, people-focused activities are those undertaken by
either China or the United States and its partners that
aim specifically to deliver benefit to foreign people and
populations as their immediate objectives (acknowledging that a strong component of self-interest drives
these decisions, too). Such people-focused activities—specifically, the type, volume, and effectiveness
of those that the United States and China choose to
undertake—will shape the world’s and the Asia-Pacific’s views on which of these two nations has earned the
right to hegemonic leadership.
In the post-World War II-era, the United States can
clearly claim leadership, particularly while China was
engulfed in the decades-long turmoil of its Communist revolution and the subsequent turbulence of its
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comprehensive social and economic reorganization.6
America’s willingness to enable post-war reconstruction, economic revitalization, and the establishment of
collaborative multilateral means for promoting peace
and stability (conspicuously, even with regard to its
vanquished foes) undeniably cast a long shadow in
modern world history and helped forge a positive perception of the United States in world affairs. Such a
viewpoint drew credibility from the dynamic noted by
Danny Quah, Director of the Saw Swee Hock Southeast
Asia Center at the London School of Economics. He
noted America’s burgeoning power growth seemed to
quicken counterintuitively the more the United States
shared and spread power and resources, rather than
reserving them all for itself, by creating an inclusive
global order that welcomed others who shared democratic ideals.7 Funding the Marshall Plan for Europe,
facilitating the recovery of Germany and Japan, and
choosing to support the United Nations (UN), which
the United States itself was instrumental in establishing and funding, all represent major American government decisions that clearly reflect an American
approach that cultivated state-level bilateral and multilateral partnerships. While many of the defining elements of post-war American foreign policy were not
purely people-focused activities in and of themselves,
they did serve as vehicles for people-focused activities
that the United States sponsored to deliver their trademark benefits to foreign people and populations. These
people-focused activities helped secure America its
success in establishing a current U.S.-led world order
whose rules, unsurprisingly, feature strong U.S. influence in their authorship and tacit or explicit acknowledgement of U.S. interests.8
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From the early years of this Pax Americana, however, there are significant instances where U.S. activities ran aground of Chinese interests, first in the PRC’s
massive intervention on the side of North Korea in
the Korean war, and again in the robust PRC support
for North Vietnam during the Vietnam war. After the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
decided to liberalize its economy in 1978, Chinese
wealth and international standing enjoyed explosive
growth, which seems to have accelerated the increasing conflict of U.S.-PRC interests.9 China borrowed liberally from economic models of the United States and
its allies to foster its own growth and ultimately take
international market share. Some of China’s recent foreign policy showcases people-focused activities that
programmatically mirror the approaches of the United
States and its allies, appearing again to create a situation where Chinese gains would accrue at U.S. expense.
Xi’s recent statements at the World Economic Forum,
for example, displayed clear people-focused elements
when he said that economic philosophies should aim
at ensuring “people have equal access to opportunities
and share in the benefits of development.”10 In another
more practical recent example, China’s establishment
of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in
2014 created a PRC-led financial institution paralleling
the World Bank that aimed to “lend money to build
roads, mobile phone towers, and other forms of infrastructure in poorer parts of Asia.”11
However, while Xi borrowing sound bites crafted
in the American style and funding the AIIB to the tune
of $50 billion make sensational news, the United States
still currently has more leverage and credibility available than China in the realm of people-focused activities.12 The luster of the Chinese narrative, after all,
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tarnishes somewhat when delivered by a one-party
state with a track record of repression that clearly does
not match its outward message.13 The PRC’s economic
windfall and the advantage it enables play perhaps too
outsized a role in China’s elements of national power
and cannot win the day on their own. In contrast, the
United States has decades of credibility in the area of
people-focused activities. English remains the primary
language of economic opportunity and multilateral
interaction. American higher education maintains its
internationally recognized leadership and continues
to attract students from around the world, including
over 300,000 Chinese in the 2014-2015 school year,
a 10.8 percent increase from the year prior. People
around the world (again, including a sizable cohort of
Chinese) still feel an intense attraction for becoming
American citizens and enjoying a free and prosperous
way of life.14 The United States must acknowledge and
exploit this asymmetric advantage over the Chinese
in these and similar areas. America highlighting these
attractive and distinct characteristics of its society and
way of life and amplifying them in people-focused
activities nested within its foreign policy could in their
own way echo and remain consistent with the “America first” message preferred by the Trump administration, a significant positive policy element worth noting
here.
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND ENGLISH IN
THE AMERICAN “BRAND”
Much of the author’s impetus for writing this
chapter comes from experiencing first-hand during
a recent assignment in Cambodia that demonstrated
how durable esteem for America can be, even when
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subjected to an overwhelmingly well-funded Chinese campaign. The script for PRC-sponsored military
assistance to Cambodia follows a course familiar to
long-time observers of U.S. and Chinese foreign policies. In the wake of an egregious Cambodian human
rights violation—in this case, returning Uighur refugees to China in 2010—U.S. military support to Cambodia abruptly halted among a political uproar within
the United States. The Chinese stepped in 2 days later
to sign deals estimated worth $850 million to fill the
military aid vacuum left by the United States.15 Among
the PRC efforts that poured resources into the Royal
Cambodian Armed Forces, the Army Institute stands
out as a particularly ambitious initiative, apparently
the first of its kind for China, to stand up a large-scale
military education institution in Southeast Asia.16
Cambodia’s Army Institute, into which the Chinese
poured resources for construction and whose operations they largely fund, prepares officers for entry into
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.17 The Cambodian
Minister of National Defense has described its facilities as “luxurious”—a descriptor rarely applied to any
kind of Cambodian military installation, and a word
choice from a key Cambodian official that underlines
the impact of the PRC investment there.18 The student
body at the Army Institute consists of approximately
1,000 young rising military leaders who study at the
campus 50 miles outside Phnom Penh: 800 participate
in a 4-year program, while another smaller cohort of
200 students attends a shorter 6-month program.19
The 4-year program consists of not only courses at the
Army Institute, but also conspicuously concludes with
6 months abroad studying in Chinese military institutions—an experience that one analyst characterized as
containing a “significant political component aimed at
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forwarding China’s foreign policy interests and building sympathy for China.”20 According to coverage by
Reuters of the Army Institute graduation ceremony
in 2015, the Cambodian Minister of Defense attended
and thanked China “for understanding [Cambodia’s]
difficulties,” ostensibly a reference to providing funding when the United States would not.21 The same article noted that graduates of the Army Institute were
now occupying positions of significant responsibility
within the Royal Cambodian Army, to include brigade
commands.22
While the Army Institute example provides proof
that China is making inroads in Cambodia through
the medium of funding educational opportunity, Chinese prestige in this field of endeavor actually still lags
significantly behind that of the United States. Interviewing a Cambodian official about the program at
the Army Institute revealed that when the Cambodian
students spend their time abroad in China, the Chinese
must actually provide their instruction in English, a
reality imposed by the lack of Chinese language penetration among those able to translate a foreign language, particularly with specialized military content,
into the Cambodian tongue.23 This revealing footnote
to the Chinese programs at the Army Institute exposes
how much ground the Chinese have to make up before
achieving parity with the United States in language
acceptance and educational cachet. Further, despite
the very high levels of foreign military aid investment
by China in Cambodia and in spite of the PRC’s foreign
aid structure that appears calibrated to curry the favor
of the Cambodian elite, these same elites dependably
exhibit a marked preference for U.S., or at least Western, education that is conducted in English.24
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No less than the Cambodian Prime Minister himself,
whose successful consolidation of power has allowed
him to control the reins of Cambodia for over 30 years,
elected to send his eldest son to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.25 That son,
who graduated from West Point in 1999, already holds
the rank of Lieutenant General, as well as the titles of
Deputy Commander of the Army and Commander of
the National Counterterrorism Special Force, roughly
the Cambodian equivalent of U.S. Special Operations
Command.26 Given his family pedigree and predictably meteoric rise in the Cambodian power structure,
some probability exists that this son might be the next
Cambodian head of state. Mirroring the choices of the
Cambodian Prime Minister, other Cambodians also
seek a U.S. or similar Western, English-based educational background for their children. In fact, the prevalence of English proficiency among those holding key
billets within the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces who
attended the two annual Bilateral Defense Discussions
held in 2015 and 2016—the highest level of military
dialogues conducted between the Cambodian and U.S.
militaries—was so high that the Cambodians elected
to forgo using translators, thereby demonstrating their
comfort level with English.27
The strong English skills among people of means
in Cambodia reflect the larger reality of English being
the single most preferred language for cross-cultural
interaction both in Asia and worldwide.28 The approximately 2 billion speakers of English around the world
overwhelm the 1.1 billion speakers of Mandarin Chinese, who are also overwhelmingly concentrated in
China.29 Again revealing the strength of English as the
dominant international language, China has approximately 330 million English speakers, “an estimated 1
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million English teachers, as well as 125 million to 200
million school students and 6 million to 13 million university students learning English.”30 These numbers
consequently also tip the scales in favor of Englishbased educational opportunities being the most desirable. This fact manifests itself in English being the
common language of various international fora and
organizations across a broad range of endeavors—for
example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the international information technology and commercial aviation industries.31
The U.S. Government, to include the military,
should deliberately work to preserve the current
strength of English, relative to Chinese, as a means
of international communication, which in turn has a
ripple effect in strengthening the appeal and relevance
across the board of U.S. international engagement
activities. These kinds of efforts already exist in various programs sponsored by the U.S. Government. For
example, the Young Southeast Asian Leadership Initiative (YSEALI) provides U.S.-based developmental
opportunities for young Southeast Asians.32 In a parallel effort, the Fulbright U.S. Scholar Program delivers U.S. experts to foreign countries to assist in English
curriculum development, as well as various other education and developmental challenges.33 Finally, American Corners offices serve as overseas outreach hubs
providing access to English learning materials and
U.S. scholarship opportunities for foreign audiences.34
The U.S. military plays a surprisingly robust role
in propagating English and English-based education
among Asian partner nations. English competence
serves as a prerequisite for attending many of the seminars and courses that the U.S. military sponsors, particularly those featuring a mix of multilateral attendees
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requiring a common language among them, or those in
which foreign partners are embedded within a group
consisting of predominantly Americans. Given the
unparalleled strength, reputation, and recent combat
experience of the U.S. military, foreign militaries
assign significant importance to one of their own being
selected to take advantage of one of these opportunities, particularly one of the longer courses sponsored
through the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program, and especially winning an
appointment to attend one of the 4-year service academies. Former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, a
graduate of West Point, and former Australian Secretary of Defence Duncan E. Lewis, a graduate of the U.S.
Army War College, stand out as extreme examples of
the ties U.S. military educational opportunities might
foster.35 While foreign heads of state graduating from
American military institutions might be relatively
rare precedents, they do illustrate how funding foreign partners to attend professional military education
or other events sponsored by the U.S. military bring
together the talent and the training for top-tier results.
The IMET, along with Foreign Military Financing
(FMF), have initiatives to expand U.S. military outreach
by supporting English training within partner nation
militaries. Since eligibility to attend IMET courses
requires prospective students to earn passing scores
on a special English test administered at their nations’
U.S. embassies, supporting English language training
within partner nation militaries helps to grow the pool
of personnel qualified to attend IMET courses.36 Better
English capabilities in a partner nation in turn increase
engagement possibilities and potential for long-term
impact, whereas low levels of English capabilities
in a nation close the doors to attending many IMET
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courses, as well as many exchanges and multilateral
engagements.
To address this issue, some IMET courses specialize in immersing foreign students in a tailored English
learning environment at the Defense Language Institute English Language Center in San Antonio, TX,
that prepares them to attend follow-on IMET courses
as soon as they meet their required English proficiency benchmarks.37 Taking a different approach to
the problem, FMF can also be used to purchase both
English language labs (servers, workstations, and software packages purpose-built to prepare students for
English in a military training context) for installation
in a host nation’s educational institution and mobile
training team (MTT) support to put qualified English
instructors there to accompany them.38 These foreign
policy tools afford America the opportunity to shape
the educational content and learning environment of
a broadened cross-section of talented military leaders
from partner nations—immersing them in English,
familiarizing them with U.S. operational concepts, and
exposing them to democratic values—that confers a
tremendous amount of influence to the United States.
As the members of that select group return to their
own countries and assume leadership roles within
their defense establishments after attending U.S.-sponsored programs, they will each bring a new set of life
experiences upon which America will have left its
fingerprints.
To the degree that education and travel can be
transformative, these U.S. military programs have
the potential to change their foreign participants’ perspectives and outlooks, perhaps for as long and as far
as their professional lives will take them. While the
initial payback to U.S. policy by such programs may
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seem no more ambitious than just augmenting partner
nation military expertise and interoperability with the
United States, the long-term impact to U.S. interests
might expand to other, far broader ramifications. For
example, a specially curated catalog of IMET known as
Expanded IMET focuses on:
proper management of defense resources, improving
military justice systems in accordance with internationally
recognized human rights, understanding the principle
of civilian control of the military, and contributing to
the cooperation between police and military forces for
counternarcotics.39

This Expanded IMET aims toward fostering not only
improved defense institutions, but also advancing
national governance and stability.
A generation of rising foreign military leaders
experiencing first-hand various U.S. institutions and
elements of American life—whether as lofty as democratic governance and freedom of the press, or as
simple as having a basic command of English and a
circle of American friends and colleagues—could have
inestimable value to the potential for the United States
to enjoy enduring shared vision and international partnership. As elevated as the dividends of such programs
might seem, it is people-focused activities serving as
the soil in which they grow. Without the people-focused activities that the U.S. Government funds and
conducts for individuals to get better at their jobs, to
become better leaders, and to become more familiar
with English, the enticing follow-on effects for cultivating continued U.S. influence internationally will
never develop.
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DOES “AMERICA FIRST” REALLY PUT AMERICA FIRST?
Unfortunately, whatever the appeal of the current
whole-of-government approach to propagating U.S.
leadership through educational opportunities and
support for widespread English usage just detailed in
the last few paragraphs, inward-looking domestic federal budget priorities are threatening to weaken it significantly. As of early 2017, the proposed White House
2018 budget cuts funding for the State Department,
which pays for much of the U.S. Government people-focused activity, by $10.1 billion or 28 percent from
2017 budget levels.40 Trump’s introductory letter for
the budget proposal justifies these cuts by stating that
they put “America first by keeping more of America’s
hard-earned tax dollars here at home.”41 To help contextualize the current risk to the programs described
previously, however, consider that the Trump administration initially looked into eliminating the State
Department’s entire Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This bureau promotes overseas outreach
for increasing English proficiency and access to American higher education opportunities, and whose programs encompass both the YSEALI and the Fulbright
U.S. Scholar Program.42 While the proposal to disband the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
was tabled, the funding for its portfolio is expected to
suffer a precipitous decline since an integral part of
Trump’s budget proposal consists of “deep cuts to foreign aid.”43
Somewhat counterintuitively, the State Department’s belt-tightening could also deeply affect military security cooperation. Funding for sending foreign
military leadership to U.S.-sponsored professional
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military education, which seems solidly in the realm of
DoD, actually comes from the State Department.44 The
International Security Assistance portion of the State
Department budget contains both the funding lines for
IMET, as well as the FMF that could be used to buy
either more education and training opportunities from
the IMET course catalog (to include English language
training MTTs) or English language labs.45
Aside from wanting to keep U.S. tax dollars at
home, the deep budget cuts to the State Department
sought by the Trump administration also seek to underwrite “the rebuilding of our Nation’s military without
adding to our Federal deficit.”46 After a protracted
focus on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the need
to fund defense modernization initiatives to reinvigorate U.S. capabilities to defeat near-peer competitors,
along with investing to counter burgeoning threats in
the cyber domain, suffice to make a strong case for an
increased defense budget.47 However, cutting the State
Department’s English and education programs to fund
other priorities is too drastic. The quote from the current Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, during his tenure
as U.S. Central Command Commander, “If you don’t
fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy
more ammunition,” neatly sums up the countervailing
line of thinking to that of the White House.48 A recent
letter addressed to congressional leadership and signed
by 121 retired three and four-star flag officers echoed
the same sentiment. They cautioned, “that many of
the crises our nation faces do not have military solutions alone” and acknowledged that the U.S. military
“needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the
drivers of extremism–lack of opportunity, insecurity,
injustice, and hopelessness.” They ultimately recommended, “that resources for the [State Department’s]
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International Affairs Budget keep pace with the growing global threats and opportunities we face.”49
Given the current foundational text for Joint doctrine, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United States, espouses the concept of Unified
Action as one that “synchronizes, coordinates, and/
or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational
operations with the operations of other USG departments [e.g., the State Department] . . . to achieve unity
of effort.” A nearly 30 percent budget reduction to the
State Department coupled with promised increases to
DoD funding might imbalance diplomatic and military
efforts and inadvertently cut available funding for people-focused activities.50 Though abilities to defeat nearpeer foes might have atrophied during the GWOT, the
military capability that arguable achieved its peak in
the same time period was conducting Unified Action
alongside State Department and USAID counterparts,
whether through coordination with the massive U.S.
embassies in Iraq and Afghanistan, or by working in or
with one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. While
government budgets are ultimately zero-sum games, it
seems like a waste to dissipate whatever recent synergy might have developed between the Department
of State and DoD by pitting them so starkly against
each other in fiscal combat. The net result seems to pit
the instruments of national power against each other,
rather than seeking to maximize their aggregate effects
through balance and synchronization.
CHINA’S GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES AND WAY
AHEAD RECOMMENDATIONS
The current U.S. administration’s emphasis on hard
power, coupled with its confusion between wanting to
narrow its concerns to “America first” and wanting to
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maintain the mantel of global superpower, likely suits
the PRC just fine. Since America’s decisive Operation
DESERT STORM victory in 1991, the Chinese have
worried about what the ramifications are to them of
the overwhelming U.S. military dominance demonstrated in that conflict.51 The Chinese realized that
the revolution in military affairs they had witnessed
would necessitate a far-reaching reconsideration of
their strategy.52 In the wake of this strategic reassessment, the PRC has embraced a strategy of “gray zone”
activities that successfully impose Chinese will on
smaller Asian states, yet remain below U.S. and ally
and partner nation thresholds for military action.53
Beginning in the 1990s and accelerating sharply in
the late 2000s, China embarked on its most conspicuous example of gray zone activity by mobilizing all the
elements of its national power to lay the foundations
for its claims in the South China Sea.54 China has implemented a range of policies and actions that successfully
exert practical control over significant contested areas.
These extend from early domestic legal revisions proclaiming offshore domestic territory to later informational narratives positioning the Chinese as economic
developers uninterested in territorial conquest. They
are followed by the employment of militiamen embedded in the fishing fleet and eventually to the construction of militarized outposts with the ability to enforce
maritime and airspace claims.55 By the estimate of analysts from the Naval War College and the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, China has “forced
the region and the United States to live with a new and
largely irreversible strategic reality” and “it’s hard to
see how such gains can be reversed short of open warfare.”56 These strategic maneuvers have allowed the
Chinese largely to circumvent American conventional
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military superiority by utilizing methods that carefully
avoided situations in which the United States or its
allies would engage in armed conflict.57
The reality of this Chinese strategic success must
shape future American employment of and investment
across its own instruments of national power. The
current administration’s direction of planned budget
cuts to diplomacy and increased spending in defense
should be reconsidered to ensure appropriate and sufficient foreign policy advantage is available whether
the situations at hand involve military force. The
Chinese ability to bypass U.S. military advantages in
achieving strategic goals should encourage additional
investment in people-focused activities. As stated earlier, much of the strength of American appeal internationally stemmed from its credibility as a hegemon
whose policies ultimately supported the international
greater good from which partner nations would also
benefit, and this concept should be embraced more
deliberately and visibly.58 The precedents of U.S.-sponsored people-focused activities provides a broad menu
of options that greatly exceeds what this chapter covered, and new policy approaches can be formulated
and executed. The hard work and difficult decisions lie
in selecting which old and new approaches to take that
are best suited to the changing political and operational
environment and fit within resourcing parameters. In
addition to the English language and education programs already displayed, Humanitarian Assistance/
Disaster Relief (HA/DR), food security, and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) stand out as three areas of
exceptional potential.
The HA/DR exemplifies the strength of the people-focused activity approach. Natural disasters provide high-profile events that build unambiguous
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consensus regarding the need to act to relieve human
suffering. HA/DR therefore provides a medium
through which U.S. involvement in foreign affairs
can unequivocally deliver on existing perception of
a benevolent presence in the region. Whether HA/
DR initiatives are civilian-led by the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance at a U.S. Embassy, or consist of military-led efforts to deliver support in spite of damaged
or destroyed civil infrastructure, the message is clear:
America is a powerful, globally-engaged friend you
want to have. As an example, U.S. HA/DR response
to a tsunami that struck Indonesia in 2004, killing over
166,000 people, had a profound impact on U.S.-Indonesia relations.59 Human rights issues that had previously strained relations between the two countries
were immediately set aside and the imperative to aid
Indonesian suffering opened the door for USAID and
U.S. military assets to participate in the relief effort,
thereby having a “dramatic and immediate impact on
U.S.-Indonesia relations.”60 Similarly, the robust U.S.
response to the 2011 Fukushima tsunami bolstered
relations between the United States and Japan, highlighting the U.S. commitment to assist Japan and the
benefits delivered by U.S. installations within Japan.61
By being a people-focused activity intervening to benefit foreign populations when they are most in need
and vulnerable, HA/DR can dramatically illustrate the
U.S. benefits of U.S. presence and commitment to our
allies and partners. The State Department funding line
for International Disaster Assistance should be sustained to enable these operations.
An area that holds potential for countering PRC
actions in the South China Sea is food security. Through
USAID, the United States is already highlighting
wild fisheries as an important element of the marine
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environment that provides a critical source of food and
protein for communities in developing countries.62 Like
HA/DR, ensuring peoples’ access to a livelihood and
nutrition seems to serve as a firm foundation for consensus and conviction to act. This issue of food security
relates strongly to Chinese actions in the South China
Sea because they have precipitated an environmental
catastrophe that is threatening a fishery collapse in key
areas where they have been complicit in unregulated
Chinese fishing and environmentally destructive land
reclamation practices.63 The ruling of the international
tribunal on “Philippines vs. China, the case brought by
Manila challenging China’s claims and actions in the
South China Sea” found “that China had ‘violated its
obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems
and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered
species’ and ‘inflicted irreparable harm to the marine
environment’.”64 Going further, John McManus, professor of marine biology and fisheries and director
of the National Center for Coral Reef Research at the
University of Miami, spoke at a conference on the
South China Sea held at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He characterized the damage
done by the Chinese as sufficiently grave to predict “a
‘major, major fisheries collapse’ if decisive action isn’t
taken.”65 These findings by the international tribunal
and academia should be engaged by the United States
through USAID as a people-focused activity highlighting an impending food security disaster created by
China and threatening the welfare of civilians in the
South China Sea. Taking the issue from the abstract
disagreement regarding lines of maritime sovereignty
to a people-focused issue should be explored to bring
visibility and apply more pressure to this nagging foreign policy problem.
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A final area to explore with respect to people-focused activities is PKO. While PKO may seem more
aligned with military operations, it still merits consideration as a people-focused activity because its intent
and impact delivers security and relief of suffering to
an affected foreign population. In the frame of U.S.
Government implementation, PKO parallels HA/DR
in being a complex interagency effort in which military
and civilian personnel will be enmeshed in intersecting
approvals, logistics, and security concerns. However,
while PKO seems to be among the most militarized of
people-focused activities referenced so far, it might be
the one that holds the most promise for defusing rising
tensions between the United States and PRC. Again,
as with HA/DR, PKO largely occurs when broad consensus exists that sufficiently horrific events are taking
place that a dangerous and expensive intervention is
required.
China has recently taken on significant responsibilities in this area by deciding to participate in PKO only
under the auspices of the UN, but often being in the top
10 of all troop contributors to UN missions and committing the most troops out of all the permanent UN
Security Council members.66 This Chinese participation in PKO through the UN, one of the organizations
with roots in a U.S.-led world order, presents a strategic
opportunity for the United States, especially as Trump
has expressed a desire for partners and allies to pay
their fair share in shared security arrangements.67 PKO
holds potential as an area in which the United States
and PRC could cooperate broadly (including militarily, which would be significant) over shared interests.
The U.S. military should identify and resource some
specific international PKO efforts for increased participation and deliberate cooperative outreach with the
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PRC’s military participants. Such an initiative could
create some strong, mutually beneficial precedents in
American and Chinese forces working together in support of a rules-based order, thereby helping counteract
existing dynamics toward misunderstanding and conflict in these two nations’ relationship.
CONCLUSION
People-focused activities provide tangible, convincing reassurance to foreign partner nations of the
security and other benefits that come with a relationship with the United States. These activities reinforce
persistent impressions of the United States as a benevolent leader of a peaceful post-World War II world order
by delivering opportunity and assistance in improving
human welfare. As China and other global competitors are actively working to degrade the prevalence of
the worldview that sees the United States in the lead,
continued support for people-focused activities has
potential to sustain the credibility of and respect for
the United States as an engaged world power. Leveraging the potential of people-focused activities, however,
requires acknowledgement of needing a more diversified government approach in implementation and
funding beyond reliance on just security and defense
initiatives. Upcoming deep funding cuts planned for
the Department of State and USAID seem problematic in terms of how involved these entities are in the
implementation of much of America’s people-focused
activities. With the expected increase of DoD staffing
and resourcing by the Trump administration, however, the U.S. military will still find itself in a position
to sustain and perhaps expand its own portfolio of
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people-focused activities that support the preservation
of American strength.
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CHAPTER 14
DIPLOMACY UNDER THE STRATEGIC
REBALANCE AND A LOOK FORWARD
Sandra Minkel

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This chapter examines the use of diplomacy under
former President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia”
through the Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME) construct to assess the effectiveness and
soundness of diplomatic efforts under the rebalance
strategy. It discusses successes and failures that form
the basis of lessons-learned in order to provide recommendations for the Trump administration as it formulates its strategy for the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The
formulation and articulation of strategy is key to any
administration. The process prioritizes foreign policy
objectives and guides government officials as they
strive to promote and protect U.S. national interests
successfully through bilateral and multilateral negotiations with other sovereign states in a rules-based
international order.
While the balance between the roles of diplomatic
and military power under the Obama administration
seemed right for the situation, the rising tensions in
the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula may
demand an adjustment. Based on lessons learned, the
following are recommendations to continue to support
U.S. interests in the region.
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• Continue face-to-face high-level (Presidential
and Cabinet-level) exchanges through summits,
dialogues, and participation in multilateral
forums.
• Join the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) as a member and support efforts through
coordinated projects with the World Bank and
the Asia Development Bank (ADB).
• After pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), quickly negotiate and enter into
bilateral or multilateral trade deals that support
U.S. economic prosperity and business opportunities abroad. Trump stated his preference for
bilateral trade deals. However, consideration
should be given to multilateral trade deals that
support his economic agenda.
• Use various mediums to relay a consistent U.S.
policy with explanations to the public as to its
importance.
• Nominate personnel with appropriate regional
experience to fill key positions within State,
U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the Department of Defense (DoD)
to assist with policy formulation and ensure
implementation of the policy in line with the
new administration’s priorities.
• Refrain from deep budget cuts in foreign assistance that allows the Department of State and
USAID to deliver diplomatic and development
exertions required to achieve national security
objectives.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, the people of the United States
elected Trump to be the 45th President of the United
States. The new leadership will undoubtedly usher
in different priorities, policies, and strategies, making
this an ideal time to review Obama’s strategic pivot
or rebalance to the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) and to
look ahead toward the next 4 years. This chapter considers the Obama administration’s use of diplomacy
to achieve long-term objectives in line with national
security interests in the IAP region. While traditional
diplomatic negotiations are often not directly in the
public eye or as newsworthy as military activities, they
nevertheless occur on a constant basis across all governmental agencies. As Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under
Obama, wrote, “The personal dimension of American
diplomacy is probably the least understood and most
important facet of American power in Asia.”1
Merriam-Webster defines diplomacy as “the art and
practice of conducting negotiations between nations”
and the “skill in handling affairs without arousing
hostility.”2 Charles Freeman described diplomacy in
his book, Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy, as the
adjustment of relations between states by mutual agreement. It is the method and process by which foreign
policy is pursued through peaceful means. He added
that diplomatic strategy “must be judged by what it
prevents as much as by what it achieves.”3 This chapter
discusses successes and failures under the pivot to the
IAP in the use of diplomacy in a whole-of-government
pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It reviews aspects
of the strategy through the DIME construct to determine whether the efforts in the region were sound. It
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contends that there was a mix of successes and disappointments. It then draws on these lessons learned to
recommend actions under the Trump administration.
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: REBALANCE TO
THE INDO-ASIA-PACIFIC
In 2011, Obama declared to the Australian Parliament that he had “made a deliberate and strategic
decision―as a Pacific nation” to seek “security, prosperity, and dignity for all” in the Asia-Pacific region.
He clearly stated, “So let there be no doubt, in the Asia
Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.”4 While the United States has always been
a “Pacific nation” and previous administrations have
focused on emerging opportunities in Asia, many
in the region felt that in recent years, U.S. presence
waned. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as
the 2008 financial crisis, had diverted resources and
attention. As a result, high-level U.S. officials did not
always attend regional forums, leading Asian leaders
to feel abandoned in their quest for regional stability.
Among the few visible gauges of traditional diplomacy, the “D” in DIME, are state-to-state and highlevel engagements and meetings. In this regard, Obama
backed up his pledge to “be all in.” “Nine-tenths of
success in diplomacy in Asia is showing up,” said
Michael J. Green, a key figure on Asian affairs on President George W. Bush’s National Security Council, in a
riff on a quote made famous by Woody Allen.5 Obama
definitely showed up―traveling to Asia 63 times, more
than any president in history. A look at the records of
four two-term presidents―Dwight Eisenhower spent
12 days in Asia; Ronald Reagan, 21 days; Bill Clinton,
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52; and George W. Bush, 50―illustrates the increasing
focus on the region over the last 24 years.6
Hillary Clinton also did her part to reinforce the
U.S. reinvigorated interest in Asia. She broke from tradition when she became the first Secretary of State in 50
years to visit Asia on her first official trip―just 1 month
after her confirmation.7 Maintaining the enthusiasm
for commitment to the rebalance, she went on to make
more trips to the region than any previous Secretary
of State―62, compared to Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s
47.8 In a 2015 speech at the Brookings Institute, Clinton
called the rebalance policy a “response to the very real
sense of abandonment that Asian leaders expressed to
me,”9 due to the U.S. focus on Afghanistan and Iraq.
The sense was “we were just not paying attention to the
developments in Asia.”10 Secretary Clinton reinforced
the U.S. commitment by attending the first Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional
Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting, where she signed
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in
July 2009. The TAC’s language represents the foundational principles of ASEAN, and signing indicated
a general acceptance of them for dealing with the 10
ASEAN nations. It also opened the door for expanded
participation in other ASEAN-related forums. The
United States became the first non-ASEAN country to
establish a dedicated diplomatic mission, and in 2010
to appoint a resident ambassador to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.11 The arrangement provided for continuous and consistent contact by a U.S. representative
dedicated to ASEAN affairs.
Transition to a new Secretary of State, John Kerry
in 2013, and the departure of Assistant Secretary for

415

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell―one
of the architects of the rebalance to Asia―sparked
Asian doubts about the U.S. ongoing commitment to
the region.12 Meanwhile, disagreements at home over
the debt ceiling added to concerns about U.S. stability
and staying power. “Running the government of the
world’s mightiest power by sequestration and threats
of going over a fiscal cliff,” wrote Robert Hathaway, a
Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center, “mystified
those who look to the United States for leadership,”13
and exacerbated doubts of U.S. commitment to the
rebalance. Criticized for diverting attention to issues in
Europe and the Middle East, Kerry and other administration officials nevertheless continued to engage
substantively with Asia, making it a point to attend
the ARF meetings, for example, and standing in for
Obama at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
and East Asia Summit (EAS) meetings. (APEC, comprised of 22 economies, is a forum for promoting economic cooperation and trade liberalization.)14
The partial U.S. Government shutdown in 2013,
driven by sharp budget differences between congressional Republicans and the White House,15 prompted
Obama to cancel his attendance at an APEC meeting
in Indonesia, an EAS meeting in Brunei, and a visit
to Malaysia. Although the United States sent Kerry,
along with U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman
and Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, the Asians
were disappointed that Obama was not there to offer
a high-level counter to the Chinese head of state, Xi
Jinping.16 In particular, key leaders were disappointed
he was unable to use his personal influence to press
for progress on the TPP,17 an agreement connecting 12
countries and intended to expand economic growth
with lower non-tariff barriers and higher standards to
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address intellectual property rights and state-owned
enterprises.
Meanwhile, on the sidelines of APEC, Xi was pushing countries to commit to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an agreement
between ASEAN and six other Asian countries―Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South
Korea―with which it has bilateral free trade pacts.18
The United States and Russia had become full participants in the EAS in 2011. In an article for the East
Asian Forum, John Pang wrote that the “single biggest
influence on the direction of the EAS has been the consistent presence of Washington’s ‘Pacific President,’
who shifted the EAS agenda towards geostrategic
concerns.”19
Public Diplomacy
The success of diplomacy requires clearly defined
and articulated messaging, which gains buy-in and
impels others toward common goals. In “America’s
Pacific Century,” a 2011 article for Foreign Policy, Secretary Clinton included such phrases as “the United
States stands at a pivot point,” “efforts to pivot to new
global realities,” and, “this kind of pivot is not easy.”
Journalists latched onto the catch phrase to brand the
new strategy.20 Whereas the intent had been to articulate an integrated approach to focusing on a strategically important region in the 21st century, the phrase
had the unintended impact of signaling a turning-away
from Europe and the Middle East. Uncertainty regarding U.S. capabilities and the long-term U.S. commitment to those other regions grew. Asian allies became
concerned that the United States could as easily turn
away from them should a crisis arise in another region.
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Though the policy would later be re-branded as a
“rebalance,” it was too late to repair the initial damage.
Kurt Campbell admitted to a poorly-handled rollout of the rebalance, saying the administration “could
have been more effective at communicating what the
goals were,” including its desire to “embed China in
a regional strategy.”21 The branding itself detracted
from the broader intent. While attempting to reassure the IAP region that it was a top priority for the
United States, this phrasing―in widespread use until
recently―made it seem as though the administration
was shifting from, rather than extending the efforts of
previous administrations.
In fact, the rebalance was nothing more than an elevation of a strategy conceived by previous administrations. Thanks to September 11, 2001 (9/11), the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the global financial crisis
of 2008, this earlier strategy had simply fallen off the
radar. While his administration had focused on Asia
from the start, Obama turned his attention to the financial crisis, as it was shaking nerves across the global
community and calling into question the U.S. role as a
world leader. China seized on this perceived weakening, becoming more assertive in its territorial claims in
the South and East China Seas, as well as on the economic front.
The Obama administration also could have done
a better job explaining its integrated strategy to the
American people. A well-articulated and documented
strategy in one central place might have assuaged
confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders at home
and abroad. The administration had captured toplevel priorities, including a refocus on Asia and a
whole-of-government approach to foreign policy, in
the 2015 National Security Strategy, but the public knew
little to nothing about it.
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Bilateral Diplomacy
Fortified through various bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic, economic, and security relationships, the
IAP is of great importance to U.S. security and economy. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
estimates that, by 2030, the IAP region will contain the
three largest economies after the United States (China,
India, and Japan).22 Five of the 10 most populous countries―Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan―are in Asia, and 7 of the 10 largest militaries are
in the IAP.23 Of these, the United States has bilateral
defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
and the Philippines, strong partnerships with Singapore and New Zealand, and strengthened partnerships
with Indonesia and Vietnam. The simple guiding goal
of the pivot, as Campbell has explained, is to intensify
its bilateral relationships with “nearly every Asian
state, from India to Vietnam and from Malaysia to
Mongolia, and to embed itself in Asia’s growing web
of regional institutions.”24
In her Foreign Policy article, Secretary Clinton wrote
that strengthening bilateral relations was among the
six elements of the strategy that complement efforts
through multilateral forums and institutions and
regional security architecture.25 Bilateral relationships
and promotion of U.S. interests and values overseas
are not new, but the number of high-level visits and
face-to-face dialogues helped to build relationships.
Under Obama, administration officials strengthened
bilateral relationships across the IAP, promoting an
international, rules-based order, adherence to international law, democratic values, and human rights.
Nations long neglected by Washington (New Zealand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and small Pacific island
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states) received high-ranking U.S. official visits, as did
India, and most notably, Burma and Vietnam.26
After signing the TAC in 2010, Secretary Clinton
presented the U.S. “principled engagement” strategy
toward Burma to ASEAN. The strategy represented
a shift in policy, from sanctions imposed by previous administrations to engagement based on Burma’s
reform efforts toward democracy. When she visited a
year later, Clinton became the first Secretary of State
to do so in 55 years. A year later, the U.S. Government
re-established full diplomatic relations with Burma―
nominating Derek Mitchell as the first ambassador
since 1990―and reopened a USAID mission there. In
testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted
efforts with Burma to “modernize and strengthen legal
and regulatory regimes” in the country, “helping set
the stage for major American companies to enter that
market.”27
Similarly, the engagement with Vietnam brought
positive results. Since a bilateral trade agreement was
signed in 2001, trade and investment opportunities
have grown dramatically, and the country continues to take positive steps on human rights, including
having authorized independent trade unions, a first in
modern times. The 2013 U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive
Partnership has encouraged respect for the rule of law.
After Obama visited the country in May 2016, in part to
mark the 2015 anniversary of 20 years of bilateral relations (that year U.S. exports to the country increased
by 23 percent), Vietnam signed the TPP. Still, challenges remain, particularly regarding labor standards;
Vietnam has yet to pass laws that would bring it to the
level required for participation in the TPP.28
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Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama
all visited India, underscoring the growing importance
of this bilateral relationship for mutual prosperity and
security. The Bush administration committed to new
cooperation on four highly sensitive fronts: civilian
nuclear energy, civilian space programs, dual-use high
technology, and missile defense.29 The 2005 U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement “opened the
doors to a new relationship with an emerging power,”
as Ashley J. Tellis put it.30 In the years since, cooperation
between the two countries has steadily increased, helping to offset China’s growing expansion in the region.
Obama highlighted the “strategic convergence” with
India’s Act East Policy and the U.S. “continued implementation of the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” in
the 2015 National Security Strategy.31 Similar to the U.S.
rebalance, India actively seeks to engage with ASEAN
and other Asian countries. India is the second largest
contributor to the AIIB and is negotiating to join the
regional trade agreement. In 2012, the United States
and India created the Defense Technology and Trade
Initiative, and the White House recognized India as a
major defense partner, a level that the United States
accords its close partners and allies.32 This enables
expanding defense trade and technology sharing with
the country. With the rise of India’s population and
economy―Bloomberg reports that the USDA expects
India to move ahead of Japan as the world’s third largest economy by 203033―it will continue to be a significant partner economically as well as militarily.
South Korea and Japan are both treaty allies with
long histories of cooperation (and some historical tensions between the two) with the United States. These
countries are integral alliance partners and coordinate
closely with the United States on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and other economic and
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military issues in the region. The United States worked
to modernize the treaty with Japan by modifying the
Defense Guidelines with new and expanded forms of
security cooperation in 2015 and a new 5-year package
of host nation support for U.S. troops in 2016.
South Korea agreed last year to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defense system as a way of defending against rising
threats from North Korea. South Korea’s hosting of
THAAD threatens China, as it is perceived as a surveillance mechanism and soured South Korea’s relations with China and created additional tensions in
the region. Many Asian experts believe that Obama’s
approach of “strategic patience” toward North Korea
has failed, and they are looking to Trump for a change
in strategy. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently
said that, after 20 years of failure to denuclearize the
peninsula, “strategic patience is over,” and that the
new administration would most likely take a different
approach.34
In 2014, the United States deepened long-standing
security cooperation with the Philippines by signing
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. The
agreement authorizes the U.S. military access on a rotational basis and allows the two nations’ forces to conduct security cooperation exercises, joint training, and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.35
The United States is one of the largest foreign investors
in the Philippines, and there is a strong bilateral trade
relationship, though recent concerns about human
rights abuses under the Duterte presidency and harsh
statements made by Duterte about Obama raise questions about future long-term relations. Additionally,
Duterte’s balancing act between pleasing the United
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States and China is a precarious situation fraught with
the potential to anger either of the two large powers.36
China remains the most prominent player and the
most complex of U.S. bilateral relationships in the
region. Historians, political analysts, and academics
have theorized about the “rise of China” as a great
power and whether a transition from the United States
as the status quo power and the rise of China as a great
power might escalate to a military conflict (as has happened in 12 out of 16 such transitions over the last 500
years). Whether, in other words, the two rivals will
avoid the so-called Thucydides Trap37―a reference to
the author who chronicled the 5th century BC Peloponnesian War, pitting a rising Athens against the
status quo power, Sparta, and the shift in the balance
of power between them. In a 2015 article for The Atlantic, Graham Allison considered the key drivers behind
the conflict: on one hand, “the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and demand
for greater say and sway,” and on the other, “the fear,
insecurity, and determination to defend the status quo
this engenders in the established power.”38
China says it strives for peaceful development,
with win-win benefits for both nations, while the
United States says it welcomes a peaceful rise of China
as long as it adheres to multilateral norms and the
rules of international law. “There is no such thing as
the so-called Thucydides Trap,” said Xi on a visit to
Washington in 2015. “But should major countries time
and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.”39
It will take diligence, dialogue, and understanding to
avoid such miscalculations. After dealing with U.S.
domestic issues, the Obama administration showed
signs of improved partnership with China―following
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the line from the Bush administration to hold China
accountable as a responsible stakeholder regarding
global issues and increasing the number of high-level
dialogues.
The Obama administration invested substantial
resources in a growing set of bilateral forums, including the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,
the Strategic Security Dialogue, and over 60 other
issue-based and regional dialogues with Chinese government officials.40 In 2013, Obama hosted Xi in California for an informal 2-day summit, just months after
the new president had taken office, to deepen their
personal relationship and seek a way forward on key
issues. The leaders discussed North Korea, cyber-theft
and espionage, maritime territorial disputes in the East
and South China Seas, and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.41
These informal summits, the Security and Economic
Dialogues, and other forums increase understanding and cooperation and yield results. Arguably, the
mutual commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate
change is a great sign of willingness to address global
challenges. However, any momentum toward growing
trust and cooperation established during the Obama
administration has been lost with the Trump administration’s decision to pull out of the Paris Agreement.
While the agreement on climate change and highlevel dialogues delivered many positive benefits, there
is still much to do to reduce the level of mistrust on
both sides. China claims it strives for peaceful development with win-win benefits while protecting its core
interests. The United States says it welcomes a peaceful
rise of China as long as China adheres to the norms of
international law and multilateral norms. The relationship will continue to be problematic as long as the core
interests of each country are not in closer alignment.
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Multilateral Arrangements
The United States uses a whole-of-government
approach to work through bilateral as well as multilateral institutions in order to promote its interests of
peace, security, and respect for international law. Aside
from the long-standing and largely U.S.-led Bretton
Woods institutions, the most significant multilateral
achievement under the rebalance was the U.S. signing of the ASEAN TAC, which resulted in the United
States playing an active and influential role in ASEAN
forums such as the ARF, EAS, and ASEAN Defense
Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-PLUS). In addition,
the United States is a member of several other regional
organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Lower Mekong Initiative, and is
an observer to the Pacific Islands Forum and the Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia.
Geopolitical changes are forcing many multilateral organizations to reevaluate their memberships
and voting rules to reflect better the growing influence of countries such as China and India. In 2010, the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) executive board
approved a plan to increase the voting share of the
aforementioned members and to double the amount of
permanent funding available to the Washington-based
fund.42 While the Obama administration made several
efforts to obtain legislative approval of the changes,
the proposal languished in Congress for 5 years.43
Edwin M. Truman, a former assistant secretary of the
U.S. Treasury, warned that failure to act would compel
other nations to work around the United States at the
IMF.44 Congress finally approved the proposal in 2015;
5 years after the IMF had submitted it.
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Analysts have posited growing frustration with
Washington and U.S.-led international organizations
prompted China to create the AIIB. In an article for
The Pacific Review, Xiao Ren wrote that slow-moving
reforms and resistance to accommodation of China’s
growing status in the IMF, World Bank, and ADB frustrated the Asian powerhouse.
China’s push for a regional institution within which
it would be dominant or at least have considerable
impact was a reflection of Beijing’s frustration over the
Western, especially American, dominance of the existing
international multilaterals.45

Some call Washington’s reaction to the AIIB a “diplomatic disaster.”46 Not only did the United States
show no interest in joining the AIIB, it actively lobbied
its allies to stay away, suggesting that the new bank
would not have the same high standards of creditworthiness and transparency as the other multilateral
banking institutions. The United States also feared that
the AIIB would increase China’s ability to use infrastructure financing to influence countries toward a
pro-China stance. Some have argued that China might
have invested in one of the existing banks in order
to achieve the same purpose, but its frustration had
reached a peak. Since then, several allies and other
countries rushed to join the AIIB, a situation that suggests the United States is losing influence.
In a March 2015 issue of The Economist, the editors
wrote that the United States is not wrong to question
the existence of the AIIB, but that it would have more
influence working from within the structure. They
also pointed out that, while the ADB and the World
Bank are focused on poverty alleviation and healthcare, the focus of the AIIB is large-scale infrastructure
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programs. “The continent’s relentless urbanization
requires at least $8 trillion of infrastructure spending in
this decade, according to ADB,”47 adding that the AIIB
complements existing development bank programs.
Economic Diplomacy
Under the rebalance, the United States intended to
focus on economic statecraft and strengthening economic leadership48―the “E” in DIME. At the heart of
this portion of the strategy was the ambitious TPP,
a comprehensive trading network encompassing 12
countries on 4 continents. The Obama administration
negotiated an agreement that sought to lower barriers, raise standards, and address intellectual property rights and state-owned enterprises, and that
would have covered 40 percent of the world’s trade. It
would have fortified the U.S. status as the leader of a
global, rules-based economic system that would have
expanded to trading partners in the region with North
America and South America. The ability to invest in
the development of the Asian economies and to sell
goods and services to their growing middle classes
was to power U.S. growth for decades to come.49
While Obama signed the negotiated agreement
in 2016, Congress still needed to draft a bill to implement the agreement, which would have served as U.S.
ratification of the trade deal.50 The U.S. business community largely supported the TPP―it would level the
playing field and open markets for export―but there
was not sufficient political will for ratification. The
Obama administration’s efforts to conclude the TPP
were laudable, but its inability to submit the agreement to Congress before the beginning of a contentious U.S. election cycle put the entire project at risk. In
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the end, both candidates for president denounced the
agreement―though one had worked on it as Secretary
of State―and the new administration was clear that it
would take TPP no further.
Military Diplomacy
The military initiated its portion of the pivot by
shifting 60 percent of the force to the Asia-Pacific to
protect U.S. interests while strengthening and modernizing bilateral relationships with treaty allies Japan,
South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. North
Korea’s continued efforts to acquire and test longrange nuclear missiles that will reach the United States
destabilizes the region and threatens the security of
the United States and its allies. China’s aggressiveness
on territorial claims and its militarization of the South
China Sea, combined with a staggering build-up and
modernization of its forces, threaten security and freedom of navigation in the South and East China Seas.
John Pomfret chronicled a confrontation between Secretary Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
in Hanoi in 2010, just months prior to the announcement of the rebalance. In response to her assertion that
claims to maritime space should be directly tied to
legitimate claims to land features, Yang said, “China
is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s a fact.”51 This statement may be interpreted two different ways. On one hand, China reacted
to harsh criticism from Secretary Clinton and others,
because it felt that the United States was unfairly joining with the ASEAN countries to contain the rising
power from exercising its rightful claims, and that the
United States was meddling in regional affairs. On the
other hand, the outburst may be interpreted as China’s
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true intent―to use its economic might and growing
military to coerce the “smaller countries” to gain its
goals. While the majority of Asian nations welcome the
shift in U.S. forces, China and North Korea view it as
a threat to their national interests and security. China
consistently voices concerns about the United States
trying to contain it, but this shift was largely intended
as a signal to reassure allies of the U.S. commitment to
provide stability in the region.
Over the last 6 years, the United States has participated in the ADMM-Plus and the ARF in order to build
regional trust, cohesion, and civil-military cooperation
and integration. In 2015, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear
said that, “leveraging defense diplomacy to build
greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of
the road”52 would assist in reducing gaps and building trust. Participation in ASEAN-related forums augments the bilateral relationships that DoD maintains.
The DoD will seek to expand trilateral and quadrilateral defense discussions with key partners. ASEAN-centered relationships are of growing utility in a
region affected by frequent natural disasters, the threat
of terrorism, rival maritime claims, illegal fishing,
food security challenges, environmental degradation,
and other shared interests that require a multilateral
response. However, it must be inclusive of China, as
too much emphasis on force posture and alliance building to counter China is another unintended sign that
the U.S. strategy is strictly a counterbalance to China’s
growing power as opposed to a supportive peaceful
development. Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
characterizes China as self-isolationist. In his view, the
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Chinese are raising the barriers to working in unison
by “erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.”53
Renewed and modernized defense agreements with
the Philippines, Japan, and Australia allow forward
deployment of forces on a rotational basis. Moving forward, they will allow the military to respond quickly
to potential conflicts as well as to provide security in
the region and an increased number of combined partner exercises, and assure freedom of navigation and air
space.
The Obama administration has also expanded trilateral cooperation. Bush initiated the most productive
of these, the U.S.–Japan–Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. The Obama administration expanded
the cooperative reach through a U.S.–Japan–India
trilateral in 2015. Another trilateral dialogue formed
between Japan–India–Australia in 2015. This signals
the increased importance of various countries coordinating and cooperating on a range of security issues in
every configuration. The shift represents an elevated
number of joint exercises between allies as well as
bilateral China-U.S. cooperative maneuvers. The latter
consists mostly of military school visit exchanges, dialogues, and recently the inclusion of China in the multinational Rim of the Pacific exercise.
The increased multiple partner exercises assist in
mitigating the potential for miscalculations. In relation to the complicated territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, to which the United States is not a claimant, Secretary James Mattis recently said that, “these
territories which are contested need to be addressed
politically through a legal framework consistent with
international law.”54 This represents the long-standing
view of the administration to lead with diplomacy and
statecraft and use military hard power as a last resort.
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The presence of the U.S. military is itself a show of military diplomacy, with an aim toward protecting U.S.
interests, regional stability, and freedom of navigation.
It is doubtful that any parties want to choose between
the United States and China, and elevating diplomacy
across all levels of statecraft, including military, will
help to achieve stability.
A LOOK AHEAD TO THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION
Although the Trump administration has not yet
published a comprehensive foreign policy strategy,
there are signs that the President is placing some importance on Asia. In a press briefing, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Susan
A. Thornton clearly stated that, while the pivot or
rebalance is over, the new administration will remain
engaged and active in IAP as the region is very important to global economic prosperity and growth as well
as security. She said the U.S. policy approach seeks to
level the playing field for U.S. interests and promote
fair and balanced economic opportunities.55
Regarding China, Trump has significantly softened
the tough rhetoric of his campaign, during which he
threatened to name China as a “currency manipulator”
and stated that trade deals between the countries were
“lopsided” in China’s favor. As president-elect, Trump
accepted a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese
President Tsai Ing-wen. In an interview with The Wall
Street Journal, he said that the long-standing U.S. “OneChina policy” was negotiable.56 The policy remains
essentially as first articulated in a 1972 Shanghai Communiqué: “The United States acknowledges that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain
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there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.”57
Trump subsequently talked with Xi in February 2017
and acknowledged that he will honor the decades-long
U.S. “One China” policy.58
Meanwhile, Tillerson talked with the leaders of
Australia, Japan, and South Korea in February and
“reiterated the Administration’s intent to strengthen
our military alliances, our economic partnerships,
and our diplomatic cooperation.”59 In March, he met
with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the G20
Summit in Germany, urging Beijing “to help rein in
North Korea.”60 Tillerson also traveled to Japan, South
Korea, and China to continue discussions on dealing
with North Korea and negotiated an April 2017 meeting between Xi and Trump at Mar-a-Lago.61 This sends
a message that North Korea’s recent actions are a high
priority, and the United States will remain engaged in
the region.
After the heated debates and messages from the
campaign trail, it is imperative for the United States
to delineate a clear vision and strategy for the next 4
years. To assist in formulating strategies and policies
toward the IAP and globally, the Trump administration should nominate people to fill the multiple vacant
positions in State, DoD, and USAID. According to the
nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service, as of April
11, 2017, the White House formally nominated 24
people to fill 553 politically appointed positions across
all government agencies that require Senate approval.
Of the 24 nominations, 22 have been confirmed.62 The
administration would benefit from nominating people
with extensive Asia experience to fill the key positions that deal with this region, in particular to assist
with formulation of strategy and policy in accordance
with the new administration’s approach. This will also
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assist high-level decision-makers in the formulation
of a comprehensive, whole-of-government strategy
toward the IAP.
Another concern that will affect diplomatic efforts
is the President’s budget request. Asked how cuts to
the State Department budget might affect the U.S.
military and its activities around the globe, Office of
Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney
replied, “Make no mistake about it, this is a hardpower budget, not a soft-power budget. That is what
the president wanted, and that’s what we gave him.”63
The United States has one of the largest development
assistance programs in the world (roughly 25 billion in
absolute dollars), but one of the smallest as a share of
gross national income (.018 percent), according to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.64 Cuts to eliminate positions and support programs will drastically shift government efforts from a
whole-of-government balanced soft power approach
to an emphasis on use of military force: hard power.
The foreign assistance budget has historically received
bipartisan support. Senior Republican Senator Lindsay
Graham said the Trump budget is “dead on arrival”
and added that such drastic cuts would be “a disaster.”
Senator Marco Rubio had similar statements: “Foreign
Aid is not charity,” and it is “less than 1 percent of our
budget and critical to our national security.”65 Over 120
retired generals signed a letter urging Congress not to
drastically cut foreign assistance as proposed, since
“elevating and strengthening diplomacy and development alongside defense are critical to keeping America
safe.”66
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Diplomacy plays a key role in implementing foreign policy objectives across all agencies in the government and in the wise use of the military instrument as
a deterrent. Obama and his administration should be
lauded for increased travel to and consistent presence
in the IAP and for peacefully furthering bilateral and
multilateral relationships in the region. This all could
have been accomplished without the distraction of a
“pivot” that created confusion and left various partners around the world wondering if the United States
had the ability to respond to its security commitments worldwide. His use of a whole-of-government
approach and use of other soft power tools to prevent
the need for military confrontation is applauded, as is
his recognition of the requirement for active behindthe-scenes efforts to build diplomatic relations gradually. Obama’s inability to shepherd the TPP through
its ratification process, however, and the decision not
to participate in and to lobby allies against the AIIB
will continue to have negative effects on the economic
front.
While the balance between the roles of diplomatic
and military power under the Obama administration
seemed right for the situation, the rising tensions in
the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula may
demand an adjustment. Based on lessons learned, the
following are recommendations to continue to support
U.S. interests in the region.
• Continue face-to-face high-level (Presidential
and Cabinet-level) exchanges through summits,
dialogues, and participation in multilateral
forums.
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• Join the AIIB as a member and support efforts
through coordinated projects with the World
Bank and ADB.
• After pulling out of the TPP, quickly negotiate
and enter into bilateral or multilateral trade
deals that support U.S. economic prosperity and
business opportunities abroad. Trump stated
his preference for bilateral trade deals. However, consideration should be given to multilateral trade deals that support his economic
agenda.
• Use various mediums to relay a consistent U.S.
policy with explanations to the public as to its
importance.
• Nominate personnel with appropriate regional
experience to fill key positions within State,
USAID, and DoD in order to assist with policy
formulation and ensure implementation of the
policy in line with the new administration’s
priorities.
• Refrain from deep budget cuts in the foreign
assistance that allows State and USAID to
deliver diplomatic and development exertions required to achieving national security
objectives.
Formulation and articulation of strategy is key to
any administration. While Obama had a sound strategy, the commotion in naming it as a pivot or rebalance detracted from the intended outcomes. The
administration’s missteps in messaging combined
with the inability to implement the economic portion
of the rebalance were damaging. However, the new
administration received a stronger regional security
architecture to assist with potential issues with North
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Korea and the South China Sea. The Trump administration should draw on mistakes and successes not
only from the Obama administration, but also from all
previous administrations. Recent years indicate that a
whole-of-government approach, led by soft power first
and hard power as a last resort, will yield dividends―
because no one “wins” because of a war.
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